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Entrepreneurship is viewed as a pertinent vehicle for economic growth, development, 
employment creation and income generation (entrepreneurial effects). Small-scale, micro and 
medium enterprises (SMMEs) are the dominant entrepreneurial activity in Africa, but less 
than 1% of these SMMEs grow to ten or more employees. A lack of homogeneity among 
SMMEs, making it difficult for common policies to be effective is the problem most often 
identified as the cause of this lack of growth. In the period 1997 to 2008, Zimbabwe 
experienced an economic meltdown which plunged many citizens into poverty.  On the other 
hand, a steep growth in micro and small-scale enterprises (MSEs) was also observed in both 
formal and informal sectors. Following the meltdown these MSEs are still operational but 
with minimal contribution to the recovery of the economy.  This thesis looked at the micro 
and macro aspects of micro and small-scale entrepreneurship in Zimbabwe in the wake of the 
economic meltdown.  
 
At the macro level, the objective was to develop a model that best describes the relationship 
between the economic meltdown and the growth of micro and small-scale enterprises (MSEs) 
in Zimbabwe, by testing for the presence of refugee effects. Understanding the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and key macroeconomic growth indicators is critical for generating 
growth and development in both a normal, and a meltdown economy.  Using annual data 
from 1980 to 2010, a multivariate Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) was run, with the 
total number of MSEs, unemployment rate, inflation rate, liquidity (proxied by money 
supply) and real GDP as the dependent variables. The main findings of this study indicate the 
presence of refugee effects from unemployment, albeit minimal, and that the growth in MSEs 
was significant because of the shortage of liquidity. The relationship between unemployment 
and entrepreneurship is not linear, but squared and positive in both instances. 
 
At the micro level, three objectives underpinned this study. The first objective was to 
examine whether there were differences in entrepreneurial attributes between formal sector 
and informal sector firms, using descriptive statistics and non-parametric t-tests. The second 
objective was to assess the nature of the growth constraints of existing MSEs (formal and 
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informal), and compare them across the two sectors.  The constraints were examined from 
two sources: internal and external.  The methodology used in this case was factor analysis 
and principal component analysis.  On the basis of the constraints classifications generated 
from principal component analysis, a regression was done to test whether the constraints are 
related to the willingness to formalise by informal MSEs. The contribution of need for 
achievement (N-Ach) on willingness to formalise was also tested in a logistic regression.  
 
Relevant data for the micro level analysis was collected by means of a survey in Harare, 
Zimbabwe. Using a questionnaire, 150 MSEs operating in both formal and informal sectors 
were interviewed. The questionnaire had 3 sections: the first section characterised the MSEs; 
the second section looked at the growth constraints of the MSEs and last section measured 
the need for achievement (N-Ach) of the business owner, using the Mehrabian scale of 
achieving tendency. The data collected was analysed using SPSS and STATA. 
 
 The main findings were that the characteristics of the MSEs in the formal sector are different 
to those of the informal sector. Formal sectors identified internal factors as hindering the 
growth of their business more than the external factors, whereas the informal MSEs identified 
more external factors as constraints to their growth. From the logistic regression analysis, 
‘regulatory factors’ and ‘technology factors’ were found to have a significant impact on the 
willingness by informal MSEs to formalise their business. Improving N-Ach may 
significantly decrease the odds of the informal MSEs formalising their businesses. 
 
The study concluded that MSE growth was in response to the economic meltdown, being 
driven by the refugee effects from a need for liquidity and rising unemployment.  Secondly, 
uniform policies for MSEs in formal and informal sectors fail to address their individual 
growth needs because of the differences in the dynamics of entrepreneurs operating in the 
formal sector and informal sector. Thirdly the odds of willingness to formalise by informal 
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1.1 Background Information 
Zimbabwe, once the bread basket of the Southern African Development Committee (SADC) 
region, turned in the last 10 or so years, into a country of starving people and political 
conflict. Ever since late 1996, the Zimbabwean economy has been going downhill. This 
economic fall was characterized by high levels of poverty, fuel shortages, and hunger (to the 
extent that many had to rely on wild fruits for survival) (Robertson, 2006). Use of high 
denomination currency notes, deteriorating infrastructure, absence of teachers in learning 
institutions due to low salaries, empty shelves in the supermarkets, untreated water systems, 
outbreak of disease, such as cholera, the closure of big hospitals and the absence of the rule of 
law had all become part of day to day life, which together with the printing and supplying of 
excess money into the economy, caused inflation to keep rising (Moss, 2007). These were the 
effects of the economic meltdown that hit Zimbabwe between 1997 and 2008. The worst was 
experienced in 2008 when inflation reached a record high 14,1 billion %, and unemployment 
grew to 80% (CIA factbook, 2012). Currently, and post meltdown, unemployment is still 
above 90%, and the majority of the citizens are still struggling to make ends meet (World 
Bank Data, 2013).  
 
Complementing the rising inflation was a rise in micro and small scale entrepreneurial 
activity especially in the informal sector. During the economic meltdown the informal sector 
grew faster than the formal sector, housing approximately 3 million people compared to 1.3 
million in the formal sector as of June 2005 (Coltart, 2008). In this study, informalisation is 
defined as any form of economic activity that is not recorded in the official statistics, or does 
not comply with government regulations. Lack of barriers to entry into this sector and the 
drive for tax evasion are among the reasons why most people resort to the informal sector 
(Gerxhani, 2004; Ubogu, Laah, Udemezue and Bako, 2011). The minimal regulations which 
govern operations in the informal sector make it an easier option especially for those people 
who fail to enter the formal sector.  
 
The sudden growth in the number of informal enterprises during the economic meltdown was 




considerable pedestrian congestion.  For those who were still formally employed during the 
meltdown period, the work place proved a favourable platform for their business. One usually 
opted to stay employed in order to utilize company resources such as telephones, office space, 
stationery, a car and fuel to run errands. The result was a steep growth in micro and small-
scale enterprises (MSEs).  
 
The steep growth in micro and small-scale enterprises (MSEs) especially during the 
meltdown period came with its own economic challenges, as most of these MSEs in 
Zimbabwe are housed in the informal sector and their benefits to the economy are measured 
as close to nil. A lot of the activities in the informal sector can benefit the economy in the 
recovery process, but because they are not captured in the country’s records, the economy 
fails to benefit from them. In order for the entrepreneurial effects to be realised, it is important 
that the entrepreneurial activity in Zimbabwe be formalised. There is a need for the informal 
MSEs to grow from being places of survival to being part of the formal economy and 
contribute to the country’s development. The informal sector cannot be ignored as it houses 
the greater percentage of the country’s labour force (Coltart, 2008). The Zimbabwean 
government has already taken steps towards the regularization of the informal sector by 
creating structures that support the sector, for example a ministry responsible for the informal 
sector and a Fund for micro and small-scale businesses have been established in 2010 
(Chigwenya and Mudzengerere, 2013). However, recent evidence suggests that the 
government is struggling to formalise the informal sector possibly because the sector is not 
properly regularised and there is only a vague understanding of the actual needs of the 
entrepreneurs in this sector (NewZimbabwe.com, 2014). A common policy approach has 
always been adopted without considering that the formal and informal sectors are structured 
differently. There is a need to understand the characteristics of the informal sector and how it 
is formed before providing incentives to boost enterprise development. 
 
Literature categorises the reasons for informalisation into three: for economic reasons; or 
non-economic reasons; or a combination of both (Van Rooyen, 1990). The economic reasons 
are driven by economic recessions which cause stagnation, depreciation of assets and a rise in 
unemployment, and eventually stimulate informal activities (Gerxhani, 2004). These to some 
extent, explain the story in Zimbabwe. Other economic reasons that are cited in the literature 
are low industrialisation and productivity, surplus labour in the economy, low technology and 
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the intensive use of cheap unskilled and semi-skilled labour (Gerxhani, 2004:282). These 
factors are common in most developing countries where there is a high presence of 
underutilisation of skilled labour and informal sector activities.  
 
On the other hand, the non-economic factors are greatly influenced by the role of the ‘state’1 
in overcoming structural barriers and providing opportunities for informalisation (Van 
Rooyen, 1990).  Non-economic factors include financial pressures, institutional constraints 
(tax evasions and loan requirements), over regulation of the market sector, limited skills or 
education, poor living situations, poor environment, cultural traditions, high levels of 
corruption, and geographical factors (Gerxhani, 2004). Once a government loses the trust of 
its people with respect to supporting non-economic factors, the citizens will resort to the 
informal sector for survival, and one way to gain back the trust is by addressing the concerns 
of the entrepreneurs in the informal sector and encouraging them to revert to the formal sector 
(Gerxhani, 2004; Preston-Whyte and Rogerson, 1991). 
 
Literature also shows that the same economic and non-economic factors that influence 
informalisation also impact on the growth of business, but is labelled differently as internal 
and external factors (Mahadea and Pillay, 2008). Internal factors are those aspects of the 
business that the owner has control over, like access to finance, human resources and 
management skills, and innovation and technology adoption. The entrepreneur has control 
over access to finance as his or her individual traits will determine his capabilities for 
obtaining a loan from financial institutions. Someone with good entrepreneurial abilities and 
leadership skills, or a good track record compared with someone who lacks these attributes, 
will easily access finance from the financial institutions (Lucas, 1978; Mahadea and Pillay, 
2008; Parker, 2009).  
 
On the other hand, external factors are independent of the entrepreneurs’ influence. These are 
mainly controlled by the government or policy makers. These factors include legal 
restrictions, such as taxation, licensing and formalisation, socio-economic conditions, such as 
hyperinflation, political instability and corruption, and reliability of infrastructure (Dheher 
and Gassebner, 2007). These external factors are usually in favour of the formal sector, 
1 State refers to the government 
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although they tend to increase transaction costs (Mahadea, 1997). Where tax rates are very 
high, there is likely to be a migration of entrepreneurs to the uncontrolled informal sector 
(Dheher and Gassebner, 2007). By addressing the key internal and external factors for each 
sector, the entrepreneurs in both sectors have a potential to grow and contribute to 
Zimbabwe’s economic recovery plan. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Following the economic meltdown, the government of Zimbabwe embarked on a number of 
policies targeted at supporting entrepreneurial development as a way to boost economic 
recovery and growth. The importance of entrepreneurship in economic growth through 
employment creation and income generation, especially micro and small-scale 
entrepreneurship, has been well researched for normal economies, and is popular among 
policy makers in first world nations (Deakins and Freel, 2012). Of key importance is the 
“entrepreneurial effect,” where an increase in entrepreneurial activity is associated with a 
decrease in unemployment, which subsequently contributes to economic growth. However, 
the challenge in most developing countries and countries going through a crisis has been 
where the “refugee effect,” associated with micro and small-scale entrepreneurship, dominates 
the “entrepreneurial effect”. The refugee effect refers to an increase in entrepreneurial activity 
being used as a survival platform because of an absence of other options or avenues to 
generate income2. The higher the degree of refugee effect over entrepreneurial effect makes 
entrepreneurial activity problematic, as the economic benefits of cutting down unemployment 
or generating income will not be realised. 
 
Studies that have examined the entrepreneurial and refugee effects have found that the 
entrepreneurial effect definitely occurs in different environments (Audretsch, Carree and 
Thurik, 2001; Thurik, Carree, Van Stel and Audretsch, 2008; Ghavidel, Farjadi and 
Mohammadpour, 2011). These studies, from both developed and developing nations, have 
ascertained the negative relationship between entrepreneurship and unemployment; as 
entrepreneurial activity increases unemployment decreases. However, there is a lot of 
ambiguity around the refugee effects.  Both positive and negative relationships have been 
2 Entrepreneurial effect and refugee effect works in opposite directions. Where entrepreneurial activity reduces 
unemployment (negative relationship) it is referred to as entrepreneurial effects. On the other hand, when the 




                                                 
noted with refugee effects, and the literature is still not conclusive on the impact of 
unemployment on entrepreneurship. Thurik et al., (2008), for example, found that 
unemployment is positively associated with new business start-ups, but Audretsch and Fritsch 
(1994) found a negative relationship, and Carree, Van Stel, Thurik and Wennekers (2002) 
found no statistically significant relationship between the two at all. From the previous 
findings, it is possible that unemployment might not be the only source of the refugee effect; 
hence it is important to establish the causes of the refugee effect when working with 
economies that are recovering from some crisis, especially if promoting entrepreneurial 
activity is part of a recovery plan. This study intends to test the sources of the refugee effect 
in Zimbabwe, especially during the meltdown. By identifying the sources of refugee effects, 
policies to control them can then be recommended, and in so doing enhance the 
entrepreneurial effects. 
 
Secondly, the 21st century came with a worldwide campaign to support the informal sector, 
deviating from the traditional view which identified the informal sector as a disruption. There 
are those who believe that the informal sector is important as an avenue for apprenticeship 
before moving into the formal sector (Newadi and Pietersen, 2008: 315). The argument here 
is that entrepreneurship in the informal sector should be supported as it supplies the building 
blocks or training ground for successful entrepreneurs in the formal sector. The informal 
sector should be embraced as a necessary and important part of the economy and should 
receive the same privileges and support as the formal sector. This study will show that a 
“common-policy approach” when addressing issues concerning formal and informal 
entrepreneurs is not beneficial to the economy and will only encourage further growth of the 
informal sector with minimal benefit to the economy. The concerns of the formal sector 
should be addressed separately from those of the entrepreneurs operating in the informal 
sector and at the same time providing a channel that encourages the informal sector 
entrepreneurs to grow and move into the formal sector. 
 
The major challenge faced by informal sector traders is the regulatory framework which 
distinguishes it from the formal sector and hinders development and growth (Deakins and 
Freel, 2012). As a result, it is seen as a ‘fall back’ platform with nothing permanent being 
expected to come from it. Evidence from some studies, especially those looking at African 
countries, suggests that there are some entrepreneurs who have been operating in the informal 
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sector for some time and have no intention of moving to the formal sector (Newadi and 
Pietersen, 2008). Major reasons for the hostility towards formalization of their enterprises are 
the high costs of formalization, and lack of incentives for formalizing (Ishengoma and 
Kappel, 2006). Many researchers are of the view that the only way the informal sector can be 
formalized is if there is deregulation of the market, greater private property rights and the 
abolishment of state regulations like licenses and taxation (Gerxhani, 2004; Welsh, 2005). 
 
Deregulation of the market, greater private property rights and the abolishment of state 
regulations will definitely help alleviate the regulatory problems faced by individuals 
operating in the informal sector. However, research from Nigeria suggests that the problems 
in the informal sector have more to do with a lack of recognition and acceptance of the sector 
by the government and policy makers, than in regulatory needs (Chikuezi, 2010). All the 
other challenges faced by informal traders emanate from the lack of recognition by their 
government. There are some African governments who still believe that the informal sector is 
a disruption to economic development, hence should be done away with. Some governments 
keep trying to eliminate this sector but evidence from other countries show that it is a sector 
which will always exist. For example, in 2002 the Zimbabwean government undertook a 
cleanup campaign and destroyed all unlicensed business shelters, enforcing a ban on street 
vending. This did not stop informal trading, even though traders now pay a small fee to the 
municipality for the market sites that were erected. As long as the formal sector fails to grow, 
the informal sector will continue to grow as the labor force grows (Chikuezi, 2010). 
Alternatively, instead of wasting resources fighting the informal sector, the same resources 
could be used to provide incentives for informal entrepreneurs to formalize their businesses.  
 
Newadi and Pietersen (2008) note that in developing countries the informal sector tends to 
encounter many constraints. These include low returns, and an absence of security which 
minimizes both growth and the anticipated benefits of entrepreneurship, such as poverty 
alleviation and reduced unemployment. This could be the reason why some African 
governments do not recognise the informal sector; believing it to be unnecessary, illegal and a 
disruption to the economy. However, if the government provides incentives to encourage 




Addressing the economic and non-economic factors can possibly contribute to improving 
entrepreneurial activity and the willingness of the informal sector enterprises to formalise. 
Another aspect which hasn’t been researched extensively is the role of psychological traits, 
like the need for achievement when making decisions on growing or formalising a business. 
Need for Achievement (N-Ach) refers to the desire for accomplishment or an inner urge to 
improve (McClelland, 1961). Someone with a higher N-Ach has a long term vision for his or 
her business and will put more energy into making it successful. Research is needed to 
investigate the contribution of the internal and external factors to the slow growth in MSEs in 
the two sectors (formal and informal), and also analyse how the growth constraints affect the 
willingness by informal entrepreneurs to formalise their businesses. The study will also test 
the application or relevance of David McClelland’s concept of the need for achievement (N-
Ach), to the willingness to formalise by informal sector entrepreneurs. N-Ach has been found 
to contribute significantly to business success, but there is little research considering its 
contribution to the choice between operating in the formal or informal sector by micro and 
small-scale entrepreneurs (McClelland, 1961; Mahadea, 1994; Shane 2003). This study will 
test whether the enhancement of N-Ach levels could prompt the informal business owners to 
formalise their businesses.  
 
1.3 Goals of the Study 
The main goal of the study is twofold.  Firstly, there is the macro aspect, which by testing the 
sources of the refugee effect investigates the relationship between growth in MSEs and the 
economic meltdown. Secondly, at micro level the study investigates whether ‘common policy 
approach’ could work when addressing growth concerns of MSEs in both the formal and 
informal sectors in Zimbabwe. 
 
1.4 Specific Objectives at macro level are: 
(i) To identify the causes and characteristics of the economic meltdown in Zimbabwe 
during the period 1980-2010. 
(ii) To determine the extent to which the fall in GDP has contributed to the growth in 
MSEs. 
(iii)To determine the extent to which the rise in unemployment has contributed to the 
growth in the number of MSEs. 
(iv) To determine the extent to which the rise in inflation has contributed to the growth in 
7 
 
the number of MSEs. 
(v) To determine the extent to which liquidity shortages have contributed to the growth in 
the number of MSEs. 
 
1.5 Specific Objectives at micro level are: 
(i) To characterise the MSEs in the informal sector and compare them to those in the 
formal sector. 
(ii) To examine the growth constraints of the MSEs in the formal sector and compare 
them to those in the informal sector. 
(iii)To assess the extent to which the growth constraints influence the willingness to 
formalise by informal sector entrepreneurs. 
(iv) To compare the N-Ach level of entrepreneurs in the MSEs in the formal sector with 
those of the entrepreneurs in the informal sector. 
(v) To test the significance of N-Ach in the willingness to formalise by informal 
entrepreneurs. 
(vi) To suggest strategies or approaches to help expand the MSEs in both the formal and 
informal sector and enhance their contribution to the economy through policy 
recommendations. 
 
1.6 Justification for the Study 
Coming from a state of economic meltdown and political instability during the period 1999-
2008, it is likely that it will take a few years before the Zimbabwean economy can provide 
employment for its people. One way to ensure human survival with minimal crime is to 
encourage the growth and development of MSEs, both in the formal and informal sectors. 
MSEs are definitely a quick way to earn an income and bring food to the table, and therefore 
should be encouraged. This study will make some policy recommendations that will address 
the importance of MSEs in Zimbabwe’s road to recovery from the effects of the economic 
meltdown. 
 
In Zimbabwean literature, it is felt that a gap exists on MSEs operating in the informal sector 
and their importance in the fight against unemployment and poverty alleviation during the 
country’s economic meltdown. The MSEs are the highest employers, not only in Zimbabwe, 
but also in most developing countries and yet they are not adequately recognised or supported 
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by their own governments. As unemployment and poverty keep rising, year in year out, MSEs 
can be the only solution and there is a need to ensure that something is done to improve these 
businesses and make them more profitable.  
 
Most countries in sub-Saharan Africa support micro and formal ventures, with little support 
being directed towards the informal sector, and yet it is this sector which houses the greater 
percentage of the labour force. Mostly it is the unemployed, retrenched or even retired who 
use the informal sector as a survival platform. Even those who are classified as poor are found 
in the informal sector, trying to salvage something for their families. Unless the government 
addresses the limitations of informal sector firms, and empowers the individuals who operate 
them, the fight to alleviate poverty and create employment will remain a losing battle. 
 
This study centres on the activities of an abnormal time; that of the economic meltdown in 
Zimbabwe. Most, if not all previous studies on MSEs were done in normal times, with no 
extremes. As this study focuses on micro and small firm entrepreneurship in a meltdown 
situation in Zimbabwe, it will definitely be a new addition to the existing literature. In this 
study, we will also look at the importance of N-Ach in business decisions. Many studies have 
found a strong relationship between N-Ach and business performance. Hence, there is a need 
to examine how the N-Ach of the MSEs relates to their choice of where to operate - either in 
the formal or informal sector; and whether N-Ach can be used to motivate MSEs to move 
from the informal to the formal sector. 
 
1.7 Limitations of the Study 
The main challenges for the study were limited financial resources and absence of 
consolidated secondary data set. The study involved some travelling to the country of study as 
well as recruitment and training of enumerators to help with data collection. As a result, a 
smaller sample targeting 150 firms was then used for micro analysis. Data for the macro 
analysis was sourced from published and unpublished sources from World Bank Data, 






THE ZIMBABWEAN ECONOMY: 1980-2012 
2.1 Introduction 
After close to two decades of economic problems, the Zimbabwean economy is now growing. 
In 2009, the country recorded a real growth rate of 5.8%, followed by 8.1% in 2010, 9.3% in 
2011 and 5% in 2012 (Worldbank Data, 2013). Despite the positive real growth rate, the 
country still has a long way to go on its road to recovery from the economic meltdown 
experienced over the period 1997 to 2008. Economic problems, like political instability, large 
external debt, insufficient formal employment, and retarded infrastructure development, 
shortage of water and electricity and regulatory deficiencies are among the critical factors that 
the current government needs to address for Zimbabwe to experience sustainable growth and 
development.  
 
The deterioration of the economy, which led to the economic meltdown, is believed to have 
started in 1997 when the country was experiencing the aftermath of the structural reform 
programme that was implemented in 1991 (Coltart, 2008). The situation was worsened by the 
Zimbabwean army’s involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) war 
(1998-2002), which drained the economy’s resources, and contributed to high budget deficits 
(Coltart, 2008). The subsequent controversial land reform programme coupled with repeated 
devaluations of the Zimbabwean dollar and printing money by the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe, all contributed to the economic meltdown (Matandirani, 2011). The formation of 
the Unity government in February 2009 was the turning point for the Zimbabwean economy. 
Although structural weaknesses still existed in the economy, the formation the Unity 
government brought hope to many Zimbabweans. This chapter will take us through the 
journey of the Zimbabwean economy since attainment of independence in 1980. It consists of 
five main parts: the first section discusses the Zimbabwean economy from 1980 to 1996; the 
second section discusses the economic policies implemented in Zimbabwe since 1991; the 
third section looks at the Zimbabwean economy over the period 1997-2008; the fourth section 
looks at the post economic meltdown period, 2009 to date; and the last section discusses the 




2.2 The Economy: 1980-1996 
2.2.1 Independence and its promises 
After many years of British colonial rule, the Lancaster House Constitutional Conference held 
between September-December 1979 and chaired by Lord Carrington, the British Secretary of 
State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs gave birth to the new Zimbabwe in 1980. After 
independence, the new government was made up of 80% black Zimbabweans and 20% 
whites. It inherited an industrialized and diversified economy with manufacturing, hotel and 
restaurants and agricultural and forestry sectors contributing the most to the economy (see 
figure 1 below) (Robertson, 2006). The new government promised “growth with equity,” 
mainly aimed at redistributing wealth to the vulnerable and underprivileged. 
 
Figure 1: Percentage distribution of GDP by industry, 1985-1994 
 
Source: Authors own graph using data from Zimbabwe Statistical Yearbook, 1998 
 
Between 1985 and 1990, the manufacturing sector contributed the most to GDP (about 
20.5%), followed by the agricultural and mining sectors (both with an average of 
approximately 15%). The colonial government developed a lot of processing plants for the 
agricultural commodities that were being produced in the country. These included milling 
companies (e.g. National foods), packaging (e.g. Cairns), processing (e.g. Tanganda Tea, 


































strong forward-backward linkage between the agricultural sector and the manufacturing 
industry. The growth of the agricultural sector meant the growth of the manufacturing sector 
and vice versa (Musuna and Muchapondwa, 2008).  
 
Although the first ten years after independence were challenging, the new government 
managed to keep the economy growing. What was driving the new government was the 
eagerness to ensure equality for all. Priority was given towards improving the education 
sector, health sector and rural infrastructure development, and the new government managed 
to achieve this in the first 5 years of office. The economy was also doing especially well in 
the manufacturing and agricultural sector. Figure 2, below, shows the contribution of the 
agricultural sector to economic growth between 1980 and 1996. In 1985 the agricultural 
sector recorded a growth rate of about 24%, with the highest (29%), recorded in 1993. 
Although the real agricultural GDP growth rates show a negative trend over the period 1980 – 
1996, it is important to note that there was positive economic growth in most years between 
1980 and 1996 (see figure 3 below). The data in figure 2 is highly volatile with major troughs 
in 1983 (-18%), 1986 (-10%), 1992 (-24%) and 1995 (-9%). These were the drought years 
and the harvests in these years were poor. Since agriculture was one of the biggest 
contributors to GDP, any slight change in factors that determine agricultural production, like 
rainfall, could impact on GDP. 
 
Figure 2: Real agricultural GDP growth rates, 1980-1996 
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Figure 3: GDP growth rates (%), 1980-1996 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Worldbank Data, 2012 
 
The drought periods also explain the troughs in GDP growth rates as shown in figure 3. The 
average economic growth during the period 1980-1996 was 4.5% (Worldbank Data, 2013). 
The highest economic growth of 14.4% was experienced in 1980, and thereafter growth has 
been trending downwards, although most years recorded a positive growth rate. As the 
economy was growing, inflation was also trending slowly upwards (see figure 4 below). 
 
Figure 4: Year on Year Inflation, 1980-1996 
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Year on year inflation rose steadily between 1980 and 1995, from 5.4% to 22.6%, averaging 
around 15%. However, the drought years (1983, 1986, 1992 and 1995) also caused some 
peaks with the highest inflation being registered in 1992, where the inflation rate was 42% 
(see figure 4 above). In 1991, Zimbabwe embarked on an Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP), the effects of which caused inflation to rise steeply between 1992 and 
19953. Kapoor, Mugwara and Chidavaenzi (1997) believe that the Zimbabwean government 
failed to complement structural reforms with fiscal restraint, and this resulted in high 
domestic rates of interest and high inflation as well as a growing domestic debt burden (see 
figure 5 below), that consequently hindered the growth of the private sector. 
 
2.2.2 Public Debt 
The government was committed to improving the welfare of the Zimbabwean population 
through free health and free education for the vulnerable and under privileged; however these 
activities were being run on borrowed funds. Between 1980 and 1996, total real debt rose 
from US$287.44 million to US$1,338.18 million, with external debt rising from US$785 
million to US$4 billion 984 million in 1996, (see figure 5 and 6 below) (Zimbabwe Statistical 
Yearbook, 1997; World Bank Data, 2014). Most of the debt in 1980 was inherited from the 
Ian Smith regime, borrowed to finance the civil war (Jones, 2011).  Between 1980 and 1996, 
the Zimbabwean government borrowed US$4,20 billion to fund their expenditure in the 
reconstruction projects and managed to payback an average of US$450 million each year. The 
devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar in 2006 and 2008 also forced the government to 
borrow more from the international community, and so create more debt.   On average 30% 
of the country’s exports as well as 25% of government’s revenue were used to pay the debt, 
causing a huge outflow of foreign exchange and resources (Jones, 2011). Throughout the 
1980s, the Zimbabwean government borrowed from international lenders in order to finance 
various developmental projects that they embarked on post-independence, as well as use the 





3 The structural reform programs that were implemented in Zimbabwe are discussed in section 3.2.7 Economic 
Policies since 1991. 
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Figure 5: Real Public Debt, 1980-1996 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Zimbabwe Statistical Yearbook, 1997. 
 
 
Figure 6: Zimbabwe external debt and repayment, 1980-1996 
 
Author’s own graph using data from World Databank; International Debt Statistics, 2014. 
 
Total real debt has been on the rise ever since, and to date it is still a major hindrance to 
economic development in Zimbabwe. Although the ruling government tried to contain real 
debt within reasonable amounts between 1980 and 1990, it was still growing (see figure 5 
above). Domestic real debt was always above external real debt between 1980 and 1991 but 
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when more money was borrowed to finance the 5 year structural adjustment programme 
(ESAP) that was implemented from 1991-1995 (Kapoor, Mugwara, Chidavaenzi , 1997) 
(more details on the structural reforms in section 2.3). Among the core objectives of the 
programme was black empowerment (through entrepreneurship) and trade liberalization. 
 
2.2.3 Entrepreneurship 
The history of small-scale enterprise in Zimbabwe dates back to the colonial era, between 
1888 and 1979, where blacks engaged more in primary industry activities like farming, 
mining, pottery and iron smiting (Rukuni, Eicher and Taruvinga, 2006). During the same era, 
whites operated in the secondary and tertiary industries being protected from any competition 
from the blacks by policies such as the Land Husbandry Act of 1951, which barred Africans 
from owning more than 5 cattles, and the Tribal Trust Land Act of 1965, which restricted 
land ownership by blacks to communal areas only (Rukuni et. al, 2006). As a result, the 
blacks were restricted to running small businesses, being peasants in reserves or being 
mineworkers (Wild, 1997).  
 
There were laws and regulations which also hindered the growth and expansion of the small 
businesses that were owned by blacks. For example, they could not freely market their maize 
and the market prices for produce from black farmers were ridiculously low (Rukuni et al., 
2006). For this reason, the black farmers could not become commercial farmers. On the 
contrary, white settlers in Zimbabwe were supported financially by the state and were given 
favourable prices for their crops by the marketing boards (Rukuni et al, 2006). The harsh 
environment made it unfavourable for black entrepreneurs in Zimbabwe to grow their 
businesses; therefore they remained stuck as subsistence entrepreneurs,4 and this is still the 
case for most black entrepreneurs in other African countries (Wild, 1997). Wild (1997) argues 
that delays in the development of African entrepreneurship, specifically in colonial 
Zimbabwe, were a result of the barriers to an accumulation of capital. 
 
The coming of independence saw the removal of colonial laws and regulations that forbid 
black businessmen accessing capital and markets. Black entrepreneurs hoped that the 
government would support them with credit allocations, import licenses and foreign currency 
4  Subsistence entrepreneurs seek profits, but do so in order to support a family. Proceeds are spent on day to day expenses 
rather than being used for firm growth. 
16 
 
                                                 
allocations. However, the much anticipated price controls in retail and transport, difficulties 
in obtaining bank loans, government bureaucracy, scarcity of goods and the reduced 
purchasing power of consumers, all worked against the growth of black entrepreneurs in 
Zimbabwe (Wild, 1997). 
 
After the attainment of independence in 1980, the black entrepreneurs who had established 
themselves during the colonial era, felt marginalized because the government failed to 
redistribute wealth (land and capital) to them (Wild, 1997). Lack of capital meant the black 
entrepreneurs could not grow their businesses, and therefore they remained small scale 
entrepreneurs. Failure by the government to induce private investment and to create private 
employment also worsened the situation to the extent that investment fell to its lowest since 
the Second World War in 1989 and so did employment. By 1991, a fifth of the adult 
population of Zimbabweans were employed in the informal sector (Wild, 1997). 
 
The new black government that came into power in 1980 advocated for a socialist state, 
hence it pursued policies that fostered state control of the private sector. Due to corrupt 
tendencies, the political elite manipulated the fruits of independence to their advantage. 
Instead of encouraging the development of new entrepreneurs, the politicians used their 
political influence to expand their own private businesses. Wild (1997) identified this 
development as the rise of ‘clientelistic capitalism’5 in Zimbabwe, a move away from the 
socialism which was preached at independence. As Lord Acton, the English historian wrote 
“Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely….” - this was the 
manifestation of Wild’s words in post-independent Zimbabwe. The political elite used their 
power to create clientele networks for their business in Zimbabwe by closing any possible 
avenues for emerging entrepreneurs. The result was a growth in informal micro-enterprises. 
In 1991 there were about 845 000 micro-enterprises operating in the informal sector, 
employing about 30% more labour than in the formal sector in Zimbabwe (Kapoor et al., 
1997). This sector continued to blossom and grow as more and more people looked for means 
of making a living in informal activities after becoming victims of the economic structural 
reform programmes being implemented during the period 1991-1995 (Kapoor et al., 1997).  
5  This economy is characterized with money, political power and social connections. 
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2.2.4 Land redistribution 
The Zimbabwean government embarked on a policy of land redistribution soon after 
independence in 1980. The drive for land redistribution was to ensure equal distribution of 
land between the whites and blacks in the 5 natural regions that make up the agro-ecological 
zones in Zimbabwe (Rukuni et al., 2006). The natural regions in Zimbabwe are based on soil 
type, rainfall and climatic conditions (see table 1 below). Of the five regions, regions 1-3 are 
the most favourable ones. They are suitable for most crops and receive enough rainfall for full 
maturity of crops. Besides crop production, animal husbandry is also suitable for these 
regions. 




Specialised and Diversified Farming 
- Receives above 1050mm of rain per year. 
- Receives some form of precipitation all 
year round. 
- Less than 2% of the total area of 
Zimbabwe 
- Suitable for afforestation, production of 





- Receives between 750-1000mm of rain 
per year. 
- Short rainy seasons. 
- 15% of total area of Zimbabwe. 






- Receives 650-800mm of rain per year. 
- Experiences severe mid-season dry spells. 
- 19% of total area of Zimbabwe. 
- Suitable for livestock production, fodder 






- Receives 450-650mm of rain per year. 
- Experiences seasonal droughts and severe 
dry spells during rainy season. 
- 38% of total area of Zimbabwe. 
- Suitable for livestock production and 







- Total rain received annually is too low for 
production of even drought resistant 
crops. 
- 27% of total area of Zimbabwe. 
- Suitable for cattle ranching or game 
ranching. 
Source: Author’s own table using data from Rukuni et al. (2006). 
 
At independence, the white commercial farmers “held title to about 51% of the land outside 
urban areas and national parks (44% of the total land area of Zimbabwe) with farms ranging 
from 500 to 2000 ha in size, and mostly in the better ecological zones (natural regions I, II 
and III)” (Musuna and Muchapondwa, 2008:11). Before independence, the blacks stayed in 
the Tribal Trust Lands which were in Regions 4 and 5 of the agro-ecological regions (Rukuni 
et al., 2006). As the liberation struggle was all about fighting for the land, independence 
meant moving to the fertile lands that were previously occupied by the white settlers. The 
land redistribution was to be done on a willing-buyer, willing-seller basis according to the 
Lancaster Agreement. America and Britain offered to sponsor resettlement by providing the 
money which was going to be used to compensate those farmers who were willing to sell 
their land. The first phase, which commenced in 1980 and lasted until 1986, was considered 
successful but the second phase (1986-1996) did not progress as smoothly as planned (Rukuni 
et al., 2006). 
 
The second phase resettled 70 000 families on 8.5 million ha of land instead of the targeted 
162,000 households (Moore, 2001). A major problem, as pointed out by the government, was 
the failure of the British government to honour their promise of financing the land 
redistribution (Rukuni et al., 2006). As a result, the government took things into their own 
hands and started compulsory acquisition. These acquisitions were meant to force the white 
farmers with more fertile arable land to sell part of their land to the government, and the 
redistribution was to be carried out within a specified period using funds from the IMF 







Figure 7: Share of total land in regions 1-3 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Zimbabwe Statistical Yearbook, (1997). 
 
74% of all communal land is in Region 4 and 5; 
44% of all small scale commercial land is in region 4 and 5; 
51% of all large scale commercial land is in Region 1-3; 
63% of all resettlement land is in region 1-3. 
 
In 1997, about 51.4% of Zimbabwe’s population (about 5.5 million people) lived on 
communal lands. There were 5100 large scale commercial farms and 9650 small-scale 
commercial farms in 1997, occupying 50% of the total land in Zimbabwe (62934 sq.km and 
7952 sq.km respectively) ( Zimbabwe Statistical yearbook, 1997). The white farmers who 
volunteered to sell land on willing-buyer, willing-seller terms, sold those pieces of land which 
were non-productive (Moore, 2001). Fifteen years after independence, the blacks who are the 
majority in the country were still crowded on to the less productive communal land and 
agricultural production remained the pillar of the Zimbabwean economy. 
 
2.2.5 Agricultural Production 
The economy of Zimbabwe is driven by agriculture. More than 50% of the country’s 
population resides in the communal areas where the major source of income is subsistence 













activity (crop production or cattle rearing) whilst commercial farmers have more than 30 
hectares (Musuna and Muchapondwa, 2008). Communal farmers mainly produce food crops, 
such as maize, sorghum, millet and rapoko. Besides producing food crops, they also produce 
some cash crops such as soya beans, cotton and tobacco, but on a smaller scale compared to 
the commercial farmers (Rukuni et al., 2006). According to Musuna and Muchapondwa 
(2008) commercial production mainly depends on area cultivated and capital. Capital refers to 
all the inputs that are used, like fertilisers, seeds, chemicals and machinery. Unlike 
commercial production smallholder agriculture production is, to a greater extent, dependent 
on rainfall (Musuna and Muchapondwa, 2008). Periods of high annual rainfall are associated 
with a good harvest and poor rains with a poor harvest. Figures 8-10 below show the plots of 
total annual production between 1980-1996 of two major crops grown by communal farmers 
(maize and cotton) and total annual rainfall. 
 
Figure 8: Total annual maize production by communal farmers, 1980-1996 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Zimbabwe Statistical Yearbook, (1997). 
 
Between 1980 and 1996, maize production was trending negatively with major troughs in the 
drought years (1983, 1986 and 1992). The same trend is also observed with cotton production 
(see figure 9 below) as well as total annual rainfall (see figure 10 below). The similarity in the 
trends of the maize production, cotton production and total annual rainfall shows the extent to 
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Figure 9: Total annual cotton production by communal farmers, 1980-1996 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Zimbabwe Statistical Yearbook, (1997). 
 
Figure 10: Total annual rainfall, 1980-1996 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Zimbabwe Statistical Yearbook, (1997). 
 
On the contrary, the commercial farmers who complemented rain water with irrigation had 
better yields. Figures 11-13 below, shows total production of 3 major cash crops (wheat, 
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Figure 11: Total annual wheat production by commercial farmers, 1980-1996 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Zimbabwe Statistical Yearbook, (1997). 
 
Figure 12: Total annual tobacco production by commercial farmers, 1980-1996 
 














































Figure 13: Total annual soya bean production by commercial farmers, 1980-1996 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Zimbabwe Statistical Yearbook, (1997). 
 
The production of wheat, tobacco and soya bean shown above, are from commercial farmers 
only. Over the period 1980-1996, production levels by commercial farmers have generally 
been on a positive trend, as shown in figures 11-13. One possible reason for this upward trend 
was the increase in support from the government through subsidized credit and favourable 
market price (Musuna and Muchapondwa, 2008). Most of the subsidised financial support 
from the government was granted to commercial farmers who had the collateral to support 
their loan applications (Musuna and Muchapondwa, 2008). Also, the market prices for the 
cash crops were pegged above other crops, making them more lucrative. In 1992, wheat and 
soya bean production was greatly affected by the drought experienced in that year, together 
with maize and cotton (Rukuni et al., 2006).  
 
The smallholder and communal farmers who were the intended beneficiaries of financial 
subsidies, in most instances failed to benefit as they could not produce the required collateral 
or were given too little assistance to support subsistence farming. As a result, communal 
farmers failed to improve their capital base and remained subsistence farmers. Commercial 
farmers have always performed better than subsistence farmers and the ruling party has used 
the land issue to campaign for votes from the many black subsistence farmers. Promises such 
as relocation to commercial farms were made to the subsistence farmers, but were not kept by 
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(Rukuni et al., 2006). 
 
This chapter has thus far outlined the production of certain crops by commercial and 
communal (subsistence) farmers for the period 1980 to 1996. Further details on post 1996 
agricultural production are presented in section 3.3. Besides improving agriculture between 
1980 and 1996, the government also invested in infrastructural development. The next section 
discusses the government’s involvement in post-independence development of the education, 
health and transport sectors.  
 
2.2.6 Education, Health and Transport Networks 
At independence, the new Zimbabwean government campaigned for “education for all.” New 
schools were built throughout the country, especially in the rural areas and resettlement areas. 
Table 2 below shows a summary of growth in the number of schools, enrolments, and number 
of teachers in different academic institutions between 1980 and 1995. Free education in 
primary schools was introduced in the rural areas in 1980. All other government schools 
operated on a highly subsidised fee structure. Between 1980 and 1996 enrolments in primary 
schools almost doubled, rising from 1,236,000 to 2,482,508 and the number of primary 
school teachers increased from 28,500 in 1980, to 63,475 in 1995 (see table 2 below) 
(Zimbabwe Statistical Yearbook, 1997). Post-independence enrolment has continued to cause 
shortages of trained teachers, with the pupil-teacher ratio increasing from 35 to 39 in primary 
schools and 24 to 27 in secondary schools between 1990 and 1996 (Zimbabwe Statistical 
Yearbook, 1997).  
 
Table 2: Number of Schools, Enrolment and number of Teachers 
Institution 
 
1980 1985 1995 
     
 
No. of Schools 3,160 4,297 4,633 




No. of Teachers 28,500 N/A 63,475 
 
No. of Schools N/A 1,276 1,536 
Secondary Education Enrolment N/A 534,287 711,094 
 
No. of Teachers N/A N/A 26,82s5 
 
No. of Study 
Groups 109 649 210 
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Distance Education Enrolment 9,423 42,070 17,446 
 
No. of Teachers 208 1,084 438 
 
No. of Centers 56 282 150 
Adult Education Enrolment 6,879 46,806 16,321 
 
No. of Teachers 309 2,364 1,502 
University of 
Zimbabwe Enrolment 2,240 5,846 10,606 
Agricultural Colleges Enrolment 300 789 604 
Teachers Training 
Colleges Enrolment 2,824 1,4637 17,466 
Source: Author’s own table using data from Zimbabwe Statistical Yearbook, (1997). 
N/A means not available 
 
The health sector and transport networks also received considerable attention from the new 
government. Free treatment was made available for everyone in government hospitals. New 
clinics were built and made accessible to everyone in remote areas. With all these 
developments being carried out throughout the country, it is obvious that huge sums of money 
would be needed to fund the projects. However, income did not match expenditure. “At the 
time of independence, some 6,000 farms produced 14 per cent of the Gross Domestic 
Product, 95 per cent of all marketed agricultural produce, and about 33 per cent of the nation's 
exports. Yet in 1980, only 25 per cent of these farms paid any income tax, yielding less than 6 
per cent of all income tax revenue received by the Government” (Seidman, 1982:1). To match 
the expenditure, the government had to borrow. The government borrowed both domestically 
and internationally to supplement the shortfall in income. As a result, public debt increased 
from Z$287.44 million in 1980 to Z$1,338.18 million in 1995. Managing this debt was 
among some of the challenges that the new government faced. The donors could not continue 
funding the country unless structural reforms were put in place to rectify the debt crisis that 
the country was now in (Sichone, 2003). 
 
2.3 Structural Reforms since 1991 
2.3.1 Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) – (1991-1995) 
Ten years after independence, the Zimbabwean government was sunk in a huge debt which 
was part of the economic crisis that had hit the country. The foreign donor agents that had 
been supporting post war re-construction were threatening to stop assisting unless some 
structural reform was put in place. In 1990, the Zimbabwean government succumbed to the 
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pressure from the donors and agreed to implement a five year reform program (Sichone, 
2003). The Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) was the first reform 
programme to be implemented in the country in 1991, following the suggestion by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). Key policies were on trade liberalisation, agricultural 
pricing and marketing reform and simplification of the investment licensing regime. Although 
the country was now in the hands of the blacks, the economy was still run and controlled by a 
white minority with structural reform aimed at empowering the blacks (Sichone, 2003). In 
terms of the ESAP, measures introduced were: 
• Removal of price controls;  
• Removal of wage controls;  
• Reduction of government expenditure;  
• A 40 per cent devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar;  
• Removal of subsidies on basic consumer goods;  
• Liberalizing the foreign currency allocation system;  
• Removal of protection of non-productive import substituting industries and 
increased profit remittance abroad; and  
• A radical restructuring of the various parastatals and other public enterprises 
(Sichone, 2003).  
The implications of the structural adjustment programme’s implementation were not positive, 
and many researchers agreed that the adjustment programme of 1991 was an initial 
contributory factor to economic meltdown, lasting until 2008 (Sichone, 2003; Ishengoma and 
Kappel, 2006; Luebker, 2008). The adjustment programme raised the cost of living, 
decreased the real wage in the formal sector, and caused the closure of some formal 
enterprises resulting in job retrenchments (Ishengoma and Kappel, 2006). As a result, the 
informal sector grew immensely as many retrenched people were forced into self-
employment for survival. In order to correct the shortfalls of the first phase, the government 
felt the need to implement the second phase of ESAP (Sichone, 2003). This will be covered in 




2.3.2 Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social Transformation 
(ZIMPREST 1996-2000) 
 
The second phase of the structural adjustment was implemented from 1996 to 2000 in a 
program known as ZIMPREST. The ultimate goals for the program were to achieve a real 
annual GDP growth of 6% and to create 44000 new jobs per year. ZIMPREST aimed at 
achieving the objectives of ESAP as well as implementing the following: 
• Increasing savings and investment by at least 23% of GDP; 
• Reducing the budget deficit to under 5% of GDP; 
• Improving the quality of democratic institutions; 
• Pursuing good governance, and; 
• Eliminating corruption (Sichone, 2003). 
 
Overall, the two programmes ESAP and ZIMPREST, did more harm than good. The 
economic situation continued to deteriorate and what had once been the ‘bread basket of 
Southern Africa,’ became an impoverished country recording a poverty rate of 67% in 1995 
and a 50% unemployment rate in 2000 (Sichone, 2003). The effects of these programmes are 
highlighted in the literature as being contributing factors leading to the economic meltdown 
that later hit the country between 1997 and 2008 (Coltart, 2008). The meltdown, its causes, 
and the way it manifested itself, is discussed further in section 2.5. 
 
2.4 The Economy: 1997 to 2008 
2.4.1. Agricultural Production 
Post ESAP, the Zimbabwean economy started deteriorating and the agricultural sector was 
amongst the hardest hit. The economic situation was worsened by recurring droughts between 
1997 and 2000. These droughts affected agricultural production which was the main source of 
foreign currency in the country. The agricultural sector also experienced a setback in 2000 
with the invasion of farms by war veterans. After the land invasions some of the remaining  
farmers opted not to farm due to fear of not knowing whether they were going to be forcibly 
removed from their farms or not. From 2000 onwards, agricultural production deteriorated, 





Total cereal production dropped from 3,130,664 metric tonnes in 1996, to 2,740,175 metric 
tonnes in 1997 and to 908,945 metric tonnes in 2002 (World Bank data, 2013). Although it 
increased slightly between 2003 and 2004, it then started falling again recording only 691,669 
metric tonnes in 2008 (see figure 14 below). The fall in cereal production turned the country 
from being a net food exporter to a food importer (see figure 15 below), and Zimbabwe had 
to rely on donors to provide for the country’s needs. According to the United Nation’s Food 
and Agriculture Organisation and the World Bank, cereal production in 2008 of 691,669 
metric tonnes could only meet 55% of the country’s needs, and 352,000 metric tonnes of food 
aid was needed to feed 4.1 million people (Coltart, 2008). 
 
Figure 14: Total Cereal Production: 1997-2008 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Worldbank Data, (2013).  
 
Between 1997 and 2001, more than 50% of total imported merchandise was food (see figure 
15 below). Zimbabwe changed, as indicated earlier, from being a net exporter to a net 
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Figure 15: Food imports and exports as a percentage of total merchandise of imports 
and exports: 1997-2008 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Worldbank Data, (2013). 
  
The agricultural sector, which was formerly the back bone of the economy, regressed 
significantly. The manufacturing sector also deteriorated because of the forward-backward 
linkage that existed between the agricultural sector and manufacturing sector. Between 1996 
and 2008, the real agricultural GDP growth rate fell from 20% to -40%. Agricultural 
production was also disrupted by the subsequent controversial land invasions in March 2000, 
and the government sponsored ‘Fast Track’ land reform programme that ran between July 
2000 and December 2001, affecting mostly tobacco production. Dating from the colonial era, 
tobacco was the main foreign currency earner for the country, until most of the tobacco 
farmers lost their land during the ‘Fast Track’ land reform programme. The new farmers who 
took over the farms failed to match the production levels of the previous owners. In 2000 
earnings from tobacco were US$600 million, but decreased to less than US$300 million in 
2002 and less than US$125 million in 2007 (Coltart, 2008). The new black farmers who were 
now occupying the invaded farmers could not match the standard that was set by the white 
commercial farmers (Moore, 2001). This impacted adversely on the foreign reserves of the 
country. 
 
As a whole, between 1999 and 2008 the economy shrunk by more than 60% (see figure 16 
below) (Worldbank data, 2013). The worst period was between 2003 and 2008 when the 














Food Imports and Exports (% 
merchandise imports and exports) 
Total Food Exports Total Food Imports
30 
 
in GDP for countries affected by civil war, such as Côte d’Ivoire (7%), Democratic Republic 
of Congo (19%) and Sierra Leone (25%) (Moss, 2007).  
 
Figure 16: Real GDP Growth Rates since 1997-2008 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Worldbank Data, (2011).  
 
2.4.2. Manufacturing Sector 
The other sector that was greatly affected by ESAP was that of manufacturing through trade 
liberalization. Central to trade liberalization was the removal of policies that controlled and 
protected domestic goods over imported goods. The move to remove controls on products 
opened up the domestic market to cheaper imports resulting in the closure of many 
manufacturing industries, especially the textile industry (Sichone, 2003). Between 1998 and 
2006, manufacturing productivity declined by more than 47% (Coltart, 2008). Since 2005, 
government policies that required exporters to sell a maximum of 30% of their foreign 
earnings to the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe at the falsely pegged exchange rate further 
crippled the manufacturing sector (Coltart, 2008). The situation was worsened by the 
government’s price control policy of June 2007, whereby the government halved all prices as 
a coping mechanism for rising inflation. Following this policy, within 6 months 
manufacturing output fell by more than 50% as many manufacturing firms shut down 
(Coltart, 2008). 
2.4.3. Unemployment 
The closure and downsizing of many industries resulted in the rapid growth of both 
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below 10%, but by 2000 it had more than quadrupled to 50%, and by 2009 had increased to 
over 80% (Worldbank, 2013). By 2010, the unemployment rate was sitting at 95% (see figure 
17 below). 
Figure 17: Unemployment rates since 1997-2010 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Worldbank Data, (2011)  
 
Employment in both the agricultural and industrial sectors increased significantly from 1980 
to 1994, but thereafter there was a significant reduction, especially in the industrial sector. 
Big agro-processing industries, for example tea, fruits and vegetables, sugar cane, mealie 
meal, and timber which were among the top employers in the country, experienced significant 
downsizing (Coltart, 2008).   Not only were manufacturing industries retrenching workers, 
but also the service sector (see table 3 below). Between 1999 and 2004, employment in the 
industrial sector dropped from 11.8% to 9.3%, and in the service sector from 28.1% to 15.3%. 
The service sector had the most job losses of the three sectors. Males (4.7% change) were hit 
harder compared to females (0.2% change) in the industrial sector, while in the agricultural 
sector the land invasions of 2000 had increased the employment levels. Most of the people 
who were working on the white farms that were invaded were left jobless overnight. 
However, the new farmers who were previously unemployed found themselves employed 
overnight. Statistics show that employment in the agricultural sector improved from 60% in 































Table 3: Employment by sector 
  1999 2004 
 
Agriculture 
Total employment 60 64.8 
Female 69.5 71.1 
Male 50.9 58.8 
 
Industry 
Total employment 11.8 9.3 
Female 4.6 4.4 
Male 18.7 14 
 
Service 
Total employment 28.1 15.3 
Female 25.9 13.2 
Male 30.3 17.3 
  Source: Author’s own table using data from Worldbank data, (2013). 
 
2.4.4. Inflation 
Similarly, the inflation rate in Zimbabwe increased from double figures in 1996 to four digits 
in 2006 (see figure 18 below). In the year 2001, for instance, the inflation rate rose to over 
100 per cent. By 2007, it had shot up to about 24000% and in the following year, 2008, it rose 
to a world record of 14.1 billion % (Worldbank Data, 2013). Figure 18 below shows how 
inflation suddenly jumped as the economy continued to collapse. The increase in inflation 
was also a result of the excessive printing of money by the Governor, of the Reserve Bank of 
Zimbabwe, especially over the period 2004-2008 (Matandirani, 2011). 
 
Figure 18: Inflation Rates since 1996 
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2.4.5. Exchange Rate 
In 1991, the official exchange rate for US$ to Zim$ was 1 to 55 and yet the black market rate 
was 1 to 300. The huge difference indicated that something was wrong in the country. 
Although the official rate was pegged on the unrealistic rate, the black market rate kept rising 
at an uncontrollable rate. As of late 2008, the official exchange rate of the Zimbabwean dollar 
against the American dollar was 1:30,000 and yet the black market rate was 
1:1,000,000,000,000 (CIA factbook, 2012). No country would accept the Zimbabwean dollar 
for any form of trade. The Zimbabwean economy itself could not accept its own currency for 
business, although it was illegal to use foreign currency. One could trade using either the 
US$, British pound, euros or fuel coupons with US$ value. Public institutions like schools 
and hospitals also could not accept the bulk Zimbabwean dollar, but were willing to accept 
the fuel coupons which were purchased in US$s (Moss, 2007; Matandirani, 2011). 
 
Obviously, the economy had crumbled and the government became desperate for foreign 
currency. The black market became a profitable business and was fuelled by the injection of 
cash by the Governor, of the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe, through the so-called ‘buyers’6 
(Matandirani, 2011). The objective was to buy out all the foreign currency from individuals in 
order to boost the country’s depleted reserves. The buyers had to get the foreign currency no 
matter the price. It was out of control to the extent that the holder of the foreign currency 
could peg a rate that pleased him or her. The result was an ever rising rate of exchange for the 
US$ and other foreign currencies. There was speculation everywhere and prices of basic 
commodities were changing at least twice a day. Everything became unaffordable. Unpaid 
electricity bills, water bills, housing bills and school fees all piled up in people’s houses. 
Salaries were just a drop in the ocean as both the monetary and real sectors had collapsed 
(Moss, 2007). 
       
2.4.6. Public Debt 
External debt did not stop growing and it was intensified by the devaluation of the 
Zimbabwean dollar. 
 
6 Buyers were the people who were employed by the reserve bank to go and buy out any foreign currency that 
was traded in the black market. 
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Figure 19: Zimbabwe external debt, and repayment, 1997-2008 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from World Bank data, (2014). 
As of 2011, the debt owed to the rest of the world was estimated to be around US$10.7 billion 
(113.5% of GDP) (Jones, 2011; IMF Report, 2012). It is estimated that US$750 million of 
this debt comes from the loans that were given by the World Bank, African Development 
Bank and IMF for structural adjustment in 1992 (Jones, 2011). As the structural adjustment 
programme was kicking off, a severe drought hit the country and more loans were granted to 
provide help in the form of drought relief to millions of people. Further loans were granted 
between 1998 and 2000 to help meet the repayment of old loans and provide credit for small 
businesses (Jones, 2011). The intended beneficiaries, who were the small business owners, 
failed to benefit from the loan as most of them were unable to meet the requirements due to 
the deterioration of the economy. Loan disbursements then stopped in 2000 when Zimbabwe 
defaulted on its World Bank debts (IMF report, 2012). The debt crisis carried on after the 
meltdown and in 2012 an Aid and Debt Management Office (ZADMO) was established to 
strategize on how to handle both aid and debt. 
 
As the economy was collapsing micro and small-scale entrepreneurial activity was 
intensifying, especially in the informal sector. Could one say economic collapse fostered 
growth in informal entrepreneurship or was it a question of opportunity versus necessity? 
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2.4.7. MSE growth in the formal sector 
As the economy was failing, something postive was also happening among MSEs. 
Entrepreneurial activity grew sharply, as observed in figure 20 below. The figure shows that 
the number of MSEs in the formal sector increased from 7488 in 1996 to 11069 in 2002. The 
increase was particularly significant from 2004 onwards, as shown by the huge jump of 
16780 MSEs in 2004 to 85210 in 2008. Similarly, the number of firms in the informal sector 
increased significantly and is believed to be more than double that of the formal sector 
(Ishengoma and Kappel, 2006). 
 
Figure 20: Total SMEs in the formal sector since 1996 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Worldbank Data, (2013) and City council report Harare, (2011), 
Zimbabwe Labour Statistics Yearbook, (2004). 
 
The change in the path of the Zimbabwean economy over the two periods, 1980-1996 and 
1997-2008, has been attributed to the economic meltdown that the economy experienced from 
1997 to 2008. Although much can be said about the effects of the meltdown, it is equally 
important to discuss what could have triggered the meltdown and this will be dealt with in the 
following section. 
 
2.5 The Economic Meltdown 
2.5.1 Defining Economic Meltdown  
An economic meltdown has no straight forward definition, but it can be explained in terms of 
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meltdown as, “a disastrous event especially a rapid fall in share prices”. Capozzi (2010) 
characterises economic meltdown as a crisis that is a result of intertwined factors, namely 
high unemployment, no liquidity, hyperinflation, lack of consumer confidence and the falling 
of the stock market and real GDP. Capozzi (2010) identifies the major causes of an economic 
meltdown as speculation, currency devaluation, natural and man-made disasters, and political 
conflicts. These events characterised the Zimbabwean economy from 1997 to 2008. This 
study defines economic meltdown as a period of hyperinflation (inflation above 50%), high 
unemployment, no liquidity and extended periods of drop in real GDP. The literature suggests 
that the triggering factors started in 1996 in the aftermath of ESAP (Luebker, 2008). 
However, this author thinks the factors were carried over after independence from the 
Rhodesian government. These factors will be discussed towards the end of this chapter. 
2.5.2 Triggers of the Economic Meltdown 
The reasons for the economic meltdown are mixed and are intertwined with wrong policies, 
land invasions, the collapse of democratic institutions and governance. The reasons frequently 
cited in the literature include:  
the aftermath of ESAP; Zimbabwe’s costly involvement in the conflict in the DR Congo; high 
pay-outs to veterans of the liberation war that had inflationary consequences; the often chaotic 
implementation of the country’s land reform programme; the decline of export revenue from 
the agricultural sector; high budget deficits that were financed through money creation, and 
subsequently high inflation; economic distortions caused by price regulations and the 
misalignments of the foreign exchange rate; erosion of property rights and entrepreneurial 
freedom; international sanctions such as travel restrictions on the country’s elite; declining 
FDI inflows and lack of access to credit and balance of payment support from agencies such 
as the IMF and the World Bank (Luebker, 2008:17).  
 
Some of these factors associated with the economic meltdown are examined below. 
2.5.3 Aftermath of ESAP 
Although ESAP did manage to attract foreign aid which helped strengthen the Zimbabwean 
dollar and increase imports between 1991 and 1995 as a percentage of GDP from 27.16% to 
40.92%, the program also created some dents on the economy (World Bank Data, 2013). The 
increase in imports made the local products more expensive relative to the imports and caused 
a decrease in demand for domestic products. According to a UNDP report (1999), imports 
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created such competition for local manufacturers some were forced to close down, increasing 
unemployment levels from 22% in 1992 to 35% in 1996. 
 
ESAP also required the government to increase its expenditure. The government had to 
borrow internationally from IMF to finance its expenditure. The failure by the government to 
keep spending within the requirements of ESAP meant that they had to borrow domestically 
as well, causing the interest rates to rise. This was a huge blow to local manufacturers as it 
became more costly to operate and expand their businesses (Sichone, 2003).  
 
ESAP also caused some political conflicts resulting from such measures as price decontrols, 
reduction in social services and retrenchments which were all part of the program. There was 
a constant need to balance the demands of competing economic groups, e.g. interests of the 
workers vs new businesses. The drought of 1991/92 season also contributed to the economic 
meltdown. The drought was so intense it resulted in low agricultural output, increased 
government expenditure on food imports and social expenditure. Maize production fell by 
25% in the 1990-1991 agricultural season, and a further 33% in the 1991-1992 agricultural 
season (Jones, 2011). The result was a country plunged deeply into poverty, unemployment, 
debt and hunger (Kapoor et al., 2007). After ESAP a number of other events also contributed 
to the economic downfall. Some of these events are discussed below. 
 
2.5.4 Deployment of the army to DRC 
Although the effects of the collapsing economy were seriously felt in 2008, it is believed that 
the meltdown actually started in late 1996, triggered among other things, by the budget deficit 
caused by the involvement of the Zimbabwean army in the DRC war, which drained the 
country’s foreign reserves (Coltart, 2008). In 1994 and 1995, military expenditure steeply 
increased from about Z$215 million in 1993 to about Z$1,4 billion and Z$1,3 billion 
respectively and then dropped to Z$269 million in 1996 (see figure 21 below). Most of this 
expenditure was targeted at stocking ammunition and for the upkeep of the deployed soldiers 
and their families. Moore (2001) argues that a large sum of unbudgeted funds was used in this 






Figure 21: Government Military Expenditure, 1990-2008 
 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from Worldbank Data, (2011). 
 
2.5.5 Compensation of the war veterans 
Adding to the budget deficit created by the deployment of the army to the DRC in 1996, in 
1997 the government then used large sums of money to compensate the war veterans. Each 
individual received a lump sum of Z$50,000 and a tax-free monthly pension of Z$5,000 for 
50000 war veterans (Moore, 2001:262; Matandirani, 2011). Z$4.5 billion was allocated by 
the government to cater for the demands by the war veterans (Moore, 2001). The 
announcement in 1997 of this move to compensate war veterans caused the stock market to 
crash and the Zimbabwean dollar started falling (Matandirani, 2011). Because compensation 
of war veterans was unbudgeted for, there were many economic repercussions. It caused the 
largest deprecation of the Zimbabwean dollar which then triggered intensive inflation. In the 
midst of it all, the IMF-imposed austerity measures were removed (Games, 2002; Sichone, 
2003). On the political side, there were serious political conflicts that were brewing between 
MDC and ZANU (PF), the two dominant political parties in the country. In response to the 
rising inflation, the government imposed price controls on many basic goods, announced the 
intended acquisition of 1471 farms in 1997, and imposed a 5% surtax to pay for land 
resettlement (Moore, 2001). Most commodities were no longer available in supermarkets, but 
were always available on the black market. The price controls worked in favour of the black 
market traders instead of the general public. Government action only added to the failure of 
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and redistributed (Moore, 2001; Games, 2002).  
 
2.5.6 Land invasions by war veterans 
Moore (2001:255) believes that the land invasions in March 2000 were a reflection by the war 
veterans about how they felt about the ruling party ZANU (PF). The invasions were more the 
frustration felt by unmet resettlement promises made by the government since independence. 
In the Constitutional Referendum that was voted against in February 2000, ZANU (PF) was 
lobbying to remove the willing-buyer, willing-seller clause in order to facilitate the intensive 
acquisition of 1471 farms they had promised the people in 1997 (Moore, 2001:255). The 
referendum also promised to extend the presidential powers. The opposition party was against 
the adoption of the new referendum. The voters voted against the referendum which triggered 
the land invasions of the white settler farms by war veterans in March 2000.    
 
The loss by ZANU (PF) was a huge wake up call for its policy makers and also a possible 
indication of the outcome of the upcoming June 2000 elections (Moore, 2001:256). It was 
only logical for ZANU (PF) to step up their election campaign, which resulted in their 
funding the land invasions by the war veterans. Unemployed youth were hired to run the 
invasions at a daily rate of between US$10 to US$70 (Moore, 2001:256). Most of the new 
black farmers who were subsequently resettled on the invaded farms came from communal 
lands and had minimal capital to use on the larger pieces of land. They did not receive any 
infrastructure or agricultural support service from the government, nor did they get title deeds 
to the new pieces of land (Moyo, Rutherford and Amanor-Wilks, 2000). 
 
The government's subsequent ‘Fast Track’ land reform programme, which was intended to 
run from July 2000 to December 2001, was characterized by chaos and violence, and badly 
damaged the commercial farming sector. The commercial sector was the traditional source of 
exports and foreign exchange and the provider of over 400,000 jobs. Zimbabwe was turned 
into a net importer of food products (Moyo et al., 2000). In August 2002, the government 
announced the ‘Fast Track’ land reform complete, by which time damage had been done 
which might take years to rectify (Chiremba and Masters, 2003). 
 
2.5.7 Smart sanctions 
The effects of the above events were mostly felt by the citizens of Zimbabwe. As of 2004, 
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72% of the population were below the national poverty line (World Bank data, 2013). People 
lost their lives because of political conflict and hunger leaving many children orphaned in the 
process (Moyo et al., 2000). The international community felt there were human rights’ 
infringements caused by the ruling party, and imposed the controversial “smart sanctions” on 
some members of the ruling party. At the same time the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic 
Recovery Act of 2001 was also passed. The Act was enacted by the Senate and House of 
Representatives of the United States of America in Congress and aimed at providing support 
for a transition to democracy and promoting economic recovery in Zimbabwe. The Act 
blocked all American aid to Zimbabwe until the rule of law was operational in the country7 
(Magaisa, 2009). A number of analysts felt that this was an unfair move for ordinary 
Zimbabwean citizens (Mutandirani, 2011). The role that the sanctions were supposed to play, 
that of compelling the government to promote democracy and human rights, was not 
achieved. Instead the sanctions and the Act hit the poor and were a threat to human rights and 
democracy. As Magaisa in newzimbabwe.com (2009) rightfully said, “Democracy cannot 
flourish in poverty but needs a stable economic foundation.” Banning aid to a country which 
was already depleted of resources could have fuelled the economic meltdown, as the whole 
situation was politicised (Magaisa, 2009). 
 
2.5.8 Operation Murambatsvina in 2005 
Another contributing factor to the meltdown was Operation Murambatsvina (Operation drive 
out rubbish or Operation restore order) where the government used bulldozers to destroy 
informal settlements in urban areas leaving thousands of people homeless and the informal 
sector, which had become the main source of income for the majority of Zimbabweans, 
destroyed (Coltart, 2008; Matandirani, 2011). According to the United Nations, this operation 
directly affected approximately 700,000 people who were the bread winners to approximately 
2, 4 million people. This operation was condemned by the opposition party in the country as 
well as non-governmental organisations and the international community as they felt the 
exercise infringed on human rights. This was not the only operation, but all the government 
7 In September 1999 the IMF suspended its support under a “Stand by Arrangement” approved for economic 
adjustment and reform in Zimbabwe. 
In October 1999 the International Development Association, IDA, suspended all structural adjustment loans, 
credits, and guarantees to the Government of Zimbabwe. 
In May 2000, the IDA suspended all other new lending to the Government of Zimbabwe. 
In September 2000, the IDA suspended disbursement of funds for ongoing projects under previously approved 
loans, credits, and guarantees for the Government of Zimbabwe. 
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operations mostly affected the ordinary citizens who made a living from the informal sector, 
dragging most of them below the poverty line (Coltart, 2008). 
 
The Zimbabwean economic meltdown did not happen overnight, but was a result of many 
possibly wrong choices made by the government of Zimbabwe. Since 1991, there were many 
decisions that were made by the government and the international community, some for 
political reasons, but all impacted adversely on the general citizens. After about a decade of 
economic breakdown, light dawned on the country in the form of a unity government between 
MDC and ZANU (PF), mediated partly through the leadership of Thabo Mbeki, the then 
President of South Africa.  
 
2.5.9 Control of Money Supply by the Government 
If not managed properly, the control of money supply is a huge contributing factor to 
economic instability. Mises (2013) argues that the involvement of the state in the monetary 
system causes economic instability and can also cause social instability. Increasing the money 
supply is usually used as a monetary tool when the policy makers want to increase 
consumption and forcefully create an artificial boom (Mises, 2013). According to Mises, this 
policy is unsustainable and will eventually cause the economy to crash. Increases in money 
supply are highly inflationary and will eventually increase the cost of borrowing and make it 
less profitable for business owners to borrow and invest in the growth of their businesses. 
This will force them to shut down and people will be retrenched.  
 
Examples of such experiences are firstly the Great Depression of 1930 where there was a 
huge credit build up in the 1920s, followed by an economic collapse (Kelly, 2010). The same 
also happened with the 2008 financial crisis which was characterized by huge mortgage loans 
being extended to people in lower-income brackets. This eventually became unsustainable 
causing the economy to crash (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Kelly 2010). This also 
happened in Zimbabwe where many government projects, discussed in the previous sections, 
were financed through borrowed funds and the excessive printing of money. Looking back 
into the 1980s after the attainment of independence in Zimbabwe, the reconstruction of the 
country was financed through both domestic and foreign debt. More debt was accrued in the 
1990s when the government was correcting the effects of ESAP, as well as compensating the 
war veterans with lump sum bonuses in 1997, while at the same time the Zimbabwean 
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government was involved in the DRC war. The economy failed to sustain the pressure 
resulting in the economic meltdown. 
 
Besides economic distress, a government’s involvement in the monetary system can also 
cause social instability. This can result in the rich getting richer and the poor getting poorer 
(Mises, 2013), as the poor bear the brunt of the price increases caused by increased demand 
for goods and services - a consequence of increased money supply; whilst the rich capitalize 
on the large proportion of the total money supply. The only other survival tool available to the 
poor will be outside what the economy can provide, such as in the informal sector. This could 
be a possible explanation for the sudden growth in MSEs during the meltdown, especially in 
the informal sector. 
 
2.6 Economic Recovery Plan 
2.6.1. Formation of the Government of National Unity (GNU) 
A coalition government was formed on 13 February, 2009 after intense talks between the then 
ruling ZANU (PF) government and two other opposition parties (MDC- Tsvangirai and 
MDC- Mutambara). This was a crucial turning point for the Zimbabwean economy as it 
brought to an end the partisan violence and created a framework for power sharing between 
the three parties. One good thing that came out of this Unity government was the 
dollarization of the Zimbabwean economy. Dollarization was adopted in March 2009 and 
allowed currencies such as the Botswana pula, the South African rand, and the US dollar to 
be used locally. This ended hyperinflation and restored price stability, but exposed structural 
weaknesses that continue to inhibit broad-based growth (CIA World Factbook, 2011). 
Entrepreneurial activities continue to blossom in this new era. Many families still rely on the 
MSEs that were developed during the meltdown period as a source of income. 
 
Priority was set on reviving the economy and the coalition government quickly implemented 
its first policy which was the Short-term Emergency Recovery Program (STERP) in March 
2009. This policy ran for 9 months, targeting the stabilisation of the macro and micro 
economy through recovery of savings, investment and growth. The inclusive government 
relied on international donors to help finance its programmes as the economy had depleted all 
its reserves during the meltdown.  By the end of 2009, the new inclusive government had 
managed to reduce year-on-year inflation to 6.5%, revenue collection increased to about 14% 
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of GDP from less than 4% at the beginning of the year (African Development Bank, 
2011,2013). Government expenditure was maintained within the fiscal budget. On the 
negative side, the current account deficit widened to nearly 17% and external debt remained a 
challenge. 
 
At the beginning of 2010, STERP was succeeded by the three year Macro-Economic Policy 
and Budget Framework (2010-2012). This framework addressed the short-comings of STERP 
and also promoted public and private investments and expenditure in line with poverty 
reduction and the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).  
 
Table 4: Macroeconomic Indicators post economic meltdown 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
GDP growth (annual %) 5.98% 9.62% 10.55% 4.42% 
Inflation 6.5% 3.0% 4.8% 6.1% 
Exports of goods and services (% of GDP) 29.31% 47.64% 53.81% 44.31% 
Imports of goods and services (% of GDP) 59.70% 78.48% 95.77% 76.06% 
Source: Author’s own graph using data from World Bank Data, (2014) and African Development Bank Report 
(2013). 
 
The inclusive government managed to promote economic growth, recording 9.62% growth in 
2010 and 10.55% in 2011 (see table 4 above). Although still positive, 2012 recorded a 
slightly lower growth rate of 4.42%. Inflation has been maintained in the single digits range 
with a year-on-year inflation rate of 3.0% in 2010, and 6.1% in 2012. Exports have also 
improved significantly from 29.31% of GDP in 2009, to 53.81% in 2011 and then dropping 
slightly to 44.31% of GDP in 2012. Imports still remain high as the country relies more on 
neighbouring countries for food and other services. As the country is still trying to find its 
footing, food production levels are still not enough to feed the whole country. In 2009 imports 
of goods and services constituted 59.7% of GDP, which then rose to 95.77% of GDP in 2011, 
before decreasing to 76.06% in 2012. 
 
To complement the three year Macro-Economic Policy and Budget Framework, a 5-year 
Medium Term Plan was also adopted in 2011. The macroeconomic targets for the MTP 
included: 
• A rise in GDP to US$9 billion by 2015; 
• An average growth rate of 15% per annum; 
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• Revenue and expenditure of up to 30% of GDP; 
• Savings and investment of up to 25% of GDP; 
• Budget deficit of 5% of GDP by 2015; 
• Single digit inflation figures; 
• Three months of import cover; 
• Infrastructure development with emphasis on rehabilitation and completion of 
outstanding projects; 
• Implementation of pro-poor strategies for poverty reduction; 
• Promotion of programs that ensure gender parity in access to education, health and 
other social services. 
 
Some of the targets of the MTP appear far-fetched as the Zimbabwean economy is already 
showing signs of struggling. A target of an average of 15% per annum GDP growth might not 
be achievable given that the average growth rate between 2009 and 2012 was around 7.5%. It 
is critical that the economy starts generating income and creating employment in order to 
enhance production and progress towards achieving the targets set in the MTP. Promoting the 
growth of micro and small-scale entrepreneurships, that were established before and during 
the meltdown, could be a possible tool and a cheaper option given that they are already 
functional. This research investigates the possibility of using micro and small-scale 
entrepreneurs in its road to recovery. 
 
2.7 Synthesis of the Chapter 
Although the meltdown is believed to have started in 1997, triggered by the huge devaluation 
of the Zimbabwean dollar, the deficit from increased spending on war veterans, and the war 
in the DRC, the root cause can be tracked back to the time of independence in 1980. The huge 
budget deficit, which only became problematic in 1997, was initially created in the 
reconstruction phase post-independence and has been increasing over the years. The rapid 
economic growth that was observed in the 1980s was financed by debt from the IMF, World 
Bank and other international banks (Jones, 2011). New debt, created by the reconstruction of 
Zimbabwe, was added to the original debt carried over from the Ian Smith regime, resulting 
in a huge debt burden. The Zimbabwean government has struggled to pay back this debt over 
the years and it still remains a challenge. Most of the country’s income from exports and from 
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government revenue in the 1980s was committed to debt repayment forcing the government 
to either borrow more, or print more money to finance its developmental fiscal budget. As a 
result, high budget deficit and high inflation have always characterised the Zimbabwean 
economy. Makochekanwa (2011) in his study on the relationship between budget deficit and 
inflation in Zimbabwe established that the two are positively correlated.  
 
In 1990, when Zimbabwe was due to pay its first instalment for the loans disbursed in the 
reconstruction phase, inflation was around 18%, and rose further to around 42% in 1992 
when Zimbabwe experienced one of its worst droughts. The government had to import food 
which increased the budget deficit further. Both inflation and the budget deficit continued to 
increase through the aftermath of ESAP, and other non-developmental activities, such as 
compensation to war veterans and land invasions, that occurred in the late 1990s. In 1999, 
inflation rose above 50%, marking the start of a period of hyperinflation which lasted until 
2008. The meltdown period 1999-2008 was a catastrophic period, and caused damage which 
may take a life time to repair.  
Since the formation of the coalition government and the dollarization of the Zimbabwean 
economy in 2009, inflation has been kept to a single digit, and government expenditure has 
been kept within its fiscal budget.  
  
2.8 Conclusion  
Zimbabwe's economy has grown after the meltdown period despite continuing political 
uncertainty. After a decade of contraction, the economy recorded real growth of 3.4% in 
2013. Although the country is recording positive real growth, the government of Zimbabwe 
still faces a number of economic problems, including infrastructural and regulatory 
deficiencies, on-going indigenization pressure, political uncertainty, a large external debt 
burden, and insufficient formal employment (CIA World Factbook, 2012). Until early 2009, 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe routinely printed money to fund the budget deficit, causing 
hyperinflation. The coalition government has worked hard to restore stability but there is still 
much that needs to be done to take the country back to the years when it was the bread basket 
of Southern Africa. Entrepreneurship is critical to restoring growth of the Zimbabwean 





ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ITS IMPORTANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
Entrepreneurship has always been viewed as a significant vehicle for economic development  
with its ability to create employment and generate income (Acs, 2008). In some African and 
under-developed countries, the perceived economic benefits of entrepreneurship are not 
clearly observed (Mboma, 2008). For instance in Zimbabwe, unemployment and poverty 
levels have been rising year after year, and so was the number of entrepreneurs in both formal 
and informal sectors. Barreira, Dhliwayo, Luiz, Naude and Urban (2008) identify the problem 
as the type of business that dominates most African countries. Small-scale, micro and 
medium enterprises (SMMEs) are the dominant entrepreneurial activity in Africa, but less 
than 1% of these SMMEs  have ten or more employees (Barreira et al., 2008). Worse still, the 
lack of homogeneity of the SMMEs makes it difficult for common policies to be effective in 
entrepreneurial development. However these SMMEs also have a welfare benefit, which 
makes them popular activities among under-developed and unstable nations. It is for this 
reason that Barreira et al., (2008) have concluded that the abundance of SMMEs in Africa is 
an indication of underdevelopment rather than thriving small-scale entrepreneurship.  
 
On the other hand many developing nations, such as China and India, have succeeded in 
advancing economic growth and development partly through entrepreneurship. For instance 
in 1978, the Chinese economy was ranked number 100 on the world’s largest economy 
ranking, but moved to second position in 2000, largely through the support of small 
businesses and by embracing market-oriented policies (Anderson, Li, Harrison and Robson, 
2003; CIA Factbook, 2012). From 2000 to 2010, China grew at an annual rate of more than 
10% (O’Neill, 2013). It seems Africa has a lot to learn from developed or developing nations 
before its entrepreneurial activity can be fruitful and bring about the much needed solutions to 
the poverty pandemic on the continent.  
 
This chapter focuses on formulating working definitions for the key concepts of this study. It 
consists of four parts: the first section starts by defining entrepreneurship; the second section 
looks at the entrepreneurial decision making process, with the concept of ‘Need for 
Achievement’ in entrepreneurial decision making also being discussed; thirdly the economic 
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roles of entrepreneurship in job creation, economic growth, innovation, competition and firm 
formation will be discussed; and the last section will review some empirical studies that have 
discussed the determinants of entrepreneurship.  
 
3.2 Economic elements of Entrepreneurship 
3.2.1 Neoclassical Theory 
In literature there is no consensus on the definition of entrepreneurship with different 
economists using its economic functions to define it. From the neoclassical economic theory, 
the entrepreneur is seen as an agent in the production process, using human and other 
resources to organize factors of production and create wealth, and entrepreneurship as a 
system that consists of entrepreneurs (Parkin, 2010). The theory identifies the market as an 
entity that creates and distributes wealth through many buyers and sellers. The market forces 
of demand and supply ensure that the market converges to equilibrium. If there is a 
disequilibrium, prices have to be adjusted accordingly in order to restore equilibrium in the 
market. The role of the entrepreneur is clustered with that of managers as making resource 
allocation decisions so as to maintain market equilibrium. Neoclassical theory does not 
recognize the existence of the entrepreneur as the “economic man” hence has been criticized 
(Parkin, 2010).  
 
 In line with the shortcomings of the neoclassical theory in defining the role of the 
entrepreneur, more academics and theorists have come up with their own “functional 
definitions8” which now make up the foundation of the core concepts in entrepreneurship. 
The rest of this section discusses the contributions made by four economists to 
entrepreneurship in economic theory. 
 
3.2.2 Joseph Schumpeter (1934) 
Schumpeter (1934) was among the first economists to criticize the neoclassical theory and 
make a commendable contribution to entrepreneurial theory. He defined an entrepreneur as an 
innovator through ‘creative destruction’. He identifies the entrepreneur as someone who 
develops new combinations of innovation in the economy by destroying the old ones. The 
entrepreneur can be anyone despite their social status or wealth. The innovation abilities of an 
8 Functional definition- defines an entrepreneur in terms of what an entrepreneur does. 
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entrepreneur allows him/her to destroy existing economic order by creating new products, 
new production methods, new markets, new sources of supply of raw materials and new 
forms of organization resulting in new demand (Barreira et al., 2008). Using business cycle 
theory, Schumpeter showed how new innovation can result in economic booms due to the 
activities of imitators, leading to economic growth.  
 
Besides innovative qualities, the entrepreneur also possesses leadership qualities. Schumpeter 
identifies successful innovations as depending on leadership not intelligence. People are 
entrepreneurs when they actually engage in the process of making new inventions and lose 
the role once they have built it. There is no active role for the entrepreneur once the optimal 
decisions are made. The Schumpeter entrepreneur is a person who will not necessarily create 
his own business and who also can operate as a manager because once a business is created 
that person is supposed to settle down and run the business in the same way as everyone else 
runs their business, and thus ceases to be an entrepreneur. Another characteristic of the 
Schumpeter entrepreneur is that the entrepreneur’s role of being an innovator does not include 
the element of risk taking because everything is done under conditions of certainty and 
perfect competition (Barreira et al., 2008). 
 
3.2.3 Israel Kirzner (1973) 
Kirzner (1973) defined an entrepreneur as someone who does not initiate but facilitates 
adjustment to change in the face of uncertainty by identifying arbitrage opportunities. 
Alertness is the core quality of an entrepreneur which allows him/her to identify the 
loopholes, for example underpricing, in the market and use this information to his or her 
advantage. Kirznerian entrepreneurship is defined as “the alertness to and foresight of market 
conditions…” (Stolyarov II, 2005: 161). According to Kirzner (1973), entrepreneurship is 
seemingly costless and a person can become an entrepreneur if he is alert to recognize 
opportunities unnoticed by others. Actually entrepreneurship is not costless because it does 
involve resource expenditures. The entrepreneur will make a profit from foreseeing 
opportunities that others have overlooked under uncertainty of whether his/her foresight is 




3.2.4 Mark Casson (1982) 
Casson (1982:20) also made a contribution to the theory of entrepreneurship by defining an 
entrepreneur as “someone who specializes in taking judgmental decisions about the 
coordination of scarce resources”. The entrepreneur’s goal is to maximize profits. The 
judgments are based on different perceptions of a situation resulting from differences in 
access and interpretation of information. In this scenario, the entrepreneur will be viewed as a 
planner.  
3.2.5 William Baumol (1990) 
Baumol (1990) combined the two functions of the entrepreneur, that of being a manager and a 
Schumpeterian innovator. He presented an entrepreneur as a person whose entrepreneurial 
actions can change from being productive to unproductive depending on the structure of 
incentives in the economy. He identifies 3 classes of entrepreneurship namely, productive, 
destructive and non-productive. Productive entrepreneurship creates wealth and is associated 
with innovation and contributes positively to economic growth. Unproductive 
entrepreneurship involves mainly rent-seeking and is not good for the economy as it destroys 
the natural laws of economics like demand and supply. Destructive entrepreneurship also has 
a negative effect on GDP (Acs, 2010). These 3 classes are closely linked to the economic 
stages of economic development (factor driven, efficiency driven and innovation driven). The 
number of productive entrepreneurs increases as one move from factor driven economies to 
innovation driven economies and the distribution of these 3 classes of entrepreneurship in 
each economy will depend on the institutions and incentive structure in that economy.  
 
3.3 Non-Economic elements of Entrepreneurship  
3.3.1 Psychological Elements 
The functional definitions given by the four economists above, do not give a theoretical 
framework that can be used to explain the role of entrepreneurship. As a result, recent 
researchers have drawn on theories by sociologists, psychologists and political scientists who 
define an entrepreneur in terms of human attributes, personality or motive. The focus shifted 
from simply trying to explain the economic meaning of entrepreneurship to understanding the 
sources of entrepreneurs’ motivation and understanding the decision-making process to 




The key characteristics which have been identified as important traits for any entrepreneur 
are: need for achievement (N-Ach); calculated risk-taker; creativity; high internal locus of 
control; innovative; need for autonomy, vision, ambiguity tolerance; and self-efficacy among 
others (Deakins and Freel, 2012). Some researchers have advocated for McClelland’s need 
for achievement to be the key characteristic. N-Ach is defined as the desire to excel and a 
high N-Ach is associated with a higher level of business success. However, there are also 
those who think that its importance could be overrated as it is a difficult characteristic to 
measure, hence has been criticized (Deakins and Freel, 2012). The same can also be said with 
the other characteristics like internal locus of control and self-efficacy. In the midst of all the 
criticism, the Mehrabian Scale of Achieving Tendency has been supported as a good measure 
for N-Ach (Elliot and Dweck, 2005; Scannell and Allen, 2000).  N-Ach and the Mehrabian 
measure will be discussed further in the next section as it is a key component in this study. 
 
3.3.2 Need for Achievement (N-Ach)  
According to McClelland (1961) human behavior is greatly influenced by three factors which 
are Need for Power, Need for Achievement and Need for Affiliation. Need for Power is the 
desire to have control over other people’s behaviour. Need for Affiliation is the desire to have 
a mutual understanding relationship. Need for Achievement (N-Ach) is the desire to excel. 
These three needs are closely related and McClelland (1961) believes that every individual 
possess a different mix of needs. The bias towards one of the motivational needs will 
determine their working style. A stronger power motivation usually depicts someone who is 
greedy, selfish and wants to control and suppress others (McClelland, 1961). A strong 
affiliation motivation is associated with someone who needs to be liked hence always takes 
other people’s opinions into their decision making capacity. A strong achievement motivation 
is associated with someone who is results driven, not money driven, and these people with 
high N-Ach tend to be good leaders and entrepreneurs. These three needs are acquired over 
time and can be moulded by an individual’s life experience. They can be taught and can be 
achieved by learning to a certain extent (McClelland, 1961).  
 
The N-Ach captures one’s eagerness to succeed in a business. It also shows an individual’s 
desire for significant accomplishment, mastering of skills, control, and these desires then 
motivate risk taking (McClelland, 1961). This desire is mainly for personal fulfilment, not for 
social recognition or profits. N-Ach is not a common characteristic among most people. It is 
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influenced by a combination of internal and external factors (Storey, 1995). Internal factors 
include personal drive, individual values and educational background (Mahadea and Pillay, 
2008; Shane, 2003). 
 
N-Ach can be measured by the use of questionnaires. According to Finneman (1977), a 
questionnaire approach is a reliable instrument to measure N-Ach. In this study N-Ach will be 
measured by using Mehrabian Scale of Achieving Tendency. This scale has been found to 
have a high reliability index (Elliot and Dweck, 2005). It consists of a set of 26 questions that 
are administered to male and female respondents, measured on a nine-point scale from +4 to 
– 4. The overall N-Ach score of each surveyed entrepreneur is obtained by adding up the 
scores of each question. A higher positive value indicates a greater N-Ach level, and the 
reverse is also true. 
 
Is it possible that the N-Ach could explain the high percentage of MSEs operating in the 
informal sector in Zimbabwe and in many other countries? The argument here is that those 
entrepreneurs with a lower N-Ach tend to operate in the informal sector, as they do it more 
for survival than business growth. By understanding how achievement motivation affects or 
influences choice of sector to operate in, policy makers responsible for supporting SMEs 
could use this information to enhance the development of firms and formalisation of 
businesses launched by these small entrepreneurs.  
 
Recent studies have looked at the role of N-Ach in business performance (Shane, 2003; 
Parker, 2009;  Sarasvathy and Venkataraman, 2011). Mahadea (1994) found a positive 
relationship with respect to measures of business performance, reflected in terms of real asset 
growth, sales growth and labour growth. He also found a pattern between N-Ach level and 
sophistication of business, and the (professional) background of the risk-takers. Entrepreneurs 
in service and manufacturing firms had the lowest level of need achievement, those in 
retailing had a higher level of need achievement and those in super-marketing (previous 
managers and professionals) had the highest N-Ach level (Mahadea, 1994). Shane (2003) 
agrees that N-Ach is an important variable for entrepreneurial performance. Other researchers 
found other factors that are critical to effective entrepreneurship, at both formal and informal 
levels. These are locus of control, creativity, education, innovation and training, need for 
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autonomy, internal locus of control and risk taking propensity (Caird, 1988; Boschoff and 
Hoole, 1998; Mahadea, 2001; Baumol, 2010). 
 
Clearly, entrepreneurial performance depends on need achievement, and those with higher 
levels in need achievement are more than capable of creating employment opportunities for 
themselves and for others. The informal sector in Zimbabwe houses entrepreneurs from 
different professional backgrounds who are educated enough to know that the informal sector 
is an illegal sector. Macroeconomic and labour market conditions might have forced them to 
venture into business out of necessity. It is thus important to investigate why most SMEs in 
Zimbabwe are operating in an illegal sector, and possibly come up with policy 
recommendations that will channel support into this sector or encourage them to move to the 
formal sector.  The role of N-Ach in influencing the decision to move to the formal sector is 
investigated in this study. It is only appropriate that the MSEs in Zimbabwe be encouraged to 
move into the formal sector where most of the financial support is found. Investigating the 
importance of N-Ach in the choice of sector to operate in, may help to ascertain if policies 
that enhance individual N-Ach can be recommended. This may encourage MSEs in 
Zimbabwe’s informal sector to move to the formal sector.  
 
3.4 Linking Economic and non-economic elements of entrepreneurship 
3.4.1 Individual-Opportunity Nexus 
From the economic and non-economic definitions discussed above, it is clear that the two 
approaches used by the different academics do not converge. The definitions provided above 
include defining an entrepreneur in terms of their functional role, or individual characteristics, 
or opportunities they respond to, or their resource acquisition process. The failure by these 
academics to show the link between their own definition and that of the previous academic is 
what motivated Shane (2003) to develop what he termed the “Individual-Opportunity Nexus” 
for entrepreneurship. 
 
The individual-opportunity nexus “examines the characteristics of opportunities; the 
characteristics of the individual that discover and exploit them; the processes of resource 
acquisition and organizing; and the strategies used to exploit and protect the profits from 
those efforts” through a means-ends framework (Shane, 2003:4). The means-ends framework 
involves making well informed and logical plans/ decisions on how to make profits, taking 
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into consideration the available information about the entrepreneurial opportunity. It is the 
role of the entrepreneur to create this means-ends framework before a new venture can be 
operationalized. 
 
In light of this framework, entrepreneurship is defined as “an activity that involves the 
discovery, exploitation of opportunities to introduce new goods and services, ways of 
organizing, markets, processes, and raw materials through organizing efforts that previously 
had not existed (Shane 2003:4).  
 
Shane (2003) further breaks down this definition into two operational definitions, namely 
self-employment and formation of new firms. Self-employment is the act of working for 
personal profit and not for a wage (Shane, 2003:5). Formation of new firms is the forming of 
a business venture that was previously not in existence (Shane, 2003:5). The link between 
entrepreneurship and firm formation will be discussed in later sections. The definition of 
entrepreneurship as self-employment by Shane (2003) is the one that is used in this thesis. 
 
The next section discusses how an individual decides on whether to become an entrepreneur 
or not, using the means-ends framework which was developed by Shane (2003). 
 
3.4.2 Entrepreneurial Decision Making Process  
The process of decision making in economic theory has always been allied to the price system 
where the prices contain all the information about activities happening in the economy. 
However, in the entrepreneurial decision making process, prices fail to provide the required 
information on how to allocate resources effectively, on expected future revenues, or 
information on the existence of entrepreneurial opportunity9 (Shane, 2003).  Entrepreneurial 
decisions are thus made through judgmental decision-making10 using means-ends 
framework11 (Shane, 2003).  The entrepreneurial decision is not a collective decision but 
rather an individual decision based on individual assessment of the entrepreneurial 
opportunity using the means-ends framework. 
9 An entrepreneurial opportunity is defined as “a situation in which a person creates a new means-end 
framework for re-combining resources that the entrepreneur believes will yield a profit” (Shane, 2003). 
10 Judgmental decision-making involves making decisions that require judgment that is different from the 
judgment of others. 
11 Means-ends framework is a way of thinking about the relationship between actions and outcomes. 
54 
 
                                                 
 
The opportunity can avail itself through the environment or through the individual. Individual 
attributes play a crucial role in the decision making process as well as environmental and 
psychological factors. Most academics, economists, psychologists and sociologists who have 
worked on defining entrepreneurship agree on the two sources of opportunities. From 
Schumpeter’s perspective, the opportunity is new and innovative through technological 
changes, or political changes or socio-demographic changes (Fuduric, 2008). From Kirzner’s 
perspective, market disequilibria caused by errors in decision making is the source of the 
opportunity. A Schumpeterain entrepreneur is the creator of the opportunity whilst the 
Kirznerian entrepreneur is a discoverer of the opportunity (Fuduric, 2008). After the 
entrepreneur has discovered the opportunity, he/she has to exploit the opportunities and start a 
new venture. Both processes require the entrepreneur to engage his/her personality traits 
(psychological factors) and capacity (non-psychological factors). 
 
The individual decision making process to exploit entrepreneurial opportunities can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
 
Figure 22: Individual Decision-Making process 
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Source: adapted from Shane, (2003). 
 
When an entrepreneurial opportunity avails, the entrepreneur will compare the “expected 
value of exploitation (both monetary and psychic) against the opportunity cost (best 
alternative use of their time plus the premiums for bearing uncertainty and illiquidity)” before 
making an entrepreneurial decision that will give him/her a profit/loss (Shane 2003:62). The 
expected value of exploitation should exceed the opportunity cost for one to engage in the 
entrepreneurial activity. The expected value is influenced by the nature of opportunity, non-
psychological factors, psychological factors, environmental factors and individual 
characteristics of the entrepreneur (Shane, 2003).  
 
Environmental factors such as economic, political, demographic and cultural influence the 
opportunities for entrepreneurship. They can either create or weaken the opportunities. For 
example, the state of the economy plays a crucial role in influencing the type of 
entrepreneurial activity which can range from innovative to illegal ventures. Stable economic 
conditions, unemployment rates, income disparity and capital availability are all believed to 
either cause an increase or a decrease in the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunity 
(Fuduric, 2008). For instance, high income disparity can push low wage earners into 
entrepreneurship due to the low opportunity cost of entrepreneurship. On the other hand, high 
income disparity means those with very low income might not have the financial capacity to 
start a business. On the political front, the government has a bigger role to play in facilitating 
the exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities. A more flexible rule of law, less stringent 
licensing and bankruptcy policies, deregulation of markets, efficiency-enhancing resource 
related policies, and targeted sectorial policies will increase entrepreneurial activity (Fuduric, 
2008). 
 
Individual-level characteristics that influence the expected value of exploitation of an 
entrepreneurial opportunity are education, career experience, general business experience, 
functional experience, industry experience, start-up experience, secondhand learning, age, 
social position, social status and social ties, among others (Shane, 2003). These factors 
improve the individual’s social networks which increases an individual’s early access to 
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information. An educated executive is better informed than a school dropout and is likely to 
discover an opportunity faster than the school dropout. Literature has it that people in certain 
careers like engineering, natural sciences and research and development, are likely to discover 
new venture opportunities as they have access to new knowledge and technology (Fuduric, 
2008). Also working experience is an added advantage for someone who wants to be an 
entrepreneur as a lot of social networks that encourage opportunity discovery are created 
during the working period (Delmar and Davidson, 2000). 
 
The psychological factors are classified under three classes’ namely motivational needs, core 
evaluation and cognition. These three classes are made up of different arms as shown in table 
5 below. 
 
Table 5: Psychological factors that influence entrepreneurial decision making  
Aspects of personality and motives • Extroversion 
• Agreeableness 
• Need for Achievement 
• Risk Taking 
• Desire for Independence 
Core self-evaluation • Locus of control 
• Self-efficacy 
Cognitive properties • Overconfidence 
• Representativeness 
• Intuition 
       Source: Shane, (2003).     
                                    
All the psychological attributes stated in table 5 above are believed to be positively related to 
exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunities. Cognitive properties are important in decision 
making because exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunity is usually done under uncertainty, 
with limited information and time pressure (Fuduric, 2008). According to Shane (2003) 
extroverts are more likely to exploit an opportunity than are introverts, because they are more 
comfortable with taking risks. Extroverts are able to assemble resources and organize them 
under conditions of uncertainty. In the same manner, people with a high level of internal 
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locus of control and self-efficacy are more likely to be entrepreneurs than those that have an 
external locus of control (Shane, 2003). 
 
3.5 Synthesis of the Definition of Entrepreneurship 
The economic elements of entrepreneurship12 on their own fail to give a functional definition 
that can be used in defining entrepreneurs in Zimbabwe.  When the economic elements are 
combined with non-economic elements, entrepreneurships then become activities that can be 
easily defined among other economic activities. Shane (2003:4) provides a definition of 
entrepreneurship which embraces all the elements when he defines entrepreneurship as “an 
activity that involves the discovery, evaluation and exploitation of opportunities to introduce 
new goods and services, way of organizing, markets, processes, and raw materials through 
organizing efforts that previously had not existed”. He combines the Schumpterian 
entrepreneur of creative destruction and the Kirznerian entrepreneur who is alert to 
opportunity as well as the psychologist and sociologists’ theories on the contribution of 
human traits and personality in the entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Although this definition conceptualizes all theories on entrepreneurship, it cannot be 
operationalized in an empirical research like this one. The definition used in this study is the 
one provided by Shane (2003) where entrepreneurship is defined as self-employment, being 
the activity of performing work for profit rather than wages. This activity could be in a 
business with employees or in a one man business. When entrepreneurship is defined as self-
employment it becomes measurable and can be used in empirical research. 
 
The next section discusses the economic roles of entrepreneurship by identifying its 
importance in economic development. 
 
3.6 Economic Roles of Entrepreneurship 
Despite having so many different angles in approaching the entrepreneurship process, one 
common fact among the researchers is that entrepreneurship is critical for economic 
development. Literature identifies the key roles of entrepreneurship in economic development 
as: job creation, innovation, economic growth, competition, firm formation and expansion. 
12 The economic elements were discussed on pages 53-55. 
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The next section will look at each role and reveal the findings of different researchers in 
different countries’ contexts. 
 
3.6.1 Entrepreneurship and Job Creation  
Small-scale entrepreneurial activity has been commended for its role in economic 
development and the well-being of society through job and income creation, among other 
things. In recent years, the focus by policy makers has diverted towards small firm start-ups 
and high investments in research and development as key strategies for fighting 
unemployment (Badal, 2010). Audretsch and Thurik (2001) argue that the increasing focus on 
new small firm creation has been caused by the increase in uncertainty in the world economy. 
The smaller firms are more flexible in dealing with adverse changes than large firms and 
adapt faster than large firms to any changes, like a change in technology. Evidence from 
literature suggests that young and small firms perform better than the older or larger firms, in 
terms of employment creation (Blanchflower, 2000). The biggest challenge with small-scale 
entrepreneurship has been the high exiting rates which makes it an unreliable employment 
creator (Baptista, Escaria and Madruga, 2008).  
 
The major problem with entrepreneurship is that some of the new start-ups have a low 
survival rate. For example, as of 2000, in the United States new business start-ups have been 
creating an average of 39.75% new jobs annually, of which 40% of these new firms shut 
down within the first 3 years (Spletzer, 2000). By 2008, the new firms in the United States 
accounted for 43% of the new jobs created annually and 20% of these firms collapsed within 
the first year. The high failure rates have been the reason why many researchers have 
recommended the need for concentrated support on the new small-scale firms by their 
respective governments or any other non-government organizations as these new small-scale 
firms could be the only solution to the economic growth problems worldwide (GEM Report, 
2010). 
 
The higher failure rates among the new entrants, suggest that the net relationship between 
new firms and jobs created is not always positive. Baptista et al., (2008) argue that the overall 
impact depends on whether the new firms bring about market growth. Unless the new markets 
create positive supply-side spillovers through innovation, greater competition, efficiency, 
product differentiation and improved quality, the new firms will not contribute significantly 
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to employment growth (Baptista et al., 2008:50). The empirical studies that are documented 
in the literature are diverse, in some cases showing a positive impact and in others a negative 
impact of the new entrants on employment growth depending on the methodology that was 
used (Thurik et al, 2008; Ghavidel et al. 2011).  
 
More recent researchers have emphasized the existence of lagged response with respect to the 
supply-side spillovers of new firms being visualized (Baptista et al., 2008). From a study on 
the Portuguese economy, Baptista et al. (2008) found that it took about 8 years for the supply-
side spillovers of the new entrants to be realized. As with many other studies, the direct 
effects were observed immediately in the form of new jobs entering the market. In another 
study done in Germany, the findings were that it took 6 years before the indirect positive 
effects kicked in (Fritsch and Mueller, 2004). In Great Britain it was only in the 4th year when 
the indirect positive effects kicked in (Mueller, van Stel and David, 2007). 
 
More research is still being done to try and explain the relationship between entrepreneurship 
(new firms being created) and employment creation. However, one thing that is clear is that 
there is a relationship between entrepreneurial activity and employment creation which can be 
explained differently from one country to the other. Entrepreneurship could be the solution 
for the high unemployment rate, especially in Africa, but it requires the inputs of the 
researchers to make country-level policy recommendations. 
 
3.6.2 Entrepreneurship and Economic Growth 
Literature has conclusive evidence on the importance of entrepreneurship on economic 
growth but its impact differs from country to country depending mainly on the stage of 
economic development (GEM Report, 2013). The other possible reason for the disparity on 
the impact of entrepreneurship on economic growth could be that there is no universally 
agreed measure of entrepreneurship. Depending on the scope and country under study, 
different variables have been used as proxies for entrepreneurship, among which are business 
ownership rates, the number of nascent entrepreneurs, self-employment rates and new patents 
or trademarks (Van Stel, Wennekers, Thurik and De Wit, 2003; Ovaska and Sobel, 2005).  
 
It is only until recently when the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor project was first 
implemented in 1999, that a model relating entrepreneurship and economic growth was 
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developed. The GEM model was based on the concept that the contribution of entrepreneurial 
activity to a country’s economic development depends on that country’s phase of economic 
development in line with Porter’s typology of “factor-driven economies”, “efficiency-driven 
economies” and “innovation-driven economies” (GEM Report, 2013).The main objectives of 
the GEM project are: 
• To measure differences in entrepreneurial attitudes, activity and aspirations among 
economies; 
• To uncover factors determining the nature and level of national entrepreneurial 
activity; 
• To identify policy implications for enhancing entrepreneurship in an economy 
(GEM Report, 2013). 
 
GEM views entrepreneurship as a continuous process comprised of 4 phases namely, nascent 
entrepreneurs, entrepreneurs who own and manage a new business, entrepreneurs who own 
and manage an established business and finally discontinued businesses. By combining the 
rates of the nascent entrepreneurs and that of the owner-managers entrepreneurs who have 
been operating for less than 42 months, it will give what the GEM calls the Total early-stage 
Entrepreneurial Activity (TEA).  TEA is calculated as a percentage of the adult population 
(18-64 years old) and is highest for factor-driven economics like Zambia and Nigeria with 
39%, and lowest among the innovation economies like Italy and Japan with 3.4% and 3.7% 
respectively (GEM Report, 2013). From the GEM Report (2011) one of the findings was that 
TEA is not directly linked to economic growth. A high TEA rate does not necessarily imply a 
direct positive economic growth. What matters is the profile and institutional context of 
entrepreneurship in that country. The profile of entrepreneurship refers to the ratio of TEA to 
established business ownership and to discontinued businesses.  
 
When economies are in the innovation-driven stage, the relationship between TEA and GDP 
per capita is less pronounced than when they are in the factor-driven stage (GEM Report, 
2013). This is mainly so because of the increase in job opportunities as the economy moves 
from factor driven to innovation driven. Entrepreneurial attitudes, perceptions of 
opportunities, capabilities, and fear of failure, and entrepreneurial intentions all affect TEA 
rate and its overall impact on economic growth. More precisely, individual motivation – 
necessity driven or opportunity driven – and social inclusion – demographics, education, 
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women involvement, and household income – have a lot to contribute towards the TEA rate 
(GEM Report, 2013). 
 
Carree and Thurik (2005) suggest a framework to explain how entrepreneurship influences 
economic growth through linking the entrepreneurial roles and the impact of entrepreneurial 
capital. The three roles, as identified by the scholars who initially defined the concept of 
entrepreneurship, are: innovating (Schumpeterian entrepreneur); profiteering (Kirznerian 
entrepreneur); and risk-taking under conditions of uncertainty (Caree and Thurik, 2003). A 
lack of entrepreneurial activity is thus associated with low rates of innovation, unused profit 
opportunities and risk averse attitudes, leading to low economic growth (Caree and Thurik, 
2005). 
 
There will also be no link between entrepreneurship and economic growth if the following 
three impacts of entrepreneurial capital are not realized. Firstly, entrepreneurial capital should 
create knowledge spillover, augment the number of enterprises (move from large scale to 
small-scale) and increase competition, and promote diversity among firms within the same 
location (Audretsch and Thurik, 2004). “It is the exchange of complementary knowledge 
across diverse firms and economic agents that yield an important return on new economic 
knowledge. The geographic environment promotes knowledge externalities which lead to 
innovative activity and economic growth” (Caree and Thurik, 2005:8).  
 
Evidence in the literature on the impact of entrepreneurship on economic growth, shows that 
a positive relationship is expected if entrepreneurship is defined as innovation, or  the 
introduction of new products, or by increasing competition through the introduction of 
variations on existing products and as increasing market efficiency (Van Stel et al., 2005). 
The entrepreneurial activity in many developed nations is characterized by these activities, 
hence a greater percentage of their growth in GDP is attributed to entrepreneurship. 
 
Over the years, developed nations have seen a shift from large companies to smaller firms in 
different industries, increasing competition. Developed economies have also experienced a 
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shift from a ‘managed economy’13 to an ‘entrepreneurial economy’14 allowing for knowledge 
spillover (Deakins and Freel, 2012, van Stel et al., 2005)). However, the magnitude and 
importance of entrepreneurship still differ from one country to the other depending on its 
stage of development (GEM Report, 2011). Highly developed countries tend to benefit more 
from entrepreneurship compared to less developed countries, the reason being that there is 
more opportunistic entrepreneurship compared to necessity entrepreneurship in highly 
developed countries. Opportunistic entrepreneurship contributes positively to economic 
growth as it is usually done for profit reasons and the entrepreneur always strives to make the 
most from the available opportunity (Acs, 2008; GEM Report, 2013). 
 
The positive relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth has been supported 
by many studies in different countries and there is also evidence suggesting that the 
relationship is not linear, but could be quadratic (Van Stel, 2005; Acs, 2008; GEM Report, 
2011).  
 
3.6.3 Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
Drucker (2011) defined innovation as a means by which entrepreneurs exploit available 
opportunities to create new services and businesses. These opportunities can be in the form of 
new knowledge, changes in demographics, perceptions, or industry structure. 
 
The link between entrepreneurship and innovation can be traced back to the works of 
Schumpeter (1934) and his vision of capitalism. He defined entrepreneurship as a practice 
which involved consciously implementing innovation, in terms of novel factor combinations, 
and introducing new goods, markets, modes of production, organizational forms, or sources 
of raw materials (Barreira et al., 2008:10). According to Schumpeter (1934) the process of 
innovation can be described as ‘creative destruction’ as it creates disequilibrium in the 
economy which will require other market actors to act upon it to restore economic 
equilibrium. Many factors like transparent of rule of law, sophisticated information and 
technology, high levels of income, developed industrial structures, diverse markets, only to 
13 Managed economy- as defined by van Stel et al. (2005:331) - is the political, social and economic response to 
an economy dictated by forces of large-scale production, reflecting the predominance of the production factors 
of capital and (unskilled) labor as the sources of competitive advantage. 
14 Entrepreneurial economy- according to van Stel et al. (2005:331) is the political, social and economic 
response to an economy dictated not just by the dominance of the production factor of knowledge, but also by 
the presence of entrepreneurial activity to accommodate knowledge spillovers. 
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mention a few, need to be in place for innovation to happen (Fuduric, 2008). Creative 
destruction will devalue, if not destroy, previous investments and labour skills.  Failure by 
market actors to adjust accordingly to the destruction may cause permanent economic 
distress. 
 
In today’s economics, innovation has been attuned to represent new forms of organizing, 
research and development, patents, new business models or methods of reaching customers 
(Deakins and Freel, 2012:191). Innovation no longer only involves destruction but also 
includes improving previous innovations with less emphasis on technological inventions, an 
incline towards Kirznerian entrepreneurship (Fuduric, 2008). Nevertheless, a common feature 
with all definitions of innovation in the literature is that they refer to the creation of 
something new or the discovery of something new, with the entrepreneur as an agent. Also, 
innovation is not circumscribed by the size of firm, that is, it can be done in both large and 
small firms. As more and more things are invented, competition in the market will also 
increase. 
 
3.6.4 Entrepreneurship and competition 
The concepts of entrepreneurship and competition are two notions that neoclassical 
economists have failed to link mainly because neoclassical economics emphasize maintaining 
market equilibrium through price and quantity adjustments. Under perfect competition, 
everyone has equal access to information, giving no comparative advantage on any individual 
hence no market process is allowed. In the theory of firm, it is only under imperfect 
competition that the entrepreneurial role is identified as a building block to monopoly power 
(Kirzner, 1978). Imperfect knowledge creates profit opportunities which then promote 
Kirznerian entrepreneurship.15. Competition will thus exist in the market process and 
individuals “gravitate closer and closer to the limits of their ability to participate gainfully in 
the market” (Kirzner, 1978:12). The ability for entrepreneurship to allow for knowledge 
spillover means that competition will also be enhanced and new firms will also be formed. 
New firms are formed by individuals who are alert to business opportunities and act on these 
opportunities. 
 
15 Refer to page 48 for a definition of Kirznerian entrepreneurship 
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3.6.5 Entrepreneurship and Firm formation and expansion 
Once the entrepreneur has made a decision to launch a business, he/she will then proceed to 
start the actual operations. Most businesses start small and given the right opportunities can 
grow into a larger firm. However, some start small and remain small and this has been the 
major problem with many businesses in Africa. The main reason for the failure of the small 
firms to expand has been identified as lack of financial capital (Deakins and Freel, 2012).  
 
Worldwide, government intervention towards small-scale entrepreneurship has been 
intensified, and researchers and policy makers believe that entrepreneurship is the answer to 
low economic growth and unemployment problems; hence entrepreneurship should be 
supported (Deakins and Freel, 2012). In 2005, the European Commission re-launched the 
‘Lisbon Strategy’, also known as the ‘Strategy for Growth and Jobs’. The main goal of this 
strategy is to encourage all EU nations to promote the formation of small firms and to 
prioritize the needs of established small firms so that they can grow. SMEs are now a key 
source of dynamism and innovation, and have been shown to be a key source of net job 
creation in OECD countries (Deakins and Freel, 2012:33). Despite intensified involvement of 
governments in the formation and growth of small-scale firms in developed nations, there is 
still a lot of controversy around the effectiveness of government support in developing and 
under-developed nations. For instance, in Africa one area of controversy is the lack of 
homogeneity among African small firms, making it difficult for public policies to be effective 
(Mboma, 2008). However this does not mean that government should not be involved, but 
rather it brings out the need for targeted policies when addressing small firms’ concerns, 
instead of general public policies. 
 
3.6.6 Necessity versus Opportunity Driven Entrepreneurship 
The contribution of entrepreneurship to the economy is closely linked to the motivation 
behind the enterprise. Entrepreneurs are often driven by necessity or opportunity factors in 
their quest to establish a business. Some entrepreneurs are in business because of the absence 
of any work; these are known as necessity entrepreneurs. Others are in business because an 
attractive business opportunity availed, prompting them to become entrepreneurs. These 




Necessity entrepreneurs venture into business because of survival needs arising as a result of 
loss of employment or structural changes in an economy. As the skills needed by a 
developing economy change, those individuals who are unable to acquire new skills can 
remain unemployed for a protracted period. Some of them may turn to necessity 
entrepreneurship by opening small businesses that can generate just enough revenue for their 
subsistence. Acs (2008: 97) defines necessity entrepreneurs as those individuals who “find 
themselves with no other options for work than self-employment”. This type of 
entrepreneurship is a result of unemployment push and refugee or desperation effects (Thurik 
et al., 2008). The push effects could possibly come from commitments that come with 
pregnancy, loss of a breadwinner, loss of employment or poor prospects of employment (Acs, 
2008). 
 
On the other hand, opportunity entrepreneurs are driven by the existence of unexploited 
opportunities in the market or economy. These opportunities can be in the form of resources, 
or price differentials (Acs, 2008). Shane (2003: 16) defines an entrepreneurial opportunity as 
“a situation in which a person can create a new means-end framework for recombining 
resources that the entrepreneur believes will yield a profit”. However, opportunities are not 
always profitable, causing some businesses to record a low life-span. This study will 
investigate if the state of the economy can also pose as an opportunity for entrepreneurs. One 
key feature about opportunistic entrepreneurs is that they voluntarily get into business.  They 
also have sophisticated managerial skills, technical knowledge, and delegate authority, among 
other things (Williams, 2007). 
 
The two groups of entrepreneurs, necessity entrepreneurs and opportunity entrepreneurs have 
different impacts on economic development and both exist in every economy (Acs, 2008). 
For economic development, a higher opportunity: necessity ratio is needed, and if the 
necessity ratio is higher than the opportunity ratio, then there will be little economic 
development (Acs, 2008: 98). The ratio of opportunity to necessity entrepreneurs is higher for 
high income countries and lower for low/medium income countries (GEM report, 2010). Acs 
(2008: 101) in his study on how entrepreneurship is good for economic growth, using data 
from the GEM 2004 global report, found a strong correlation between the opportunity: 
necessity ratio and the per capita income of different countries. His argument was that 
countries with a higher opportunity: necessity ratio have a positive correlation with per capita 
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income and other economic indicators, such as exports as a percentage of GDP and education 
spending, whilst those with a lower opportunity: necessity ratio are negatively, if not at all 
correlated with the above economic indicators. Based on this finding, it can be postulated that 
low income countries, which have not yet realised significant economic benefits from 
entrepreneurship, are dominated by necessity entrepreneurs. For this reason, as long as the 
opportunity: necessity ratio remains low, very little economic growth can be expected from 
the entrepreneurial activity.  
 
Another distinguishing feature between necessity and opportunity entrepreneurship pertains 
to their survival rate once established. The 2013 GEM report, noted a significant relationship 
between prevailing start-up motives in a country and new business survival rates. Those 
countries dominated by opportunity-driven entrepreneurship have a lower rate of business 
failure in the early stage and those dominated by necessity entrepreneurship have a higher 
failure rate (GEM Report 2013). Is it possible then that the MSEs in Zimbabwe, that were 
formed during the meltdown period and are still operational, were opportunity driven or a 
combination of both necessity and opportunity driven? This question will be answered in this 
research. It is also the thrust of this study to unearth the driving force of entrepreneurial 
activity in Zimbabwe, especially during the meltdown period. 
 
3.6.7 New Developments in the field of Entrepreneurship 
In recent times, new dimensions to the field of entrepreneurship have emerged.  There is more 
research on social entrepreneurship, corporate entrepreneurship and incubators, as tools for 
enhancing innovation and entrepreneurship. Social entrepreneurship is an entrepreneurial 
activity that fosters social benefits in areas where the public sector is not successful, like 
waste management, financing low-income business activities without a collateral as in the 
case of Grameen Bank, and the deployment of sanitation systems in rural areas, among others 
(Lumpkin, Moss, Gras, Kato and Amezcua, 2013). The major players in social 
entrepreneurial activity are non-profit organizations and welfare organisations, in which the 
focus is to empower poor and disadvantaged individuals whose needs cannot be adequately 
met by the private sector.  Although there is increasing interest among researchers to define 
social entrepreneurship as well as address the antecedents and outcomes of social 
entrepreneurship, theoretical underpinnings are still being developed as there are no agreed 
variables that adequately measure all social changes without interfacing with private 
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expenditure flows (Austin, Stevenson and Wei-Skillern, 2006). 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship is expanding fast.  It is an entrepreneurial process that goes on 
inside an existing firm which leads to new business ventures, the development of new 
products, services or processes and the renewal of strategies and competitive postures 
(Ramachandran, Devarajan and Ray, 2006; Porter, 2008; Stead and Stead, 2014). Central to 
this type of entrepreneurship is the urge to identify sources of existing and emerging customer 
dissatisfaction and developing solutions from within the company to eliminate them and re-
engineering process to enhance the marketing positioning of a form in the global environment    
(Ramachandran et. al, 2006). Studies have indicated that corporate entrepreneurship improves 
a company’s growth, profitability and performance (Ramachandran et. al, 2006). Corporate 
entrepreneurship can take different forms.  These include: 
Internal corporate venturing/ intrapreneurship- new businesses are created within the 
same organisation by having access to its core resources.  
External corporate venturing- creation of new businesses as a separate entity from the 
organisation with the assistance of venture or angel capital. 
Strategic Renewal- involves the renewal of key ideas, strategies or structures within 
the organisation to make it more competitive (Ramachandran et. al, 2006). 
 
Barbero, Casillas, Wright and Garcia (2013) regard an incubator as an entity that provides 
new ventures with resources that improve their probability of foundation and survival and 
accelerate their development. The incubator provides services, like human capital, financing, 
technology, marketing support and entrepreneurial spirit. There are four main archetypes of 
incubators discussed in literature, namely basic research, university, economic development 
and private incubators (Barbero et. al, 2013). These incubators generate different types of 
innovation, ranging from products and technology to organizational structures.   Most policy 
issues that are encouraging economic growth through entrepreneurship, target these 
incubators as sources of new research and development. These developments consolidate the 




Although these new developments are gaining prominence and important in both developed 
and developing countries, the above aspects of entrepreneurship were not considered in this 
study as it examines a meltdown environment where these conditions did not exist.  
 
3.7 Determinants of Entrepreneurship 
Discussions about the positive impact of entrepreneurship on economic growth and 
employment creation have taken centre stage worldwide, and emphasis has been placed on 
implementing policies that encourage especially the growth of small-scale entrepreneurship. 
This has also focussed research on investigating the determinants of entrepreneurship in a bid 
to identify the instruments that can be used when formulating policies encouraging 
entrepreneurship. 
 
Dreher and Gassebner (2007) group the determinants of entrepreneurship into 3 classes, 
namely economic factors, social or personal characteristics and institutional attributes. The 
economic factors include GDP per capita, inflation, taxes, foreign direct investments, 
unemployment rate, provision of sound money and credit availability. The social and personal 
characteristics include education and age, female share in labour force, and society’s 
tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity. The main institutional characteristics identified in 
the literature as determinants of entrepreneurship are economic freedom, quality of legal 
system, restrictions on international trade and government corruption (Dreher and Gassebner, 
2007). 
 
Below are some of the studies that have looked at the impact of the different factors on 
growth in entrepreneurship in the formal sectors. 
 
3.7.1 Economic factors 
GDP per capita  
Ovaska and Sobel (2005) looked at the relationship between the economic performance of 
different countries (former Soviet Republic and other Eastern European nations) and their 
rates of entrepreneurial activities. Using a sample of 10 countries and annual data from 1995-
2000 they ran a panel random effects model on a number of economic indicators whose 
results are given in this section. They measured entrepreneurship in terms of the number of 
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new enterprises per 1000 inhabitants. Ovaska and Sobel (2005) found no significant impact of 
GDP per capita on the number of new enterprises per 1000 inhabitants. 
 
On the contrary, Parker and Robson (2004) found a positive correlation between GDP per 
capita and entrepreneurship from the panel data analysis they carried out on 12 OECD 
countries using 1972-1996 data. In another study, van Stel, Wennekers, Thurik and de Wit 
(2003) aimed at explaining cross-country variations in nascent entrepreneurship using a 
sample of 36 countries from the GEM report of 2002. van Stel et al. (2003) found a negative 
relationship with respect to GDP per capita and a U-shaped relationship between nascent 
entrepreneurship and the square of GDP per capita.  
 
Soundness of monetary policy is another factor that was studied to investigate its influence on 
entrepreneurial activity. Ovaska and Sobel (2005) found a negative relationship with respect 
to inflation and entrepreneurial activity in his study on entrepreneurship in 10 Baltic and 
Central-European economies (post-socialist economies). In their study, inflation was used as 
a proxy to measure the soundness of monetary policy in the country. They found a negative 
relationship between entrepreneurial activity and inflation. The opposite seems to have been 
happening in Zimbabwe during the period 1996 to 2010, as entrepreneurial activity was on 
the rise when the economy was melting down. In other words, there seems to be a positive 
relationship between entrepreneurial activity and inflation in Zimbabwe. This identifies a 
possible a gap in the literature as the direction of causality between entrepreneurship and 
inflation is definitely not clear.  
 
Tax is the third economic factor studied. The effects of income tax on incentives for 
entrepreneurship have been documented in the literature as both positive and negative (Parker 
and Robson, 2004). The greater the opportunity for tax evasion, through self-employment, the 
more positive is the relationship between income tax and entrepreneurship. On the other hand, 
high tax rates tend to reduce the incentive to supply effort hence reduce the incentive to be an 
entrepreneur (Parker and Robson, 2004). Using annual data on 12 OECD countries, from 
1972-1996, Parker and Robson (2004) employed a panel integration and cointegration 
technique to study the determinants of aggregate self-employment rates. They found a 
positive relationship between entrepreneurship and personal income tax rate. However, van 




Foreign direct investment is another factor studied to investigate its influence on 
entrepreneurship. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is a proxy for the availability of financial 
capital and is expected to be positively related to entrepreneurial activity. Van Stel et al. 
(2003), Ovaska and Sobel (2005), and Parker and Robson (2004) all found no significant 
relationship between FDIs and entrepreneurship. 
 
Unemployment rate is another variable that has been studied extensively by various 
researchers. The results of the relationship between unemployment and entrepreneurship are 
rather mixed. Wennekers and Thurik (1999) found no significant relationship between 
unemployment and entrepreneurship, but found a negative relationship between employment 
benefits and self-employment. On the contrary, Thurik et al. (2008) found the existence of 
both positive and negative relationships. They used panel data of unemployment and self-
employment rates for 23 OECD countries from 1974-2002 to run a 2-equation VAR model. 
On one hand, an increase in unemployment rate leads to an increase in subsequent start-up 
activity among self-employed individuals. On the other hand, an increase in the rate of self-
employment (increased entrepreneurial activity) leads to a decrease in unemployment in 
subsequent periods (Thurik et al., 2008).  
 
Credit Availability is another variable that has been studied by researchers. One of the reasons 
why many new businesses have reported low life spans or a failure to expand was identified 
as a lack of access to financial resources. Ovaska and Sobel (2005) are researchers who have 
looked at the importance of credit availability on entrepreneurial activity and found a positive 
relationship between the two variables. Other studies that have modelled the relationship 
between credit and entrepreneurship were conducted in the form of a randomized 
experimental study. Fatchamps (2011) (in Chowdhury, Amin and Farha, 2012) used a random 
sample of microenterprises in Ghana. The microenterprises were given cash and in-kind 
grants. Positive treatment effects were picked in the form of profit differences. In-kind grants 
were more useful for women than men, whilst cash grants did not show any significant 
difference between men and women-owned enterprises. 
 
The credit constraint has also been found to have a gender characteristic where women are 
identified as being more disadvantaged than males (Arenius and Minniti, 2005). Women are 
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perceived as small and inexperienced borrowers which increases their risk-factor. The same 
applies to the sector in which the business is operating, where a formal sector enterprise is 
more likely to receive credit than an informal sector business (Chowdhury et al., 2012).  
 
Provision of sound money. From the same study that was done by Bjornskov and Foss (2008) 
provision of sound money was found to increase entrepreneurial activity. Financial capital has 
been identified as one of the factors that limit the establishment and growth of enterprises. 
Hence provision of money to the society will definitely encourage it, as much as increasing 
credit availability will do (Ovaska and Sobel, 2005; Bjornskov and Foss, 2008). 
               
3.7.2 Social and Personal Characteristics 
Education, Age and Gender are the three demographic variables that have been identified as 
influencing an individual’s desire to be an entrepreneur. Grilo and Thurik (2005) used data 
from a 2004 survey data, from the 15 old EU member states and the United States to test the 
relationship between education and gender and entrepreneurial activity. They found that 
poorly educated men are more likely to be self-employed. A study at the macro level using 27 
countries from the GEM found that a higher level of education in a country is accompanied 
by a lower self-employment rate (Uhlaner and Thurik, 2007).  
 
Wildeman, Hofstede, Noorderhaven, Thurik, Verhoeven, and Wennekers (1999) found 
education and age-structure to be insignificant using country level data from 23 OECD 
countries. However, Uhlaner and Thurik (2007) found a negative relationship with secondary 
education, but positive with tertiary education. They did a comparative analysis of 
entrepreneurial activity in 27 countries in the 2002 GEM report. Using Ordinary Least 
Squares, post materialism (as a cultural attribute measuring changes in values in modern 
societies),  per capita income, education rates (secondary and tertiary) and life satisfaction 
were regressed on the dependent variable of total entrepreneurial activity (comprised of 
nascent entrepreneurs and new formations). The finding was that education has no significant 
impact on total entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Female share in labour force is another factor that has been studied in a bid to try and find its 
influence on entrepreneurial activity. A negative relationship between female share in the 
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labour force and entrepreneurship was found in the 12 OECD countries studied by Parker and 
Robson (2004). However, Uhlaner and Thurik (2007) found a positive relationship instead. 
 
Society’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity as a measure of dissatisfaction with society, 
is another cultural factor that has been studied by researchers. Dissatisfaction with society and 
life as a whole was identified as a stronger push factor for self-employment compared to 
unemployment (Wildeman et al., 1999). Wildeman et al. (1999) used data from 23 OECD 
countries to test the relationship between dissatisfaction and self-employment. They used four 
variables to measure dissatisfaction namely; corruption, power distance, bureaucracy and 
uncertainty avoidance. Their main finding was a positive relationship between the rate of self-
employment and an increase in dissatisfaction with society and life across the 23 OECD 
nations. However, the positive relationship could not be ascertained within the countries. 
They also found a stronger relationship between the dissatisfaction variable and 
entrepreneurial activity compared to economic variables like unemployment across the 
nations. 
 
3.7.3 Institutional factors 
Economic freedom. This variable measures factors such as sound legal institutions, low 
regulations and secure property rights. A study done by Ovaska and Sobel (2005) using data 
from countries in the former Soviet Union and East Europe found no significant relationship 
between economic freedom and entrepreneurship. However, Bjornskov and Foss (2008) 
found a negative relationship between size of government and entrepreneurial activity. Their 
study was an analysis of how economic policy and institutional design affect entrepreneurship 
across 29 countries from the 2001 GEM report. OLS models and robust regression techniques 
were run in this study. 
 
Quality of legal system. According to Bjornskov and Foss (2008) the quality of the legal 
system does not have an impact on entrepreneurial activity in the 29 countries they studied.  
 
The influence of restrictions on international trade on entrepreneurial activity has also been 
studied. This factor was found not to have an impact on entrepreneurial activity by  
Bjornskov and Foss (2008) and nor do import tariffs (Ovaska and Sobel, 2005). Bjornskov 
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and Foss (2008) found that most entrepreneurial activities depend on the local producers and 
suppliers and any regulations on trade will not impact on entrepreneurial activity. 
 
Government corruption is a critical factor especially when one discusses African countries. 
Corruption has been used in other studies as a measure of dissatisfaction and was found to be 
positively related to self-employment (Wildeman et al., 1999). Ovaska and Sobel (2005) used 
corruption as a measure of soundness of governmental institutions and policies. This factor 
was found to impact more positively and significantly on smaller firm entrepreneurial 
activity, than larger firms (Ovaska and Sobel, 2005). A sound governmental institution 
protects larger firms from manipulating political processes to their advantage, jeopardising 
the creation of smaller firms (Ovaska and Sobel, 2005). 
 
In as much as the findings from the studies reviewed in this section might have found 
significant relationships between the various factors and entrepreneurship, the direction of 
causality is still inconclusive. Another important observation is that most of these studies 
have been done in ‘normal time’, and no recent study seems to have been done to explain 
entrepreneurial growth in abnormal times in Africa, such as during an economic meltdown. 
Further, earlier studies did not examine the influence of N-Ach on the development of small-
firm entrepreneurship decision making processes. This study takes these short comings into 
consideration and will make a positive contribution to the literature. 
 
Bearing in mind that the thrust of this study is to investigate the economic determinants of 
entrepreneurship in a melting down economy, the key variables to be used in this study will 
be real GDP, inflation (or money supply) and unemployment in Zimbabwe over the period 
1980-2010. One anticipates a positive relationship with respect to all the variables in order to 
justify the steep growth in entrepreneurship during the meltdown period. 
 
3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has defined the key concepts that make the foundation of the study of 
entrepreneurship, and has also conceptualized them in the context of this study. This study 
uses the definition of entrepreneurship as self-employment. Two types of entrepreneurial 
activity; opportunistic and necessity entrepreneurship were defined, and also linked to their 
role in economic development. Although the role of entrepreneurship in economic growth is 
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not conclusive, the literature maintains that it depends on the country’s stage of economic 
development and the type of entrepreneurship dominant in the specific country. In the same 
manner, factors that determine entrepreneurship differ from one country to another. The 
importance of N-Ach in business performance and its contribution in entrepreneurial decision 
making was also examined. Available evidence shows that N-Ach contributes to the 
performance of a business, and this study will now look at its importance in decisions relating 
to location of the enterprise in either the formal or informal sector.   
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 CHAPTER 4: 
MSEs AND THE INFORMAL SECTOR 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter defined the entrepreneur as the owner of a business and also identified 
the role of entrepreneurship in the economy. This chapter will focus on the enterprise and will 
identify the different types of enterprises that exist in the economy. The chapter starts by 
discussing the different classifications of the businesses in terms of their size. The rest of the 
chapter focuses on understanding the operations and the importance of micro and small-scale 
enterprises (MSEs) in the two sector economy (formal and informal sectors), in the context of 
Zimbabwe. 
 
4.2 Micro and Small-scale enterprises (MSEs) 
4.2.1 How small is small? 
 
The biggest challenge in defining small scale entrepreneurship has been finding a general 
definition of the word ‘small’ itself. How small is small? There are lots of ambiguities around 
the meaning of a small enterprise as it is generally used subjectively. For example, an 
independent car manufacturer, Aston Martin, who employs 700 people, is considered a small 
firm compared to BMW, and yet Manchester United with few staff is considered among the 
largest football clubs in the world (Deakins and Freel, 2012). Clearly smallness depends on 
the context in which it is being used. In trying to solve the ambiguity around this issue, the 
UK Committee of Inquiry on small firms (the Bolton Committee) has recognized that size is 
relative to sector; hence in some cases small firms can be defined by number of employees 
and in some cases by turnover or assets to complement the economic definition, as indicated 
in table 6 (Deakins and Freel, 2012:33).  
 








Table 6: Bolton Committee’s definition of Small Firms 
The ‘statistical’ definition 
Manufacturing  20 employees or less 
Construction and mining and quarrying  25 employees or less 
Retail and miscellaneous services Turnover of $78,000 or less 
Motor trades Turnover of $157,000 or less 
Wholesale trades Turnover of $315,000 or less 
Road transport 5 vehicles or less 
Catering  All: excluding multiple and brewery managed houses 
The ‘economic’ definition 
Small firms are those which: 
1. Have a relatively small share of their marketplace 
2. Are managed by owners or part-owners in a personalized way, and not through the 
medium of a formalized management structure 
3. Are independent, in the sense of not being part of a large enterprise 
Source: Deakins and Freel, (2012:34). 
 
The European Commission revised the Bolton Committee’s definition in 2005 and came up 
with a new definition, which disintegrates the SME sector into 3 categories; it then 
characterizes them as medium-sized, small and micro ventures, in terms of the number of 
employees, turnover and balance sheet total. The three subsets are shown in the table below: 
 
Table 7: European Union definition of SMEs 
Enterprise Category Head count Turnover Balance Sheet total 
Medium-sided <250 ≤50 million pounds ≤ 43 million pounds 
Small <50 ≤10 million pounds ≤ 10 million pounds 
Micro <10 ≤ 2 million pounds ≤ 2 million pounds 
Source: Fedulova, 2013;  Deakins and Freel, 2012: 35 
 
In South Africa, The National Small Business Act of 1996 defines a ‘small business’ as a 
separate distinct business entity, including cooperative enterprises and non-governmental 
organisations, managed by one owner or more. A micro enterprise is defined as a business 
77 
 
with a turnover less than the VAT registration limit (that is, R150 000 per year). These 
enterprises usually lack formality in terms of registration. They include, for example, spaza 
shops, minibus taxis and household industries, and employ no more than 5 people. For a 
small enterprise the upper limit is 50 employees. Small enterprises are generally more 
established than micro enterprises and exhibit more complex business practices. Medium 
enterprises have a maximum number of employees equal to 100, or 200 for the mining, 
electricity, manufacturing and construction sectors. These enterprises are often characterised 
by the decentralisation of power to an additional management layer. 
 
4.2.2 What is an MSE in Zimbabwe 
The European Commission and the Bolton Committee’s definition of small firms above, have 
become the building blocks for defining small-scale enterprises although country specifics are 
added to make it more applicable to the context in which it is intended to be used. Mostly the 
definition of small firms is based on, among other things, firm size, and number of 
employees, capital base and average income, and in some cases it is related to the context of 
the study (Mboma, 2008: 329).  
 
According to the Zimbabwean Small Enterprises Development Corporation Act (Chapter 
24:12), small enterprises are defined in terms of sector of economy, number of full-time paid 
employees, maximum total annual turnover and maximum gross value of assets excluding 
immovable property. The small enterprises are generally classified into 3 classes (micro, 
small and medium). Micro enterprises have a maximum of 5 paid employees and total annual 
turnover of $30,000 in all other sectors of the economy, except for construction, mining and 
quarrying and energy which require a maximum total annual turnover of $50,000 (see table 8 
below). Small enterprises have a maximum of 40 paid employees in the mining and 
quarrying, construction, energy and transport sectors. All other sectors require that the 
maximum number of paid employees be 30. Medium enterprises require that the maximum 
number of paid employees is 75 in all sectors. Maximum annual turnover should be from 






Table 8: Classification of Micro, Small and Medium enterprises in Zimbabwe 
Sector or sub-sector 
of Economy 
































































































































































Source: Fourth Schedule: Small Enterprises Development Corporation (Amendment) Bill, 2010 Memorandum 
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This study will define a small-scale enterprise as a firm that employs less than 40 employees 
whilst a micro-enterprise is regarded as one with less than 5 employees (including unpaid 
family members). These micro and small-scale enterprises are found in both formal and 
informal sectors. Those in the informal sector are usually not registered under the Companies 
Act or the Co-operative Companies Act and do not pay tax to the central government.  
 
4.2.3 Nature and Scale of MSEs in Zimbabwe 
Zimbabwe is an agro-based country and the MSEs that existed since independence until the 
late 1990s were mostly small-scale subsistence farmers concentrating on producing fresh 
horticultural products. These small-scale farmers were mainly based in the rural or 
marginalized areas. Most of these agricultural MSEs were family oriented and utilized a 
family owned piece of land. In 1998, there were an estimated 860,000 MSEs in Zimbabwe 
(agricultural and non-agricultural) with the majority being involved in the processing of 
agricultural commodities (USAID, 1998). Over the years, government support towards MSEs 
has been concentrated towards agricultural MSEs, with the motive of helping them grow from 
being subsistence farmers to small-scale commercial farmers (USAID, 1998).  
 
Non-governmental organizations also supported the agro-based MSEs by providing financial 
assistance and through disbursements of actual inputs like seeds, fertilizers and chemicals. 
They also taught the MSEs sustainable methods of farming, and alternative ways of 
increasing their income, such as processing their produce. Private companies, like CAIRNS, 
Olivine Industries, Interfresh and Wholesale Fruiters engaged the MSEs in contract farming. 
In contract farming, the company will supply all the inputs required in growing a particular 
crop, and the farmer will use his/her land to grow the crop. After harvesting the farmer is 
mandated to sell all of his/her produce to that company at an agreed price.  All these support 
networks contributed positively towards improving the quality of life of the mostly rural 
population in Zimbabwe (Proctor, Henson, Loader, Masakure, Brouder, Bhila, and Sigauke, 
2000). 
 
Unlike the agriculturally based ventures, the non-agricultural MSEs are mainly concentrated 
in the urban areas. There was a steep growth in urban MSEs following the structural reform 
that was implemented in 1991, which saw many bread winners being laid off from their jobs 
and the young generation migrating to the urban areas in search of ‘greener pastures’. As 
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more and more people migrated into the urban areas, the labor markets failed to grow at the 
same rate as the growth in urban population, and many people ended up establishing their 
own MSEs as an alternative source of income. The most dominating activity among the urban 
MSEs has always been retailing followed by manufacturing and services (Kapoor et al., 
1997).  
 
The effects of the economic meltdown in Zimbabwe caused the number of urban MSEs to 
increase steeply. The biggest problem, among others during this difficult time, was 
availability of cash in hand. It was practically impossible to withdraw money from a bank 
account. Having a formal job was no guarantee that one would be able to buy a loaf of bread 
at the end of the month. This situation was worsened by the rising inflation which saw prices 
of commodities changing at least twice in the same day. The only way out, was to trade in 
anything as long as the medium of exchange was money. Commodities that dominated were 
mostly food, fuel and foreign currency. Most of these enterprises were one man businesses, 
being run from the boot of a car or from home, and would move around as they got on with 
their daily activities. 
 
4.3 Importance of SMEs in today’s Economy 
As pointed out earlier, because of the huge role it plays in employment creation, increasing 
productivity and ultimately influencing economic growth, small scale entrepreneurship is a 
popular area of research. Elkan (1988) and Ubogu, Laah, Udemezue and Bako, (2011) are of 
the view that small-scale enterprises are important for African entrepreneurs as they have 
greater potential to survive, and they also have the potential to perform better than big 
enterprises. Rusten and Bryson (2007) are of the view that the small-scale enterprises can lift 
the economy out of backwardness. SMEs play a role in strengthening the industrial structure 
of the economy by facilitating “the tapping of resources for productive purposes with a 
minimum amount of capital investment, contributing greatly to the provision of employment 
opportunities, or fostering entrepreneurship” (Ubogu et al., 2011: 215). In Norway for 
example, SMEs account for 90% of all firms and contribute greatly to the economic growth 
of the country (Rusten and Bryson, 2007).  
 
According to Ubogu et al. (2011) one of the possible reasons why large-scale enterprises in 
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Africa survive is due to biased government policies. The large businesses are not profitable 
except when supported by government, through subsidies and other public policies. If the 
governments removed or reduced its support of larger firms, this would not reduce economic 
growth but would render greater opportunities for smaller firms to grow and succeed. The 
small-scale firms have great potential to survive in developing countries, more so than the 
larger firms (Deakins and Freel, 2012). 
 
In Africa, the formal sector is still dominated by large firms, and small enterprises are mostly 
found in the informal sector (Ubogu et al., 2011). The biased government policies push away 
most of the small-scale businesses into the informal sector where they are assumed to be 
operating as necessity entrepreneurs. A recent study done in England however, discovered the 
existence of both necessity and opportunity MSEs in the informal sector (Collin, 2007). 
According to Collin (2007), 77% of the study population, who happened to be small-scale 
entrepreneurs operating in the informal sector, were employed in formal employment and 
were setting up or running a business venture ‘on the side’ as a part-time activity. Their 
motive for starting the business in the informal sector was not purely necessity driven, but 
was a combination of both necessity and opportunity factors. For this reason it is important to 
incorporate informal enterprises into policy formulation, as they have more to offer than the 
destructive role they are often perceived to have. 
 
4.4 MSEs in the informal sector 
4.2.4 Defining the Informal Sector 
The term ‘informal sector’ has been used for decades, but a universally agreed definition is 
yet to be established. Recent publications generally define it in terms of its characteristics and 
also in context to the study been carried out (Gerxhani, 2004; Collin, 2007). Hart (1973) first 
introduced it as referring to self-employment or small-scale industries or retail trades, or all 
forms of economic activities that are not recorded in the official statistics or do not comply 
with government regulations. Over the years, the definitions have expanded to include, scale 
of ownership, firm size (with an undefined degree of ‘smallness’ of the firm), capital base or 
average income (Mboma, 2008). Despite the various approaches to the definition, most 
scholars agree on the characteristics of the informal sector, which include family ownership, 
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ease of entry, labour intensive, and operating in unregulated but competitive markets, among 
other things (Ubogu et al., 2011).  
 
According to Nattrass (1987) cited by Mahadea (2001:190), the informal sector is a 
temporary sector which is comprised “of all people outside formal wage employment in the 
officially recognised and regulated sector, as well as all enterprises which engage in survival 
activities and function outside government’s rules and regulations, and which operate on a 
small scale using labour-intensive technology.” Recent studies have shown that the informal 
sector has migrated from this traditional view to a modern view that acknowledges its 
permanency in the economy as well as its contribution to reducing poverty and promoting 
growth. Table 9 below, adapted from Chen (2007) summarises the old and the new views of 
the informal sector. 
 
Table 9: Old and new views of the informal sector 
The old view The new view 
The informal sector is the 
traditional economy that will 
wither away and die with 
modern, industrialized growth. 
The informal economy is ‘here to stay’ and expanding 
with modern, industrial growth. 
It exists separately from the 
formal economy 
It is linked to the formal economy- it produces for, trades 
with, distributes for and provides services to the formal 
economy.  
It is only marginally productive. It is a major provider of employment, goods and services 
for lower-income groups. It contributes a significant share 
to GDP 
It represents a reserve pool of 
surplus labour. 
Much of the recent rise in informal employment is due to 
the decline in formal employment or to the informalisation 
of previously formal employment relationships. 
It is comprised of street 
traders and very small-scale 
producers 
It is made up of a wide range of formal occupations 
Most of those in the sector are 
entrepreneurs who run illegal 
and unregistered enterprises 
in order to avoid regulation 
and taxation 
It is made up of non-standard wage workers as well as 
entrepreneurs and self-employed persons producing legal 
goods and services. 
Work in the informal economy 
is comprised mostly of survival 
activities and thus is not a 
subject for economic policy 
Informal enterprises include not only survival activities 
but also stable, dynamic growing businesses and wage 
employment. All forms of informal employment are 
affected by most economic policies 




In modern economics, the informal sector is an important part of the economy especially in 
developing countries and yet little is done to support activities in this sector. In Africa, as of 
2004, the informal sector constituted 44% of the Gross National Product (GNP), in Middle 
and Eastern Europe about 20%, and in OECD countries about 12% (Gerxhani, 2004). In Sub-
Saharan Africa the informal sector employs on average 50% of the work force (Onyenechere, 
2011).  
 
In this study, the informal enterprises will be defined as enterprises that are operating without 
a company registration certificate. Those operating in this sector do not declare taxes to the 
government and are not recognised for any support from the government. Only entrepreneurs 
venturing into ‘legal’ trades will be considered for this study. Illegal operations like drug 
trafficking and prostitution will not be considered. 
 
Recession is believed to be the major cause of the development and growth of the informal 
sector in the developed nations as it causes stagnation, unemployment and depreciation of 
assets (Gerxhani, 2004: 278). According to Renooy (1990), cited in Gerxhani (2004: 278), the 
two groups of factors that influence the decision to operate in the informal sector are 
‘structural factors’ and ‘opportunity factors’. The structural factors include financial 
constraints, institutional constraints and socio-psychological pressures.  These factors include 
poverty,16 lack of employment opportunities, restrictive laws as well as prohibitive taxation. 
De Soto (1982) attributes the growth and development of the informal sector to the many 
government regulations in the formal sector. 
 
The opportunity factors are sub-divided into individual backgrounds: education; skills; 
contacts; living situation; and non-individual factors: culture; values and standards; and 
environment (Gerxhani, 2004). Renooy (1990) cited by Gerxhani (2004) is of the view that 
the opportunity factors stated above greatly influence people’s perceptions on taxes and their 
attitude towards their government. If the general opinion is that the public do not trust their 
government’s expenditure, and also feel that the laws are too lenient on those who avoid 
16 Poverty is defined as lack of basic needs, that is food, proper housing, access to health facilities. 
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paying their taxes, more people will choose to operate in the informal sector in order to avoid 
paying taxes. 
 
4.2.5 The informal Sector in Urban Zimbabwe 
The informal sector in Zimbabwe has always existed prior to the attainment of independence 
in 1980, but was closely monitored by strict laws and legislation (the Town and Country 
Planning Act (1946), the Vagrancy Act (1960), Urban Councils Act (1973), Vendors and 
Hawkers by-laws (1973) (Dhemba, 1999: 12). With the attainment of independence this 
sector has been growing, mainly due to urban migration as people move from rural poverty to 
urban areas in search of work and a way to alleviate poverty (Dhemba, 1999: 9). Further 
growth in this sector came as an aftermath to the introduction of ESAP in 1991, which 
brought about more suffering than solutions, especially for the urban population.  
 
Informal sector policies that have been adopted over the last decade or so, in line with 
alleviating poverty in Zimbabwe, have not succeeded (Sichone, 2003). Statistics from the last 
Poverty Assessment carried out by the Zimbabwean government in 1995, showed that 62% of 
the population were living in poverty, 72% of the households in the rural areas were living 
below the poverty line compared to the 46% in the urban areas (Sichone, 2003). These figures 
are believed to have increased following the meltdown (1996 to 2008) and also because of the 
migration by the rural people as they flee from rural poverty. Accordingly, urban poverty has 
doubled. During the meltdown period the growth in formal labour markets was close to zero 
and the informal sector was the main survival platform for people moving from rural to urban 
areas, as well as school leavers and those who had been retrenched (Ishengoma and Kappel, 
2005). 
 
With government support being concentrated on the rural poor and side-lining the urban poor, 
it became more and more difficult for urban dwellers to make a living.  The job market 
continued to shrink, absorbing less than a fifth of new graduates each year (Dhemba, 1999: 
12). For those who were unemployed, the only way to make a living was to look for an 
alternative in the informal sector. Although it has been argued that MSEs did not contribute 
much to economic development, the presence of necessity entrepreneurship in the economy 
was an important social activity in the fight against urban poverty as it brought food to the 
tables of starving Zimbabweans during the melt-down period.  
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Chikuezi (2010) is of the view that urban poverty can be fought if policies that are in line 
with labour markets are implemented, and the informal sector activities are also considered. 
In the previous years, emphasis has been put on the eradication of the informal sector. 
Alternatively, emphasis should be placed on utilizing the labour markets that are present in 
the informal sector. In as much as the Zimbabwean government wanted to do away with the 
informal sector, evidence from other countries show that the informal sector is an important 
part of an economy, posing some benefits for economic development (Newadi and Pietersen, 
2008). The presence of MSEs in this sector plays a pivotal role in employment creation and 
income generation, and therefore should be prioritised. 
 
Not much can be said without understanding why MSEs choose the informal sector as their 
area of preference and whether they are willing to move to the formal sector, and what their 
expectations are from the government. Acs (2008: 97) is of the view that the high percentage 
of informal self-employment worldwide is a result of bureaucratic barriers which hinder the 
creation of new formal businesses, or that the economy is creating less wage-earning job 
opportunities. The over-regulation of the market sector, through taxes, legislation on labour, 
quality of products and production limits makes it unfeasible for MSEs with small capital 
bases to operate in the formal sector (Gerxhani, 2004: 279; Chigwenya and Mudzengerere, 
2013). This, to some extent, suggests that the government is to blame for the existence of the 
informal sector, and yet to operate in the informal sector is an individual’s choice, having 
been driven by necessity or the availability of an opportunity. It is the aim of this study to 
carry out an analysis of the factors that drove the MSEs in Zimbabwe into the informal sector 
rather than the formal sector, and also analyse the factors that can possibly encourage them to 
formalise their informal businesses. 
 
4.5 MSEs in the formal sector 
The process of registering and licensing, which are requirements for any business operating in 
the formal sector, has always been blamed for the growth of the informal sector. Below are 







Table 10: Company Registration process in Zimbabwe  
First Stage: Company Registration 
1. Company Search. Submit Form CR21 to the Chief Registrar of companies in order to 
conduct a name search to ensure that no other company has the same or similar name. 
Fee:…………..(to be advised) 
2. Memorandum and Articles of Association the Registrar’s office. This document states 
the type of business to be undertaken by the company, rules binding the shareholders 
and the directors. Four copies are required covered in special paper and each tied with 
a ribbon. Fee…………….(to be advised) 
3. Certificate of Incorporation. This is issued on satisfactory submission of the above, 
provided there are no errors. Processing time…………...(to be advised) 
4. Investment Certificate- Submit a project proposal to the Zimbabwe Investment Centre 
for registration, and attach company’s certificate of incorporation. An investment 
certificate will then be issued………….. 
5. Registrar- Notify the Registrar of the appointment of the company’s directors and 
secretaries. 
6. Tax Authorities- Particulars of the company, and of its employees, have to be 
submitted to the tax authorities. Businesses with an expected turnover of ….. or more 
per year have to have a sales tax registration number. 
7. To Operate a Factory: Obtain a license from the Department of Occupational Health, 
Safety and Workers Compensation, at a fee…… 
Source: Kapoor et al., (1997:15). 
This cumbersome process has however been shortened by the emergence of Company 
Traders who specialize in registering companies, and then selling registered companies to 
individuals. The Company Traders will process all the required documents as highlighted in 
table 10 above. After completing the registration, the Company Trader will then sell the 
company to a new entrepreneur. The main shortfall of buying a registered company will be 
that the entrepreneur will not have the privilege to decide on a name for their company, but 
will have to pay extra for change of name. 
 
After registering, the next requirement will be to obtain an operating license from the 




Table 11: Licensing process for a company in Zimbabwe  
Second Stage: Company Licensing 
1. Pay a fee to get the forms. 
2. Health and Safety Inspection Municipality officer will visit your business premises to 
inspect. 
3. Post Adverts in the local newspaper on 3 different dates. 
4. Pay for licenses. 
5. Compile required documents, submit and wait for license. 
Source: Author’s own table 
 
The last modality involves registering the company with the Zimbabwe Revenue Authority 
(ZIMRA) for a Tax Clearance Certificate. 
 
Table 12: Tax and Customs’ requirements for new businesses in Zimbabwe 
Third Stage: ZIMRA registration 
1. To register, you are required to have a bank account among other requirements. 
2. Once you have a bank account, you can then approach ZIMRA for registration. You 
will be required to complete registration forms depending on the nature of your 
business operations. All clients will be required to complete the REV 1 form, which 
can be obtained from ZIMRA offices or can be downloaded from this website. Once 
registered, you will be issued with a Business Partner Number (BP) which acts as the 
business’ identification number and is used for all transactions with ZIMRA, 
including remittances of tax. 
3.  After commencing operations, you are required to keep records of all your business 
operations and pay Provisional Tax on the stipulated dates (as shown below). The 
dates are referred to as Quarterly Payment Dates (QPDs). The Provisional Tax 
payable is based on the respective percentage of estimated annual tax due. The annual 
estimated tax due should be revised to update the estimate every quarter. 
4. The form ITF 12B, which is a return for provisional tax payments, has to be 
completed in respect of these payments. 
5. The payment dates and the percentage of tax due for each tax year are listed below: 
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QPD Due Date (on or before) 
Instalment Due 
(as a % of the 
annual tax 
payable) 
1st QPD 25th March 10% 
2nd QPD 25th June 25% 
3rd QPD 25th September 30% 
4th QPD 20th December 35% 
  
6. Some businesses, operators are required to pay Presumptive Taxes and this includes 
operators of omnibuses, taxi-cabs, driving schools, goods vehicles, hairdressing 
salons, informal traders, operators of restaurants or bottle stores, small scale 
miners,  cottage industry operators, operators of commercial waterborne vessels used 
for the carriage of passengers for profit and fishing rigs. 
7. A tax return is required after the end of each tax year. The tax year runs from 1 
January to 31 December of each year. Clients who have been specified in terms of 
Section 37A of the Income Tax Act [Chapter 23:06] as being on Self-Assessment are 
required to furnish Self-Assessment Returns in duplicate by 30th April of the 
following year. 
8. Operators will also require a Tax Clearance Certificate - form ITF 263 which is issued 
by ZIMRA once you have met all the stipulated obligations which include submission 
of tax returns and remittances of tax due. If you do not have this clearance, anyone 
who pays you any amounts in excess of US$250.00 is required to withhold and remit 
to ZIMRA 10% of the amounts paid. 
9. There is need to strictly observe the requirements in Section 80 of the Income Tax Act 
[Chapter 23:06]. It requires that all registered business taxpayers who enter into any 
contracts which result in an obligation to pay any amounts whose total or aggregate is 
US$250.00 or more to withhold 10% of each amount payable to payees who fail to 
furnish valid tax clearance certificates. 
Source: ZIMRA web page, (2013). 
 
Most of the MSEs that are found in the formal sector fall short of either one or two of the 
three requirements indicated above. However, due to the presence of the Company Traders, 
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anyone can easily buy a company and start trading using that name before licensing and 
registering with ZIMRA.  
 
4.6 Formalising the Informal 
The recognition of the informal sector as an important driver of national economy has 
fostered the need to revamp this sector and ensure that the informal enterprises are 
encouraged to formalize their businesses, and in so doing contribute fully to the economy. 
Many economies, especially in developed nations have already adopted policies that 
acknowledge the existence of these informal enterprises and help them grow and formalize 
their businesses (Deakins and Freel, 2012). The policies are crafted around the recognition 
that informal traders need to use appropriate trading venues and should abide with the 
regulatory laws as well as have access to all support networks necessary for their growth and 
success (van Rooyen and Antonites, 2007).  
 
According to Welch (2005) the arguments for formalizing are, firstly formality contributes to 
job creation and hence contributes towards fighting national unemployment problems. 
Formality also broadens the tax base and in some instances may lower the tax rates. Traders 
in the formal sector have access to better information which promotes deal-making and 
increased investment. Stronger networks are found in the formal sector and there are higher 
chances of getting new jobs than in the informal sector. Another important feature of 
formality is that the rule of law exists. Traders can freely conduct their business knowing that 
they are protected by the law and their interests will always be protected. 
 
Besides these favorable features of formalization, the literature identifies a number of factors 
which hinder formalization, and in so doing promotes informalisation. These factors are 
regulatory and administrative barriers, fees and financial requirements, absence of business 
services like formal entrepreneurial training, corruption, social-cultural factors which restrict 
females from engaging in other activities and criminality (Welch, 2005). These factors have 
also been identified as major constraints for the growth of the enterprises in both formal and 
informal sectors (Chikuezi, 2010; Kaburi, Mobegi, Kombo, Omari and Sewe, 2012). 
 
 As possible solutions, Welch recommends that the government officials should be educated 
on the needs of the business owners in the informal sector. Their empirical understanding of 
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the need to formalize has to be enhanced, and services that provide formalization incentives 
have to be used. This study will conduct an empirical analysis of the factors that are hindering 
the growth of enterprises in Zimbabwe, as well as investigating their role in the willingness of 
informal enterprises to formalize their business.  
 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter concentrated on defining MSEs in the formal and informal sectors and showing 
how enterprises in both sectors are important for the national economy. Zimbabwe’s MSEs 
are mainly housed in the informal sector. However, their presence in this sector does not 
mean that they are unproductive. The following chapter will discuss the methodology that 
was used to test the relationship between the formal and informal sector as well as the 





RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers the research methodology and instruments used to collect data for the 
purpose of this study. The methodology is covered in 2 parts. The first section, presented as 
methodology I, discusses methods that were used to analyse the relationship between 
entrepreneurship and economic meltdown at a macro level using time series data covering the 
period 1980 - 2010. The second, captured as methodology II, discusses methods that were 
used to analyse the characteristics and growth constraints of MSEs in formal and informal 
sectors at micro level using survey data. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Framework for Determinants of Entrepreneurship 
Understanding how the state of the economy influences entrepreneurial activity in the formal 
and informal sectors, and vice versa, was one of the key objectives of this research. The state 
of the economy refers to whether there is economic growth, stagnation or economic collapse 
in the country. From previous research, a relationship has been ascertained between economic 
growth and entrepreneurial activity (GEM Report, 2013). However, a gap in knowledge still 
exists on the relationship between economic collapse or economic meltdown and 
entrepreneurial activity. The terms economic meltdown and economic growth are defined 
below.  
 
Economic growth is defined as an increase in an economy’s capacity to produce goods and 
services, measured by comparing real GDP or GNP (Gross National Product) over a period of 
time. Economic meltdown, also known as economic downfall, has no precise definition but 
the term is frequently used to describe adverse economic conditions, such as hyperinflation 
and high unemployment rates and a steep decline in population or prolonged depression 
(Capozzi, 2010). 
 
When defining economic growth or meltdown, real GDP is the unit of measurement. The rise 
of the economy’s total production will determine whether there is economic growth. A 
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From figure 23 above, the state of the macro economy is shown as being influenced by five 
factors, namely real GDP, unemployment, inflation, money supply and entrepreneurial 
activity. State of the economy refers to whether there is economic growth or economic 
meltdown and can be measured using any of the five economic indicators. There is also a 
forward-backward relationship between the macro-economic indicators and entrepreneurial 
activity in the formal and informal sectors of the micro economy. This relationship is core to 
this study. 
 
From the theory of production, output is a function of capital (K), labor (L) and materials (M) 
(Perloff, 2012). Depending on the production function and the scale of the firm, an increase in 
the amount of inputs being used is likely to bring about an increase in output. Assuming all 
firms in the country recruit more people (causing the level of employment to increase and 
unemployment to decrease), the result will be an increase in total production and a rise in real 
GDP, which means economic growth. This relationship between unemployment and real 
GDP is described by Okun’s Law.  
 
Okun’s law is a statistical relationship that relies on the regression of unemployment and 
economic growth (Lang and de Peretti, 2009). It is used to show by how much a country’s 
real GDP will change following a change in the unemployment rate, above or below its 
natural rate; this relationship is not necessarily linear (Lang and de Peretti, 2009). Okun’s law 
identifies a negative relationship between economic growth and unemployment (Faria, 
Cuestas and Mourelle, 2010). Thus, a positive real GDP in the economy means an expansion 
in real output, and more jobs are likely to be created. This will reduce unemployment levels. 
On the contrary, when there is an economic downfall, there is negative real growth.  Many 
people lose their jobs as companies layoff some of their workers or shut down. 
Unemployment rate will increase. Some of the unemployed will resort to necessity 
entrepreneurship for survival. This relationship between unemployment and entrepreneurship 
will be discussed further below. On the positive side, unemployment rates decrease as the 
level of real GDP increases significantly with labour-absorbing economic growth.  
 
Previous research has revealed that the relationship between economic growth and 
unemployment rate comes with a lag, and the size of the lag is not known a priori (Levine, 
2013). Levine (2013) argues that when an economy experiences economic growth after a 
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recession, employers will concentrate on fully utilizing the underutilized employees on their 
payroll first, instead of hiring new employees. This temporary increase in labour productivity 
will only last until output cannot grow faster than the rate of productivity growth, and at this 
point firms will start hiring, and unemployment rate will start decreasing. This lagged 
response was taken into consideration when deciding on the appropriate analytical method to 
use in the current study. 
 
Besides real GDP, inflation also influences the level of unemployment in a country. The 
Phillips curve suggests an inverse short run trade-off between inflation and unemployment, 
assuming the natural unemployment rate and expected inflation remains the same (Parkins, 
2010). If inflation increases, unemployment should decrease in accordance with the 
traditional Phillips curve. In the long run, expected inflation is equal to actual inflation 
(Dornbusch, Fischer and Startz, 2008). The long run relationship means a rise in inflation will 
not change unemployment rates (natural unemployment rate) and also a rise in unemployment 
will not change inflation rate. This relationship becomes problematic if both inflation and 
unemployment increases (a scenario which was evident in Zimbabwe during the economic 
meltdown from 1996 to 2008). This relationship between inflation and unemployment will be 
analysed in the VAR model. 
 
When analysing the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth, additional 
variables such as, unemployment and inflation have been used by previous researchers (van 
Stel et al, 2003; Ovaska and Sobel, 2005; Thurik et al., 2008; GEM Report, 2011).17 Also, in 
the literature, various economic variables have been identified to determine the level of 
entrepreneurial activity. These include unemployment, real GDP, credit availability, tax, 
inflation, provision of sound money, economic freedom and government corruption (Ovaska 
and Sobel, 2005; Acs, 2008; Thurik et al., 2008; Bjornskov and Foss, 2008). In this study, 
real GDP, unemployment and inflation will again be used to investigate the relationship 
between entrepreneurship and the opposite of economic growth, which is economic 
meltdown.  
 
As an economy goes through repeated years of economic downfalls, its industries will 




                                                 
retrench some workers, or even go to the extreme of shutting down. Part of the labour force 
that loses jobs as a result of the economic downfall (or for other reasons), resort to other 
income generating activities, also known as entrepreneurial activities, to earn a living out of 
necessity. This type of entrepreneurial activity which is driven by the absence of formal 
employment is known as necessity entrepreneurship.18 Necessity entrepreneurship is 
characterised by people who are running a business as a coping mechanism, due to the need 
for survival and to create an income. Most of these people are found in the informal sector 
where no business registration or licenses are required to run a venture (Gerxhani, 2004; 
Collin, 2007; Mboma 2008; Ubogu et al., 2011). Necessity entrepreneurship may arise 
because of liquidity constraints or unavailability of money. In this context, money is defined 
as a unit of exchange. One of the characteristics of an economic meltdown is inadequate 
liquidity, which makes it difficult for most people to buy the basic commodities that they 
need for their day to day up-keep. Money supply and inflation will be used inter-changeably 
as a proxy to measure this liquidity constraint in this study. 
 
On the other hand, an economic uplift can also encourage opportunity entrepreneurship.19  
Opportunity entrepreneurship is a result of the presence of unexploited opportunities. When 
there are unidentified market gaps or unexploited resources available in the economy, such as 
start-up funds from the Government, these can be an opportunity for those alert individuals 
with entrepreneurial qualities to exploit and use to start their own businesses. The motive for 
opportunity-driven entrepreneurs is to generate income as well as to be independent (GEM 
Report, 2013). 
 
According to Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi and Ireland (2012), the process of opportunity 
discovery, and opportunity exploitation resulting in entrepreneurial outcome is guided by 
three theories which also influence the choice between operating in the formal sector or 
informal sector, as shown in figure 24 below. These theories are the institutional theory, 
motivation-related theories, and resource allocation theory (Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi and 
Ireland, 2012). Of the three, institutional theory is perhaps the most critical in linking the 
choice of sector to operate in.   
18 Necessity entrepreneurship has been defined in Chapter 3 from page 64. 
19 Opportunity entrepreneurship has been defined in Chapter 3 from page 64. 
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Figure 24: Theoretical Framework of the entrepreneurship process 
 
Adapted from Webb, Bruton, Tihanyi and Ireland, (2012:602).
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The institutional environment is the most critical element in choosing whether to operate in 
the formal or informal sector as it provides information on the attractiveness of the 
opportunity in one sector over the other. North (1990) in Webb et al. (2012) defined 
institutions in two categories. Firstly there are formal institutions which are laws and 
regulations. Secondly there are informal institutions which are societal norms, values and 
beliefs. These institutions define the socially acceptable behaviour. When there are 
differences in the formal and informal institutions’ definitions of socially acceptable 
behaviour it gives an opportunity for entrepreneurship activity in the informal sector. For 
instance, if there are stringent policies or weak enforcement of formal institutions, space is 
created for informal entrepreneurship (Webb et al., 2012). Evidence from previous research 
shows that stringent policies are associated with access to finance and this encourages the 
growth of the informal sector (Gerxhani, 2004; Mboma, 2008). 
 
The choice between operating in the informal or formal economy is also influenced by the 
economic and social considerations of each opportunity. As an opportunity avails itself, 
motivation-related theories will help explain why individuals can act outside the societal 
norms, rules and regulations and choose to operate in the informal sector instead of the formal 
sector. Economic motivation is associated with the costs, such as taxes, that are incurred 
when operating in the formal sector. Whenever the perceived costs of operating informally 
are minimal relative to institutional benefits, entrepreneurs are more likely to operate 
informally (Webb et al., 2012). Social motivations include financial strain, exclusion from 
formal economy, eagerness to gain higher social status, lack of access to legitimate means, 
and access to illegitimate means (Webb et al., 2012). Gurtoo and Williams (2009) in their 
study found that informal entrepreneurs are also both necessity and opportunity driven 
depending on whether informality is being used as a primary source of income or secondary 
source of income. 
 
Motivation-related theory also recognise that actions outside societal norms can be 
constructive or destructive, implying that operations in the informal sector can have positive 
and negative effects (Webb et al., 2012). As much as most developing countries regard the 




this sector be utilised and help uplift the economy. Some of the positive aspects include the 
ability of the informal sector to provide a means of subsistence as an alternative for criminal 
acts (Webb et al., 2012). This is important especially to this study which aims at bringing out 
the role the informal sector can play in Zimbabwe’s road to recovery from the effects of the 
economic meltdown. Zimbabwe’s unemployment level is currently standing above 90% and 
the informal sector houses most of these unemployed individuals (Worldbank data, 2013). 
Instead of regarding the informal sector as an underground economy, the government needs 
to support it.  The informal sector also provides jobs, goods and services and complements 
the formal sector as it acts as a training ground for small business. Some of the negative 
effects include loss of tax revenue and exploitation of rules and regulations (Webb, 2012). 
Although some revenue is lost through tax evasion, most of the revenue generated in the 
informal sector is spent in the formal sector, thereby bringing the money back into the formal 
economy (Schneider, 2002). 
 
The third theory that can be used to explain the choice of sector to operate in is the resource 
allocation theory. Resource allocation theory explains how the entrepreneurs manoeuvre 
around their resource constraints. Financial resource constraints are one of the biggest 
challenges for many entrepreneurs who end up operating in the informal sector (Chikuezi, 
2010; Kaburi, Mobegi, Kombo, Omari and Sewe, 2012). Many informal entrepreneurs 
finance their business using their family resources because they fail to meet the loan 
requirements from the financial institutions. 
 
Having identified how the informal economy is formed, recent research has also shown that 
this sector has moved from being a temporary shadow economy to a permanent sector which 
is important in promoting growth and reducing poverty (Chen, 2007). The informal sector has 
become part of the economic chain providing goods and services to the formal sector. The 
link between the two sectors improves the competitiveness of the formal sector as money 
generated in the informal sector is spent in the formal sector. The permanency of the informal 
sector makes it crucial for the policy makers to promote inclusive policies that can foster the 
growth and expansion of enterprises in both sectors. A huge problem for MSEs worldwide 




large business (Deakins and Freel, 2012). Of late, more nations have embraced the role of 
small-scale businesses in promoting economic growth and are prioritising them more, 
although most of the support is only directed towards formal enterprises, side-lining the 
informal enterprises. Policies should address the needs of each sector without using one 
sector as the rule of thumb. This study further analysed the growth inhibiting factors in the 
two sectors in a bid to test whether common law is appropriate for the MSEs in Zimbabwe. 
 
The literature identifies various factors that hinder growth of MSEs (Mahadea and Pillay, 
2008; Kaburi, Mobegi, Kombo, Omari and Sewe, 2012). Based on previous research, a list of 
21 growth inhibiting factors examined in this study is given below. 
Table 13: Internal and External growth inhibiting factors 
Internal growth inhibiting factors External growth inhibiting factors 
1. Access to finance 
2. Lack of information or advice 
on how to start an enterprise 
3. Access to business networks 
4. Lack of entrepreneurial 
training 
5. Access to business premises 
6. Access to technology 
7. Finding right employees 
8. Lack of management skills 
1. Problems with authorities 
2. Gender discrimination 
3. Late payment by creditors 
4. Lack of profitable markets 
5. Taxes 
6. Interest rates 
7. Business registration problems 
8. Crime  
9. Political instability 
10. Corruption 
11. Dollarization 
12. Lack of clients 
13. Excessive competition 
Source: Mahadea and Pillay, (2008); Chikuezi, (2010); Kaburi, Mobegi, Kombo, Omari and 
Sewe, (2012). 
This study will show that the problem in Zimbabwe is not the informal sector but the 




reforms that were put in place post the economic meltdown targeting the formal sector 
entrepreneurs, are actually needed more by the entrepreneurs in the informal sector. If these 
opportunities are also made available to the informal entrepreneurs, it might help speed up the 
recovery process. Correct institutions can help curb the destructive traits of the informal 
economy entrepreneurs and encourage them to formalise their business. This analysis was 
done through a comparison study of the entrepreneurs in the formal sector to those in the 
informal sector, by isolating the differences and the similarities in characteristics of the 
entrepreneurs operating in the two sectors. 
 
5.3 Research Methods and Designs 
5.3.1 Introduction 
The importance of MSEs in economic growth has been widely studied but gaps still exist on 
how growth in entrepreneurial activity could be an indication or a result of an economic 
downfall during an abnormal period. One of the aims of this study is to investigate the 
contribution of the economic meltdown to MSE growth by testing the presence of the 
‘refugee effect’. As explained in Chapter 1 (page 2), the refugee effect shows the positive 
relationship between entrepreneurial activity and unemployment. The second objective is to 
do a comparative analysis of MSEs in the informal sector with those in the formal sector 
aiming to understand why the number of informal MSEs grew faster than the formal MSEs. 
Lastly, the study investigates the factors that are hindering the growth of MSEs in the two 
sectors, with the objective of making policy recommendations on how the MSEs can be 
assisted to grow and be part of the recovery plan in Zimbabwe.  
 
The study uses both the qualitative and quantitative approaches in its investigation of the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and economic meltdown. Combining these two 
methods is helpful for this study because each approach compensates for the shortfalls of the 
other. The quantitative approach makes use of statistics and econometrics, and the qualitative 
approach gives the MSE’s views and opinions with regard to the effects of the economic 
meltdown on their decision to start their business as well as factors hindering further growth 





In order to address the above research questions, a combination of experimental and survey 
research designs were used. An experimental research design is a study design that tests 
cause-and-effect relationships between variables (Gujarati and Porter, 2009). Central to this 
study is investigating the relationship between economic meltdown in Zimbabwe and 
entrepreneurship. This was first done at country level using macro variables. Multivariate 
regression analysis was used to run a VECM, testing the relationship between growth of 
MSEs, real GDP, inflation rate, money supply (proxy for no liquidity), and unemployment 
rate covering the period 1980 to 2010 at macro level. This design was appropriate as it 
isolated the influence of the variables that define economic meltdown on growth of MSEs. 
The literature identifies a number of factors that determine entrepreneurial activity (see 
section 2.2.8) among which are real GDP, unemployment, provision of sound money and 
inflation (Ovaska and Sobel, 2005; Acs, 2008; Thurik et al., 2008). These variables are used 
as proxies for economic meltdown in this study. The previous studies in this field have also 
used an experimental design, and produced credible results. For this reason, the author 
decided to adopt this approach.  
 
The second part analyses the MSEs at the micro level through a survey method. The survey 
design entails the use of a questionnaire and interviews a targeted population (Gujarati and 
Porter, 2009). Data on the individual MSEs operating in Zimbabwe was not readily available 
and the only way it could be sourced was through a survey. This approach was appropriate as 
it allowed the author not only to gather information relevant to the study but also interact and 
have a one-on-one moment with the entrepreneurs. The main objective of this analysis was to 
investigate whether ‘common policies’ work in Zimbabwe’s entrepreneurial sector, given that 
these policies are formulated in line with the needs of the formal entrepreneurs without 
considering the informal sector which houses the majority of the micro entrepreneurs. Three 
sub-objectives underpinned this study. The first objective was to examine whether there are 
differences in entrepreneurial attributes between formal sector and informal sector firms and 
entrepreneurs using descriptive statistics and non-parametric t-tests. The second objective was 
to assess the nature of the growth constraints of existing MSEs (formal and informal) and 
how these can be addressed to ensure that these firms contribute to the recovery of the 




internal and external.  The methodology used in this case was principal component analysis. 
The third objective was to assess the contribution of the growth constraints to the willingness 
of informal entrepreneurs to formalise their businesses. This was investigated using logistic 
regression.  
 
5.3.2 Data Collection 
Data was collected from two sources: primary sources and secondary sources. Primary 
sources provide original information which has not been filtered through either interpretation 
or evaluation. These include interviews, letters, audio recordings, newspaper articles and 
survey research (Lind, Marchal and Mason, 2002; Hox and Boeije, 2005). The primary 
sources are used mainly to gather data from individual entrepreneurs. Secondary data sources 
are journal articles, scholarly books, web sites, bibliographies, dictionaries and magazines 
(Lind et al., 2002; Hox and Boeije, 2005). These sources were used to gather data that is used 
to analyse the relationship between entrepreneurship and the state of the Zimbabwean 
economy at macro level. 
 
5.3.2.1 Secondary Sources 
To analyse the relationship between entrepreneurship and economic meltdown, annual time 
series data on agricultural real GDP, unemployment and inflation rates, and the total number 
of MSEs in the formal sector were sourced from the World Bank website, CIA World 
Factbook website, Zimbabwe Central Statistics Office and Harare City Council. The data 
collected from Zimbabwe Central Statistics Office came from both published and 
unpublished sources.  
 
Time series annual data from 1980 to 2010 for unemployment rate, entrepreneurship, 
inflation, money supply and real GDP was used to analyse the relationship between MSEs’ 
growth and economic meltdown. Of interest to this study was how these variables interact 
with each other. Unemployment rate, inflation, money supply and real GDP are all measures 





Entrepreneurship - This variable represents the total number of micro and small-scale firms 
in the formal sector with 50 employees or less in a specific year. The data excludes 
agricultural firms of large scale commercial farmers, and Agricultural and Rural 
Development Authority (ARDA). The data was sourced from both published and unpublished 
sources from the Central Statistics Office and the Economic Information Services for 
Zimbabwe Statistics website. The data was first log transformed to allow the coefficients in 
the model to be interpreted as elasticity. The variable names in the analysis are LMSE for 
levels data and DLMSE for 1st differenced data. 
 
Unemployment - This variable captures the percentage of the labour force that was without 
jobs in a specific year. The unit of measurement is percentage (%). For this study the broad 
definition of unemployment was used. Accordingly, any person aged 15 and over and either 
without a job, or available for work, or looking for work over the previous 12 months was 
counted as unemployed. The data was sourced from Zimbabwe’s Central Statistics Office and 
combined with that from CIA Factbook Africa website to come up with a time series of 30 
years. The variable names used in the analysis are UNEMP for levels data and DUNEMP for 
1st differenced data. 
Inflation - This variable shows the annual consumer price index measured as a percentage. 
The data was sourced from the World Bank data website. The variable names in the analysis 
are INFL for levels data and DINFL for 1st differenced data. 
 
Real GDP - This variable shows the total annual real GDP in constant US$ currency. The 
data was sourced from World Bank data website. The variable names in the analysis are 
LRGDP for levels data and DRGDP for 1st differenced data. 
 
Money Supply - shows the total amount of bank notes and coins in circulation together with 
short-term and medium-term deposits (M2) in constant US$ currency. The variable name in 
the analysis is LMSUPPLY for levels data and DLMSUPPLY for 1st differenced data. 
 
Meltdown Dummy - This dummy captures the meltdown period from 1999 to 2005 when 




that defined the economic meltdown but are not specified in the model. These factors include 
political instability, speculative activities, and black market for foreign currency. The variable 
name in the analysis is D1. 
 
Chaos Dummy - This dummy captures the chaotic period when inflation was above 1000%. 
This represents the period from 2006 to 2008. The variable name in the analysis is D2. 
 
Structural Break Dummy - this dummy captures the year when the Zimbabwean economy 
experienced a structural change in 1999. In 1999 the opposition party, Movement for 
Democratic Change (MDC) was formed, which marked the beginning of political unrest in 
the country. In the same year the first draft constitutional referendum was presented and its 
debate was politicised. Also, in the same year, inflation rose above 50% marking the 
commencement of the period of hyperinflation leading to the meltdown. The variable name 
for this structural break dummy in the analysis is S1. 
 
5.3.2.2 Primary Sources 
Primary data was collected by means of a questionnaire, guided by interviews. Both closed 
and open-ended questions are included in the questionnaire. Open-ended questions allow 
respondents to express feelings and opinions in their own words (Lewis-Beck, Bryman and 
Futing Liao, 2004). Closed-ended questions make it easier to capture responses for 
quantitative analysis (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004). Three fieldworkers were recruited and trained 
to assist with the administration of the questionnaires under the supervision of the researcher. 
This was important to ensure that sufficient information was collected in a short period, and 
the fieldwork completed within six weeks. The fieldworkers had to interview the 
entrepreneurial person that was responsible for operations in the business. 
5.3.2.2.1. Study Area 
Zimbabwe is a landlocked country in the southern hemisphere. It shares its borders with 
South Africa, Bostwana, Zambia and Mozambique. The capital city of Zimbabwe is Harare 
and it is also the largest city in the country. Zimbabwe has 8 provinces which are Manicaland, 
Mashonaland Central, Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Masvingo, Matabeleland 




Bulawayo.The 2012 population of the country was estimated to be 12,619,600 housed on 
390,757 km2 of land (CIA, World Factbook, 2012). The agricultural sector used to be the 
main contributor to GDP until the late 90s when the land disputes disrupted the commercial 
farming sector. The service sector currently contributes the most to GDP, an estimated 54,7% 
as of 2011 (CIA World Factbook, 2012). The US$ currently stands as the official currency 
but the South African rand, Botswana pula, and Chinese renminbi are also acceptable at the 
official bank rate. The Zimbabwean dollar was suspended from operating in 2009 due to 
hyperinflation, and currently the US$ together with the South African rand and Botswana 
pula, are the currencies being used in Zimbabwe.  
 
Harare is divided into 4 zones, namely high density areas, low density areas, industrial areas 
and the central business district (CBD) area. The low density areas house the rich few who 
own large houses on a big pieces of land and are situated in the north eastern part of Harare. 
The high density areas have a higher population density with many houses clustered together 
on smaller pieces of land. The high density areas are in the southern part of Harare. The CBD 
and industrial areas are in the middle of Harare. Most of the formal entrepreneurial activity is 
done in the low density, industrial and CBD areas (map of Harare is attached in appendix). 
Entrepreneurial activity in the high density areas is mostly informal and in the CBD area and 
low density area is mostly formal.  
 
5.3.2.2.2. Profile of businesses in high density areas 
The profiles given in this section are based on the authors’ observations and assessments 
which were done as part of the study. Most of the informal businesses in the high density 
areas are run by one person. The owner is usually the only employee in his/her business. 
These businesses operate from unapproved structures which are erected along the main streets 
and near supermarkets. These structures are used as business premises. The premises are not 
permanent and can be moved depending on competition and clientele. Most of the businesses 
are not registered with the authorities and they do not pay any tax to the government. Some 
individuals operate from the gates of their homes and cited the rents for premises as being too 





Formal enterprises are found in shopping centres like High Glen shopping centre and 
Machipisa shopping centre. High Glen shopping centre is located on the periphery of 
Budiriro and Glen View high density suburbs. It was built alongside one of the busiest roads 
that link many high density suburbs. Machipisa shopping centre is one of the oldest shopping 
centres and is located in Highfield high density area. This shopping centre was formed during 
the colonial era and is a popular centre especially for the residents from the surrounding high 
density areas (Glen Norah, Lusaka, Canaan, Western Triangle, Jerusaleum, Geneva, 
Houghton Park, Glen View, Budiriro, Mufakose, Kuwadzana and Dzivarasekwa). 
 
Machipisa Shopping Centre has grocery supermarkets (OK20, TM, Spar, and smaller shops 
run by individuals), food courts for fast food, post office, medical surgeries and other medical 
services (clinic, pharmacies, dentists and radiologists), service stations, banks, rooms rented 
out for different business (like saloons, internet services, tailoring, bottle store, dry cleaner, 
hardware), an open space for selling vegetables, council stands rented out to herbalists, and 
open air vendors who operate from the pavements.  
 
High Glen Shopping Centre is more structured with no pavement traders. Most entrepreneurs 
are renting business premises in the complex. There are two big supermarkets (TM and Farm 
and City), furniture shops, clothing shops, a medical centre, banks, saloons, pharmacy, bottle 
store and hardware. High Glen Shopping Centre has more formal entrepreneurs than 
Machipisa Shopping Centre. 
 
5.3.2.2.3. Profile of businesses in the industrial areas 
There are two types of industries in Harare, namely heavy industries and light industries. 
Heavy industries are capital and labour intensive, have high barriers to entry and produce 
large quantities of goods. Examples of heavy industry in Zimbabwe are the automobile, 
petroleum and steel industries. The heavy industries of Zimbabwe are mainly made up of 
formal large scale entrepreneurs (Chigwenya and Mudzengerere, 2013). The light industries 
are less capital intensive but more labour intensive, for example, the clothing and textile 
2020 OK, TM, Farm and City and Spar are among the big grocery supermarkets and the government has shares in 
them. During the meltdown they were forced to enforce price controls on basic goods resulting in most shops 




                                                 
manufacturing and food processing companies. Similar to the heavy industries, most of the 
entrepreneurs are formal large scale entrepreneurs. In the midst of these formal industries are 
some informal trading sites where micro and small-scale entrepreneurs are found. Some of 
the prominent and very functional informal trading sites found in the industrial area are 
Siyaso, Gazaland and Mupedza Nhamo. 
 
Siyaso is found next to the light industries near the high density suburb called Mbare. It is an 
open ground enclosed by a precast concrete wall. Some individuals erected some wood and 
plastic platforms on their selling points. Merchandise found in this complex extends from 
building material, to electrical goods, and motor parts. Anything metal or made of wood can 
be found at Siyaso. The setup is informal and crowded. Outside the wall are vendors who sell 
all sorts of things. 
 
Mupedza Nhamo is found in the same area as Siyaso. This place is also walled and has a big 
shaded area divided into smaller (2mX2m) sections. These sections are rented out to 
individuals who sell clothes. The clothes are both brand new, and sourced from neighbouring 
countries, or second hand and brought into the country in bales. Outside the wall are food 
vendors and some traders reselling clothes they would have bought inside the complex. 
 
Gazaland is found next to the heavy industries and next to Highfield high density area. The 
set up at Gazaland is different from Siyaso and Mupedza Nhamo, in that there are a wide 
range of entrepreneurial activities and the place is not enclosed by a wall. The entrepreneurial 
activities found at this location include mechanical services, saloons, butchery, clothing 
shops, supermarket, motor parts retailers and vegetable vendors. It is a congested area with 
some people renting a 1m x 1m corner for as much as US$150 per month. Most of the 
entrepreneurial activity is informal and no taxes are paid to the government. 
 
5.3.2.2.4. Profile of businesses in the medium to low density areas 
The businesses in the low density areas are structured in an orderly manner with well-built, 
well maintained and furnished premises. They are mostly in complexes where banks and big 




those of premises in high density and industrial areas. The targeted market is the wealthy 
residents in the medium to low density areas. Most of the businesses are formal, for example 
restaurants and food outlets, have the required registration and pay their monthly taxes. Some 
informal activity is also found in these medium and low density areas in the form of flea 
markets. Other informal traders are also found operating by the robots. The two medium to 
low density shopping centres that were used in the research are Avondale shopping centre in 
Avondale and Sami Levi Village Park in Borrowdale. 
 
5.3.2.2.5. Profile of businesses in the CBD area 
This area is mainly made up of office blocks, government buildings and large-scale registered 
formal enterprises. Most of the formal businesses have employees to assist. They have all the 
required documents (Certificates of Registration, Tax Clearance and Vendor Number) and 
pay taxes to the government. A very active informal sector also exists in the CBD area. Some 
of these informal enterprises operate from premises where they pay rent and others use 
pavements and street corners.  
   
5.3.2.2.6. Sampling Frame 
For this study, the targeted participants were MSEs, restricted to urban dwellers in different 
suburbs of the capital city of Harare, operating in both the formal and the informal sectors. 
The absence of an updated register of the MSEs who are operating in Harare posed some 
limitations when drawing up the sample for the study. A judgemental and purposive sampling 
technique combined with stratified random sampling was eventually used to select 150 MSEs 
from both the formal and informal sector. Judgemental sampling is a form of convenience 
sampling in which the elements are selected based on the judgement or expertise to choose 
elements that are representative of the population of interest in the study (Malhotra, 
1999:335). This technique was also used by Newadi and Pietersen (2008) in their study on 
informal entrepreneurship in South Africa.  
 
Initially, the study plan was to sample 400 MSEs through stratified random selection but 
owing to resource constraints, a smaller sample (150 firms) was considered. Stratification was 




areas discussed above). A pre-test of the questionnaire was done on a sample of 10 MSEs (5 
formal and 5 informal MSEs) from each suburb and the results showed that this stratification 
would not give a representative sample since there are more informal MSEs compared to 
formal and some areas had only informal enterprises, for example Siyaso and Mupedza 
Nhamo. The stratifications were then adjusted to sector of business and location of business.  
 
In order to ensure a representative sample, individuals running micro and small enterprises 
were selected from the 3 cluster areas, that is: 
• a high density area; 
• an industrial area, and 
• the CBD and low density area.  
 
The CBD and low density areas were clustered together because of the similarity in the 
profile of the two areas. From each cluster or location, 50 MSEs were sampled with the 
business venture having to be in one of the following three sectors: services, retail or 
manufacturing and construction. Another selection criterion is that the enterprise should have 
been operational for a period longer than 5 years to ensure that the enterprise was formed 
during the economic meltdown. Both female and male entrepreneurs were interviewed. A 
total of 88 enterprises were interviewed from the informal sector and 62 enterprises from the 
formal sector. 
 
5.3.2.2.7. Questionnaire Design 
The instrument that was used for primary data collection was a questionnaire. The 
questionnaire consisted of 4 sections. (A copy of the questionnaire is attached in the 
appendix). The first section covered the respondents’ demographic aspects. The questions in 
this section were intended to provide background information on the owner of the enterprise. 
Section 1 sought information on: the educational qualifications of the owners; their formal 
working experience (in years); age and marital status; as well as the reasons behind the 
formation of their business and whether the establishment of the business was necessity-
driven or opportunity-driven. These two types of entrepreneurship, necessity and opportunity 





The second part of the questionnaire is more focused on the enterprise. Some of the questions 
sought data on when the business was established; whether the business is a family business 
or not; if the business premises were owned or rented; and whether the business is an 
informal venture or a formal sector firm.  
 
The third section covers the entrepreneurial dynamics to determine whether the enterprise is 
growing or not. This is covered by three questions. The first one tracks the growth in 
employees from the time of formation to the current period, and a positive change would 
represent growth. This question was problematic in that most informal businesses are one-
man businesses, hence failed to capture the growth factor. The second question tracks the 
change over time in average earnings and expenses per month. This question also proved not 
to be a good measure of growth, as most MSEs did not record their transactions and based the 
facts on what they could remember which was not reliable. The third question which was then 
adopted for further analysis was a yes/no question on whether the entrepreneur feels that 
his/her business was growing. There was a follow-up question to expand on their answer of 
yes or no, allowing them to define growth in their own way. Most entrepreneurs indicated 
growth or lack of it in terms of merchandise size, location of business (operating in the high 
density areas against operating in the CBD area). Some felt their businesses were growing, 
but slowly. 
 
The growth inhibiting factors are covered by a set of 21 internal and external factors, using a 
Likert scale, and drawn from the literature. The Likert scale ranged from 1 to 5, with higher 
values indicating greater disagreement and lower values indicating greater agreement. For 
each factor, the respondent had to indicate, by ticking the scale, what best described their 
agreement or disagreement. 
 
The fourth section examines the N-Ach of the respondents. N-Ach, as indicated in chapter 3, 
measures an individual’s eagerness to succeed. N-Ach is an important attribute for business 
success and business growth. N-Ach is measured using the Mehrabian scale of the tendency 




respondents. It is measured on a nine-point Likert scale from +4 to – 4. The overall N-Ach 
score of each surveyed entrepreneur is obtained by adding up the scores from each question. 
A higher positive value indicates a greater N-Ach level, and the reverse is also true. This 
scale has been found to have a high reliability index (Elliot and Dweck, 2005). 
 
5.3.2.2.8. Ethical Clearance 
Ethical clearance was obtained from the UKZN Research Office before administering the 
questionnaires. This is to ensure that the study will not pose any threat to minors or the 
disadvantaged. Each respondent had to sign a form consenting to voluntary participation. 
 
5.3.2.2.9. Practical and Ethical Limitations 
• Willingness to participate by some respondents. 
• Inaccuracy of data due to longer recall period as most of them had no documented 
records. 
• Biased responses by some participants. 
• Unethical practices like tax evasion and employee benefits evasion by formal 
entrepreneurs could not be clearly verified. 
 
5.3.3 Hypothesis Formulation  
According to Thurik, Carree, van Stel and Audretsch (2008) and Faria et al. (2010) the 
empirical relationship between unemployment and entrepreneurship is two way (positive and 
negative). Increased levels of unemployment can lead to an increase in entrepreneurial 
activity (refugee effect - positive relationship), and at the same time, the high entrepreneurial 
activity can lead to a reduction in the level of unemployment (entrepreneurial effect- negative 
relationship) (Acs, 2008). These two effects are further explained below. 
 
A refugee effect refers to the act of using entrepreneurship as a survival platform because of 
an absence of other options or avenues to generate income (Acs, 2008). The refugee effect 




unemployment and entrepreneurship. Thus, as unemployment levels increase, refugee 
entrepreneurial activity will also increase.  
 
An entrepreneurial/opportunity effect arises when entrepreneurship is driven by the presence 
of an opportunity and resources (Acs, 2008). The entrepreneurial effect will show as a 
negative relationship between unemployment and entrepreneurship. As opportunistic 
entrepreneurial activity increases, more jobs will be created by the new entrepreneurs causing 
the unemployment level to drop and generating economic growth.  
In a melting down economy, the high unemployment rate created by the low real GDP is 
expected to increase refugee activities in subsequent periods. However, the collapse of the 
Zimbabwean economy was complemented with the collapse of the legal system. The absence 
of rule of law opened the doors for all sorts of activities to flourish, including the black 
market. It is a possibility that the unregulated economic environment provided an opportunity 
for the unemployed to make a living for themselves without fear of being penalised. In this 
case a negative relationship would be expected between unemployment and entrepreneurship. 
The following hypothesis will be tested. 
 
NH1: There is a negative and significant relationship between total number of MSEs and 
unemployment rate - opportunity entrepreneurial effect. 
AH1: There is a positive and significant relationship between total number of MSEs and 
unemployment rate – refugee effect. 
 
A relationship also exists between inflation and entrepreneurial activity. Theory suggests a 
negative relationship between inflation and entrepreneurial activity (Ovaska and Sobel, 
2005). According to Ovaska and Sobel (2005) high inflation rates do not foster new 
investments, but rather tend to reduce the creation of new firms. In this study, the relationship 
between inflation and entrepreneurial activity in a meltdown economy is expected to be 
positive. Entrepreneurial activity during the meltdown involved a lot of price speculation and 
that impacted acutely on the rate of inflation. As people speculated they caused a further 
increase in prices. These price increases eventually became a reality as there were constraints 




money supply, creating acute shortages of cash at hand. As an alternative way to source the 
cash, people resorted to entrepreneurial activity where they traded on a cash basis.  
 
NH2: There is a negative and significant relationship between total number of MSEs and 
inflation. 
AH2: There is a positive and significant relationship between total number of MSEs and 
inflation rate. 
Most micro and small-scale businesses operate on a cash and carry transaction system with 
very minimal credit. For this reason, these businesses usually have cash at hand at all times. 
One of the challenges during the meltdown was accessing the hard currency (Zim$); the 
financial intermediaries could not meet the daily cash demands from the public. In as much as 
the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe printed more cash, the supply could not match the demand 
triggered by the escalating inflation. There is a possibility that growth in MSEs occurred out 
of necessity, created by the shortage of currency, and entrepreneurship was used as an 
alternative means to fight the liquidity crisis. The following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
NH3: There is a negative and significant relationship between total number of MSEs and 
money supply. 
AH3: There is a positive and significant relationship between total number of MSEs and 
money supply. 
 
Literature identifies a positive and statistically significant relationship between 
entrepreneurship and economic growth as measured by real GDP or income per capita 
(Ovaska and Sobel, 2005, Parker and Robson, 2004).  The role of small businesses as vehicles 
for entrepreneurship has become more pronounced, especially in European countries, due to 
their contribution in curbing unemployment, and fostering economic growth. Policy makers 
embrace them more as instruments for supporting economic development. Audretsch, Carree, 
van Stel and Thurik (2002) argue that a country with low entrepreneurial activity will 





Further research has revealed that this relationship also depends on the country’s phase of 
economic development (GEM Report, 2013). It depends on whether the economy is factor-
driven or efficiency-driven or innovation-driven21 (GEM Report, 2013). Innovation-driven 
economies benefit more from entrepreneurial activities, than do factor driven economies 
(GEM Report, 2013). Most developing nations in Africa, Zimbabwe included, are factor-
driven, and the necessity-driven entrepreneurship dominates in these economies (GEM 
Report, 2013). Necessity-driven entrepreneurship can be intensified by the economic 
conditions like insufficient supply of jobs and a low level of social security entitlement 
conditions which force people to look for other sources of income and resort to 
entrepreneurship. In such circumstances a positive relationship will be expected between 
entrepreneurship and economic conditions as measured by real GDP. The following 
hypothesis will thus be tested for Zimbabwe. 
 
NH4: There is a positive and significant relationship between total number of MSEs and real 
GDP. 
AH4: There is a negative and significant relationship between total number of MSEs and real 
GDP, that is, necessity driven entrepreneurship. 
 
This macro-economic analysis does not give much information on the characteristics of the 
MSEs that were formed during the economic meltdown, and their relationship with the 
economic meltdown. Nor does it explain why most of these MSEs are operating in the 
unrecognised informal sector and not in the formal sector. If micro and small-scale 
entrepreneurship is to be used as part of the recovery plan, it is important to understand the 
characteristics and problems that the MSEs in Zimbabwe face, and what factors hinder the 
growth of their businesses and the willingness by informal sector entrepreneurs to formalise 
their businesses.  
 
The following hypotheses were tested. 
21 Factor-driven economies rely on unprocessed natural resources as a basis for their comparative advantage. 
Efficiency-driven economies rely on the efficient production of more advanced goods and services as a basis for 
their comparative advantage. 
Innovation-driven economies rely on their ability to produce innovative products using advanced methods as the 




                                                 
NH5: On average there are no differences between the formal sector business owners and 
informal sector business owners with respect to demographic aspects, average educational 
qualifications and pre-entrepreneurship employment experience. 
AH5: On average there are differences between the formal sector business owners and 
informal sector business owners with respect to demographic aspects, average educational 
qualifications and pre-entrepreneurship employment experience. 
NH6: Entrepreneurs running informal enterprises have on average the same N-Ach level as 
those running formal enterprises.  
AH6: Entrepreneurs running informal enterprises have on average a lower N-Ach level 
compared to those running formal enterprises. 
NH7: Factors that influence business growth in the formal sector are similar to those in the 
informal sector. 
AH7: Factors that influence business growth in the formal sector are different to those in the 
informal sector. 
NH8: There are no differences between internal and external factors with respect to their 
influence on formal sector businesses. 
AH8: Internal factors have a greater influence on the growth of formal businesses than 
external factors. 
NH9: There are no differences between internal and external factors with respect to their 
influence on informal sector businesses. 
AH9: External factors have a greater influence on the growth of informal businesses than do 
internal factors. 
NH10: The level of the entrepreneur’s N-Ach has a positive impact on the formalisation 
propensity of the MSEs in the informal sector. 
AH10: The level of the entrepreneur’s N-Ach has a negative impact on the formalisation 




NH11: Improving the growth constraints will improve the odds of informal sector 
entrepreneurs formalising their businesses. 
AH11: Improving the growth constraints will not improve the odds of the informal sector 
entrepreneurs formalising their businesses. 
 
5.3.4 Data Analysis 
5.3.4.1 Direction of Causality and Model Specification for Macro Analysis 
Recent empirical studies have revealed that the relationship between entrepreneurship and 
economic performance indicators is two-way, which is a migration from identifying one of 
the variables as exogenous and the other as endogenous (Hartog, Parker, van Stel and Thurik, 
2010). The relationship between entrepreneurship and economic growth is argued to be 
twofold and the direction of causality is reversal. Entrepreneurship can assist economic 
growth, while economic growth can in turn assist the development of entrepreneurship (Acs, 
2008; Hartog et al., 2010). If a country is experiencing economic growth, the output 
expansion in itself can generate entrepreneurial opportunities as the economy will have 
surplus resources that it can use to encourage entrepreneurial activities.  
 
As was discussed earlier, the relationship between entrepreneurship and unemployment is 
also two way and includes a lag structure which can last up to 10 years (Acs, 2008; Fritsch 
and Noseleit, 2013). The high unemployment rate can be associated with high entrepreneurial 
activity due to refugee effects. On the other hand,  good economic performance provides 
opportunities for entrepreneurship, causing entrepreneurial effects. Also these effects can be 
picked in lags which may last for a long time (Acs, 2008; Fritsch and Noseleit, 2013).  
 
In order to avoid methodological flaws associated with imposing prior assumptions on the 
direction of causality, this study used a Vector Autoregressive Model (VAR model) to test the 
relationship between entrepreneurship and the state of the economy (as proxied by a number 
of macroeconomic indicators). The VAR model does not impose any prior assumptions on 
the endogeneity of any of the variables in the model and allows us to isolate the genuine 





The main research questions that need to be answered from this analysis are: 
• What was the contribution of the economic meltdown to growth in micro and small-
scale entrepreneurial activity in Zimbabwe? 
• Did the growth of entrepreneurial activity contribute to the economic meltdown? 
 
The above two questions seek to address the issue of reversal causality in the relationship 
between micro and small-scale entrepreneurial activity and economic meltdown, and examine 
whether MSEs contributed to the meltdown and whether the meltdown contributed to the 
increase in MSEs. According to Gujarati (2009) an appropriate way of investigating the 
relationship between quantitative variables is through correlation or regression. Correlation is 
a statistical method used to show how strongly pairs of variables are related, and regression is 
a statistical method which uses one variable to predict the outcome of the other (Gujarati, 
2009). The regression approach was used here. A simple regression model relating 
entrepreneurship to the other variables is represented in the equation below as follows 
 
𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐸 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙 + 𝛽𝛽4𝑀𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦 + 𝜀                        (equation 1) 
 
where: 
LMSE represents log of total number of MSEs; 
Unemp represents the unemployment rate; 
RGDP represents the real Gross Domestic Product; 
Infl represents inflation rate; 
MSupply represents money supply; 
ε is the error term. 
 
Estimating this model using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is not ideal as it is likely to 
produce a spurious regression because the data is non-stationary. The only way the results can 
be regarded as sound is when one or more cointegrating vectors are present (Harris, 1994; 
Greene, 2008). Cointegration is a stochastic process approach in which two time series are 




the error terms of the VAR equations are uncorrelated, then the estimates will be unbiased 
and efficient. The estimates will be showing a stable long run relationship. The test for 
cointegration is more appropriate when testing for relationships using a limited sample size 
compared to a large sample. 
 
 Assuming one adopts the simple OLS equation 1, it will answer the first question. To answer 
the question on the contribution of growth in MSEs to the economic meltdown, equation 1 
will be re-arranged, and 4 other equations for each of the explanatory variables formulated 
with each variable being the independent variable. All in all, the present study will end up 
running 5 individual analyses, coupled with a test for cointegration in each equation before 
declaring the results sound. The analyses using OLS is likely to be cumbersome and might 
create some confusion. However, by running a Vector Autoregression (VAR) model, 
simultaneous equations will be combined in one model, overcoming the limitations of the 
OLS analysis (Sims, 1980; Hartog, 2010).  
 
VAR models can be presented through:  
1. Unrestricted VAR - is a reduced form whose output is interpretable unless some 
structural restrictions are imposed. 
2. Impulse responses - measure the effects of different shocks on the variable under 
study. 
3. Variance Decomposition - measures the relative importance of the different shocks to 
the variation in the different variables. 
4. Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) - captures both long run and short run 
dynamics between the variables that are being studied. The error correction coefficient 
will give the speed of adjustment to the long run relationship (Bjornland, 2000; 
Mertler and Vanatta, 2002; Greene, 2008; Hartog, 2010). 
 
From the theoretical framework, a number of relationships can be postulated for the five 
variables in equation 1 above, where either one or more of the explanatory variables becomes 
the dependent variable or entrepreneurship will be part of the explanatory variables. Previous 




relationship between unemployment and entrepreneurial activity (Thurik et al, 2008). For this 
reason, an appropriate model to analyse both the short run and long run dynamics of a number 
of simultaneous equations that include lags in a single model will be a VECM (Bjornland, 
2000; Mertler and Vanatta, 2002). Unlike the traditional macro-econometric models that 
require restrictions classifying variables in the model as either endogenous or exogenous, 
VECM models treat all variables as endogenous (Bjornland, 2000). 
 
A VECM model: 
• Allows the combination of variables of different order of integration in the same 
model; 
• Takes into consideration the possibility of reverse causality, as all variables are taken 
in as endogenous; 
• Can be used in forecasting (Bjornland, 2000; Mertler and Vanatta, 2002; Musuna 
and Muchapondwa, 2008). 
 
A VECM model makes it possible to analyse the reversal long run and short run relationship 
between all the variables in the model using levels data, to test for counteraction; to test for 
granger causality, and to study the effects of policy or shocks through impulse response 
characteristics (Greene, 2008: 587). Granger causality is a statistical test used to determine 
whether one time series is useful in forecasting the other time series. It predicts whether one 
thing happens before the other, but does not necessarily imply correlation, especially if 
Granger causality is in one direction (more precisely, if x Granger causes y, but y does not 
Granger cause x), (Sorensen, 2005). 
 
The general form of the m-dimensional22 VAR model of order p23 is given by; 
 
(𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕 − 𝜸 − 𝜹𝜹𝒕𝒕) = ∅𝟏(𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕−𝟏 − 𝜸 − 𝜹𝜹(𝒕𝒕 − 𝟏) + ⋯+ ∅𝒋(𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕−𝒋 − 𝜸 − 𝜹𝜹(𝒕𝒕 − 𝒑)+∈ 𝑫𝑫𝒕𝒕 + 𝜺𝜺𝒕𝒕     
          (equation 2) 
Where 
22 M denotes the number of variables in the model, in this case m=4 since inflation and real GDP will be used 
interchangeably to avoid multicollinearity. 




                                                 
• 𝑌𝑡 is a vector containing m variables. 
• 𝑌𝑡−𝑗 denotes lagged values with corresponding mxm matrices of coefficients ∅𝑗 for 
j=1,…,p. 
• 𝛾 denotes an mx1 vector of intercepts. 
• 𝛿 denotes an mx1 vector of deterministic drifts. 
• 𝑡 is a time trend. 
• 𝐷𝑡 is a dx1 vector containing dummies and/or other non-stochastic variables. 
• ∈ is an mxd parameter matrix. 
• 𝜀𝑡 is the error term. 
 
From the VAR model in equation 2, the reduced form VECM can be written as; 
∆𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕 = 𝝁𝝁𝟎 + 𝝀𝝀(𝜷𝜷′𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕−𝟏 − 𝝁𝝁𝟏 − 𝜹𝜹𝟏𝒕𝒕) + ∑ 𝜽𝜽𝒋∆𝒀𝒀𝒕𝒕−𝒋
𝒑−𝟏
𝒋=𝟏 +∈ 𝑫𝑫𝒕𝒕 + 𝜺𝜺𝒕𝒕                 
           (equation 3) 
Where 
• 𝛽𝛽′𝑌𝑡−1 denotes the long-run equilibrium relations. 
𝝀𝝀 denotes the corresponding adjustment parameters that describe the speed of adjustment 
towards the long-run equilibrium if variables are out of equilibrium. The coefficient for 𝝀𝝀 
should be negative and between 0 and 1. The closer the adjustment parameter is to 1, the 
faster the speed of adjustment (Engel and Granger, 1987). 
• 𝜃𝑗  denotes parameter matrices of the short-run dynamics. 
• 𝜇0 is a constant. 
 
The VECM above (equation 3) was used to examine the long-run and short-run dynamics of 
entrepreneurial activity and the state of the Zimbabwean economy during the period 1980 to 
2010. The VECM was run in STATA using the Johansen technique. Previously, Engel-
Granger two-step approach was commonly used to estimate an Error Correction Model 
(ECM) (Engel and Granger, 1987; Harris, 1994)24. However, its failure to determine the 
24 The Engel-Granger two step procedure: 1) Estimate the long run (equilibrium) equation. Then test for 
statonarity in the residual. If stationary exists then it implies cointegration. 
2) Substitute the long run equation into the error correction equation and estimate the new equation to get the 




                                                 
cointegration rank if more than 1 rank exists is making it less popular. The Engel-Granger 
approach is now being replaced by the Johansen technique. 
 
The Johansen technique consists of the following steps: 
1. Testing the order of integration of each variable entering the multivariate model. Only 
I(1), that is those variables that become stationary after first differencing, can enter the 
model. In this study, three tests were run to test for stationarity, namely Augmented-
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test, Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test and the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test for stationarity first with levels data 
and then with differenced data. 
2.  Testing the order of the VAR/VECM/ selecting the appropriate lag length (p) for the 
endogenous variables using information criteria. Three information criteria were used 
namely Akaike information Criteria (AIC), Hannan and Quinn information criteria 
(HQIC) and Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). 
3. Run the unrestricted VAR and test for Granger Causality.  
4. Determining the number of cointegrating vectors (r) in the VAR/VECM using the 
trace statistic and the max-eigenvalue test.  
5. Testing for restrictions in the model. These restrictions are based on theory about the 
variables or the research questions in this study. 
6. Run the Error Correction Model to determine the short run dynamics and long run 
dynamics. 
7. Impulse response plots to show response to exogenous shocks (Mertler and Vanatta, 
2002). 
To avoid the possibility of multicollinearity between real GDP and inflation, the two were 
regressed separately in two VECMs. The first VECM had entrepreneurship, money supply, 
unemployment and real GDP as the dependent variables. The second VECM replaced real 
GDP with inflation. Thus, the second VECM had entrepreneurship, money supply, 
unemployment and inflation as the dependent variables.  
  
Assuming the analysis reveals the presence of 4 cointegrating equations, the expected signs 




Table 14: Expected signs on the Explanatory Variables from running the VECM 
Dependent Variable Explanatory Variable Expected Sign 
Eqn 1:Entrepreneurship Unemployment Rate + (refugee effect) 
 Real GDP - 
 Inflation Rate + 
 Money supply + (necessity driven entr) 
Eqn 2:Unemployment Entrepreneurship  - (entrepreneurial effect) 
 Money Supply + 
 Real GDP - 
 Inflation Rate - 
Eqn 3: Real GDP Entrepreneurship + 
 Unemployment Rate - 
 Real GDP lags + 
 Inflation Rate - 
Eqn 4:Inflation Rate Entrepreneurship + 
 Unemployment Rate + 
 Real GDP - 
 Inflation Rate lags + 
 
 
In the entrepreneurship equation (Eqn1 in table 14 above), positive relationships are expected 
with money supply, unemployment and inflation. This positive relationship is thought to be 
driven by the need for survival in the face of adversities. Hence, as inflation increases and 
unemployment increases as well as liquidity shortages arise, entrepreneurial activity is 
expected to increase. In Eqn 2 (from table 14 above), a negative relationship is expected 
between unemployment and entrepreneurship because of entrepreneurial effect. In equation 3, 
Real GDP is expected to have a positive relationship with entrepreneurship because of the 
ability of entrepreneurship to generate income for the economy. A negative relationship is 
expected with respect to unemployment and inflation in equation 3. In the inflation equation 





5.3.4.2 Descriptive Analysis and non-parametric t-test 
In order to further understand and compare the MSEs operating in the formal and informal 
sectors of Zimbabwe, descriptive analysis is done using frequency tables, t-statistics and 
graphs. Descriptive analysis is helpful for this study because it summarises the collected data, 
aiding the drawing up of meaningful inferences and comparisons. Descriptive analysis is used 
to compare the characteristics of business owners and their businesses in the formal sector to 
those in the informal sector.  
 
5.3.4.3 Principal Component Analysis 
In order to obtain quantitative measures of the factors hindering the growth of the MSEs in 
both the formal and informal sectors, Principal Component Analysis, also known as factor 
analysis, was used (Lam, 1998). Factor analysis reduces data to groups with similar 
characteristics by minimizing variability within each group and maximizing variability across 
groups (Lam, 1998). In this study the growth hindering factors are analysed separately for the 
formal sector and informal sector MSEs. This analysis is important as it isolates and groups 
the main factors that are hindering the growth of MSEs in Zimbabwe into clusters. A similar 
approach has been used before by other researchers, although most have looked at formal 
sector firms only. However, the current study uses factor analysis to examine growth 
inhibiting constraints for both formal and informal firms, enabling one to establish where 
there are commonalities or differences between the two sectors, and also establish whether 
external factors have a greater bearing on hindering growth. Separate analysis of the formal 
and informal sectors provides policy makers with better information on how to boost 
entrepreneurial growth without using the blanket, or one-size-fits-all approach for the two 
sectors. This approach combined with the meltdown scenario makes the present study unique 










5.3.4.4 Logistic Analysis of the willingness to formalize by informal 
entrepreneurs 
As was discussed earlier, one of the challenges for the Zimbabwean economy post the 
economic meltdown has been formalising the informal enterprises. Literature identifies the 
reasons for informalisation as regulatory and administrative barriers, fees and financial 
requirements, absence of business services like formal training, corruption, and criminality, 
among others (Welch, 2005). These factors are closely linked to the growth inhibiting factors, 
and as such, the Zimbabwean government adopted a policy to improve access to financial 
assistance by informal traders through the formation of a Fund in 2010, in anticipation that it 
will encourage the traders to formalise their businesses. Formalisation of the informal 
enterprises will broaden the tax base for the economy, hence improve revenue generation. 
Four years down the line, it still remains a challenge and poses questions on the link between 
the growth constraints and the willingness to formalise by informal traders. 
 
This part of the micro-level analysis involved running a logistic model that tested the 
relationship between the growth constraints clusters; generated from the principal component 
analysis, and the willingness of informal sector business owners to formalise their businesses. 
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, assuming a value 1, if the informal sector 
entrepreneur indicated that he/she is willing to formalise his/her business; 0 if not willing.  
The independent variables will be the principal component clusters generated from the factor 
analysis, described in chapter 7. Additional to these variables, N-Ach is also included as an 
independent variable. The logistic model as presented in equation (4) below, was estimated 
using SPSS. 
 
The logit model is based on the logistic probability distribution: 




+ 𝝑𝑵 − 𝑨𝒄𝒉𝒊 + µ𝒊 
                     (equation 4) 
 
Here the study estimates the log of the odds that Y = 1 (ratio of likelihood of event occurring 




ln{odds(Y = 1)}.  Xs are growth constraint clusters generated through principal 
component analysis. N-Ach is a measure of the need to achieve and µ𝑖 is the error term. 
 
The logit model is a non-linear model, and estimated using Maximum Likelihood Estimation. 
When interpreting the 𝛽𝛽 coefficients, the focus is more on the signs of the coefficients than on 
their magnitudes: 
If 𝛽𝛽 > 0: as X increases the probability of the event occurring P(Y = 1) also increases,  
If 𝛽𝛽 < 0: as X increases, P(Y = 1) decreases. 
 
Some tests to evaluate the logistic model were also carried out. Firstly, the Wald test was 
carried out to test for the overall fitness of the logistic model. The Omnibus test and Hosmer 
and Lemeshow test were done to test the ‘goodness of fit’ of the model. The Pseudo R-
squared statistics was measured using the Cox and Snell and the Nagelkerke R Square. Lastly 




This chapter presented an overview of the research design methods. Data was collected from 
secondary (published) and primary (questionnaire) sources. The methodology was divided 
into two. The first section presents methods to analyse the relationship between MSE growth 
and economic meltdown at the macro level. The main instrument of analysis is a VECM 
model. The second section presents methods to analyse the characteristics and growth 
inhibiting factors of MSEs as well as the owners of these businesses, in the formal and 
informal sectors. This second part combines descriptive statistics, principal component 
analysis, and binary logistic regression model estimation. Results of these analyses are 










LINKING MSE GROWTH TO ECONOMIC MELTDOWN IN 
ZIMBABWE25 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides regression results and a discussion of the relationship between MSE 
growth and the economic meltdown, by testing for the presence of refugee effects. It presents 
the results of the first part of the methodology that utilises time series data from 1980 to 2010, 
to analyse the relationship between growth in MSEs and economic meltdown at macro-level. 
The relationship between growth in MSEs and four macroeconomic variables, used as proxies 
for economic meltdown, was examined using regression analysis. The macroeconomic 
variables used were unemployment, real GDP, inflation and no liquidity proxied by money 
supply.  Due to the nature of the real GDP and inflation data, there was a high probability of 
the regression model failing to produce sound results because of multicollinerity. This 
problem was rectified by running two separate VECMs and then comparing the results. The 
first model (Model 1 with inflation) tested the relationship between growth in entrepreneurial 
activity and money supply, unemployment and inflation. The second model (Model 2 with 
RGDP) replaced inflation with real GDP. Further, the tests for stationarity and the test for 
cointegration were done on the data sets in order to define the VECM using the Johansen 
technique. 
 
6.2 Developing the VECM 
6.2.1 Testing the Order of Integration 
Three methods were used to test for stationarity on the five variables (LMSE, UNEMP, INFL, 
LMSUPPLY and RGDP) that were intended to enter the VECM. These methods were 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test, Phillips-Perron (PP) unit root test and the 
Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test for stationarity.26 Of the three tests, KPSS 
works well with smaller data sets and was used as a decisive test in cases were ADF and PP 
25 The findings of this chapter have been partly published as a journal article: S Mukorera and D Mahadea 
(2014), Linking entrepreneurial activity to economic meltdown in Zimbabwe, Mediterranean Journal of Social 
Sciences, vol 5(3), pg.42-50 
26 Dickey- Fuller test: H0 is a unit root, HA is stationarity 




                                                 
failed to be conclusive (Green, 2003). Results from the three tests of stationarity are shown in 
tables 15 and 16 below.  
 
Table 15: PP and ADF test for unit root results 













2.261 -3.725 -2.986 -2624 0.9764 
1st differenced 
DRGDP 




5.656 -3.743 -2.997 -2.629 1.0000 
1st differenced  
DINFL 
-1.520 -3.750 -3.000 -2.630 0.5236 
Levels  
LMSE 




-3.350 -3.743 -2.997 -2.629 0.0128 
Levels 
UNEMP 
1.397 -3.730 -2.992 -2.626 0.9971 
1st differenced 
DUNEMP 
-5.780 -3.750 -3.000 -2.630 0.0000 
Levels 
LMSUPPLY 
-1.726 -3.716 -2.986 -2.624 0.4180 
1st differenced 
DLMSUPPLY 




















-1.253 -3.721 -2.976 -2.625 0.6325 
1st differenced  
DRGDP 




1.838 -3.743 -2.997 -2.629 0.9984 
1st differenced 
DINFL 
-2.329 -3.750 -3.000 -2.630 0.1627 
Levels  
LMSE 




-3.345 -3.743 -2.997 -2.629 0.0130 
Levels  
UNEMP 
1.022 -3.730 -2.992 -2.626 0.9945 
1st differenced 
DUNEMP 
-5.203 -3.750 -3.000 -2.630 0.0000 
Levels  
LMSUPPLY 
1.653 -3.730 -2.980 -2.620 0.5618 
1st differenced 
DLMSUPPLY 
-3.985 -3.745 -2.998 -2.640 0.0000 
*Note: Numbers in bold show stationarity 
 
Table 16: KPSS test for stationarity results 
KPSS test for Stationarity 
 Levels t-statistics 1st differenced t-statistics 
 LRGDP 1.53 0.584 
INFL 0.98 0.403 




UNEMP 2.72 0.617 
LMSUPPLY 1.86 0.412 
*Note: Numbers in bold show stationarity 
1% Critical Value 5% Critical Value 10% Critical Value 
0.739 0.463 0.347 
Source: Author’s own table reporting results analysed in STATA 
 
All data sets detected a unit root in levels data and no unit root in their first differenced data. 
However, inflation data set was initially problematic as the first differenced data was coming 
out as non-stationary from the PP test and ADF test but stationary from the KPSS test. Visual 
inspection of the first differenced data of inflation showed the presence of outliers which 
were identified as the possible cause of the distortion (see fig 25 below). After removing the 
outliers in the years 2008 and 2007, and running the unit root test, the data sets emerged as 
I(1), thus differenced data was stationary. From KPSS test, the t-statistics for 1st differenced 
data sets for real GDP was 0.584, for inflation was 0.403, for MSE was 0.429, for money 
supply and for unemployment was 0.412 and 0.617 respectively (see table 16 above). All the 
t-statistics were smaller than the t-critical value of 0.739 at 1% level of significance, hence 
failed to reject the null hypothesis of stationarity, and concluded that the 5 series become 
stationary after 1st differencing. 
 
Figure 25 : Scatter plot of the 1st differenced inflation data, 1980-2010  
 
























Since all 5 data series were found to be I(1), they can be part of the VECM since only I(1) 
variables are allowed to be part of the long run equation in a VECM. The next step according 
to Johansen technique is to establish lag length or order of the VECM. 
 
6.2.2 Lag length/ order of VECM selection 
The second step in modelling a VECM is to determine the lag length (number of lags) of the 
VECM. The three information criteria that were used in determining the lag length were 
Akaike Information Criteria (AIC), Hannan and Quinn information criteria (HQIC) and 
Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC). The SBIC and the HQIC are the more 
consistent estimators than the AIC because the AIC tends to overestimate in cases where the 
actual number of lags (p ) is less or equal to the maximum number of lags (pmax) that is 
specified in the estimation (Green, 2003).27 After trying for pmax equal to 2 and equal to 3, a 
conclusion was made that only 1 lag was to be included. Table 16 below shows the summary 
of the results. The full set of results is in the appendix. 
 
Table 17: Results for test of the order of the VAR/VECM 
pmax Number of lags 
identified by AIC 
Number of lags 
identified by HQIC 
Number of lags 
identified by SIBC 
2 2 1 1 
3 1 1 1 
Source: Author’s own table reporting results analysed in STATA 
 
The results in table 16 above have all the information criteria agreeing on an order of 1 for the 
VECM. Thus, no lags of all I(1) variables will be included in the analysis. Having ascertained 









                                                 
6.2.3 Testing for Granger Causality 
Table 18: Results for test for Granger Causality: Model 1 with inflation 

































































Source: Author’s own table reporting results analysed in STATA 
*show significant p-values 
 
The Granger causality test results reported in tables 18 and 19 shows the significance of the 
excluded variable in causing the test variable to vary. From Model 1 with inflation (table 18), 
the LMSE equations show that money supply (p-value is 0.052 showing 5% level of 
significance) is the only series that is useful in forecasting growth in MSEs, that is, money 
supply Granger causes growth in MSEs. This means that some variation in money supply can 
cause entrepreneurial activity to change. From the unemployment equation, none of the series 
Granger causes unemployment since all the p-values are greater than 10% (0.118 for LMSE, 
0.152 for INFL and 0.747 for LMSUPPLY). This is also true for inflation, where none of the 
variables Granger causes inflation. With the money supply equation, it is only growth in 




possibility of 2 cointegrating equations and possibility of reversal causality between the two 
variables growth in MSEs and money supply. However, this can only be ascertained after 
running a test for cointegration. 
 
Table 19: Results for test for Granger Causality: Model 2 with real GDP 

































































Source: Author’s own table reporting results analysed in STATA 
*show significant p-values 
 
From Model 2 (table 19) with real GDP, unemployment and real GDP Granger cause growth 
in MSEs (p-values are 0.000 and 0.022 respectively) and money supply does not Granger 
cause it (p-value is 0.167). However in the money supply equations, growth in MSEs (p-value 
is 0.023) is the only series that Granger cause it. In the unemployment equation, growth in 
MSEs and real GDP Granger causes unemployment (p-values are 0.004 and 0.014 




unemployment and money supply) Granger causes it as all the p-values are reported as 
statistically insignificant. The next step is to test for cointegration to ascertain if any of these 
relationships imply causality. 
 
6.2.4 Testing for Cointegration 
In time series analysis, running a multivariate model with non-stationary variables is unlikely 
to produce sound results unless there is evidence of cointegration. The presence of 
cointegration is a sign that there is long run equilibrium. To test for cointegration, the 
Johansen test was used. The test identified the presence of only 1 cointegrating vector for 
both models (full output of results is in the appendix pg. 212-213). With a trace statistic of 
25.7233 (pg. 212) for model 1 and 25.5903 (pg. 213) for model 2, which are both less than 
the 5% critical value of 29.68, we failed to reject the null hypothesis of maximum rank of 1 or 
less for both models. The max-eigenvalue also indicated 1 cointegrating equation at the 5% 
level of significance for both models. The cointegrating equation was normalised on the 
entrepreneurial activity equation and the 2 VECM can be specified as follows. 
 
Model 1: with inflation 
∆𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛿1𝑆1𝑡 + 𝛿2𝐷1𝑡 + 𝛿3𝐷2𝑡
+ 𝜆1[𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝑀𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑡] + ɛ1𝑡 
                     (equation 5) 
Model 2: with real GDP 
∆𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑡 = 𝛼1 + 𝛿4𝑆1𝑡 + 𝛿5𝐷1𝑡 + 𝛿6𝐷2𝑡
+ 𝜆2[𝜃1𝐿𝑀𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑡 + 𝜃2𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑡 + 𝜃3𝐿𝑅𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡 − 𝐿𝑀𝑆𝐸𝑡] + ɛ2𝑡 










6.3 Regression Results  
Table 20: Results from the VECM 
With 1 lag       
Dependent Variable: LMSE (log MSE)  
Variable   Model 1 with Inflation 
Model 2  
with RGDP 
    Long-term   Long-term 





INFL  1.55e-09***   








LRGDP    -1.43e-08*** 
    
(0,000) 






















𝝀𝝀    -0.0956***   -0.3352*** 
R-squared 89,83%   50,93% 
Note: *** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. 
Numbers in () are standard deviations 
Source: Author’s own table reporting results analysed in STATA 
 
The results reported in table 20 above are a simulation of MSE growth in the formal sector in 
Zimbabwe. Model 1 results show that there is a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between MSE growth (LMSE) and money supply (LMSUPPLY) (with a 
coefficient 0.944), inflation (INFL) (with a coefficient 1.55e-09), unemployment (UNEMP) 
(with a coefficient 0.0291) and the chaos period (D2) (with a coefficient 0.3537). A 1% 
increase in the shortage of liquidity (as proxied my money supply) tends to result in a 0.944% 
increase in the total number of MSEs, holding all other things constant. This relationship is 
statistically significant at 5% level of significance. A positive relationship was also found 
between MSE growth and unemployment and between MSE growth and inflation, although 




in MSEs. The chaos period (D2) also contributed significantly to the growth in MSEs 
accounting for about 42.43% ((e0.3537 -1) x100=42.43%)28 of the change in MSEs. The 
positive relationship with the explanatory variables supports previous findings by other 
researchers of a refugee effect (Thurik et al., 2008; Ghavidel et al., 2011). However, in this 
case the refugee effect is emanating to a greater extent from the shortage of liquidity and to a 
lesser extent from unemployment. This model has a goodness of fit of 89.83% (table 20 
above). 
 
Although not significant, the meltdown period (D1) accounts for approximately 4.21% ((e-
0.043 -1) x100=4.21%) of the variation in MSEs growth. An adjustment coefficient of -0.0956 
implies that only 9.56% of the variation will be corrected in the first year, thus it will take 
about 10.46 (1/0.0956) years for the economy to adjust back to the long run equilibrium 
defined by Model 1 following a shock in the economy. A period of 10.46 years is perhaps too 
long for the adoption of any policy that employs variables used in this model as instruments.  
 
Model 2 presents a slightly different picture. The positive relationship, which shows refugee 
effect, is again picked in this model between MSE growth and unemployment (with a 
coefficient 0.049) and money supply (with a coefficient 1.257). A 1% increase in the shortage 
of liquidity seems to result in 1.257% increase in the total number of MSEs, holding all other 
things constant. A 1% increase in unemployment seems to result in a 0.05% increase in the 
total number of MSEs, holding all other things constant. These two relationships are 
statistically significant at 5% level of significance. MSE growth is negatively related to real 
GDP with a coefficient of -1.43e-08. A 1% decrease in real GDP tends to result in a 
0.0000000143% increase in MSEs, holding all other things constant. Although there is a 
significant relationship between real GDP and MSE growth, the coefficient is extremely 
small. The structural break (S1) is also statistically significant and explains about 109.19% 
((e0.7381 -1) x 100=109.19%) change in MSE growth. The dummy for meltdown period (D1) is 
also statistically significant at 1% level and explains 39.27% ((e-0.4987 -1) x 100=39.27%) of 
the growth in the number of MSEs. The constant (0.6094) is statistically significant at 1% 
level of significance, suggesting that there are some variables that are not included in the 




                                                 
model that can explain the variation in MSE growth. The adjustment period in this model is 
2.98 years and this model explains about 50.93% of the variation in MSE growth. 
 
A lot of ambiguity exists in the literature around the refugee effects from unemployment 
especially under circumstances of high unemployment. Some studies support the refugee 
effect and some studies picked a negative relationship between unemployment and 
entrepreneurship which is not consistent with the refugee effect (Audretsch et al., 2001; 
Baptista et al., 2006). To test for the impact of excessive unemployment, a squared 
unemployment variable was introduced to the model. The results are reported in table 21 
below.  
 
Table 21: MODEL 3 VECM results with squared unemployment variable 
 Dependent Variable: LMSE 
Variable    Model 3 with Inflation 
     Long-term   








INFL   6.53e-10***  
   (3.73e-11)  




























λ    -0.2138***   
R-squared  90.22%   
Note: *** 1% level of significance, ** 5% level of significance, * 10% level of significance. Numbers in 
() are standard deviations 




The introduction of the squared unemployment variable confirmed the initial findings of the 
presence of the refugee effect and improves the model’s goodness of fit to 90.22%. The 
unemployed squared variable coefficient (UNEMP2) is positive (0.0004) and significant at 
5% level of significance. The two unemployment variables both have positive coefficients 
although UNEMP (with a coefficient 0.0008) has a higher coefficient than UNEMP2 (with a 
coefficient 0.0004). The two unemployment variables show that as unemployment increases, 
MSEs increase and the positive relationship continues even with higher unemployment rates. 
The smaller coefficient on Unemp2 could be the reason that a higher unemployment level 
may imply a lower capital base, which reduces the chances of new enterprises being formed 
and surviving. In other words, greater unemployment stimulates start-up activity due to the 
need for survival, but most of them may not survive in the long run because of a poor initial 
capital base (Reynold, Miller and Makai, 1995).  
 
Money supply (with a coefficient 0.3910) and inflation (with a coefficient 6.53e-10) still have 
the positive relationship with MSE growth. The meltdown period (D1) explains 16.64%   ((e-
0.182 -1) x 100=16.64%), whilst the chaos period (D2) explains approximately 32.98 % ((e0.285 
-1) x 100=109.19%) of the growth in MSEs. An adjustment coefficient of -0.2138 means that 
it will take approximately 4.68 years (1/0.2138) to restore long run equilibrium defined by 
model 3, following any shock. This low speed of adjustment still makes it difficult to utilise 
any of the variables in the model as policy instruments.  
 
6.4 Discussion of Results 
A summary of the conclusions of the hypotheses which were being tested in this analysis is 
presented in table 22 below. 
Table 22: Hypotheses test results 
NH1: There is a negative and significant relationship between total 
number of MSEs and unemployment rate - opportunity entrepreneurial 
effect. 
AH1: There is a positive and significant relationship between total 









NH2: There is a negative and significant relationship between total 
number of MSEs and inflation. 
AH2: There is a positive and significant relationship between total 






NH3: There is a negative and significant relationship between total 
number of MSEs and money supply. 
AH3: There is a positive and significant relationship between total 






NH4: There is a positive and significant relationship between total 
number of MSEs and real GDP. 
AH4: There is a negative and significant relationship between total 





Source: Authors own compilation 
 
All the 4 null hypotheses were rejected in favour of the alternatives which concluded for a 
positive and significant relationship between total number of MSEs and unemployment, 
inflation and money supply and a negative relationship with real GDP. Some of the results are 
consistent with what is in the literature except for inflation and money supply. Ovaska and 
Sobel (2005) found a negative relationship between entrepreneurial activity and inflation in 
10 European Union countries with normal economies. The positive relationship picked in this 
study captures the abnormality of the Zimbabwean economy during the meltdown. The 
outcome on the inflation and money supply variables validates the importance of sound 
monetary policy on entrepreneurial growth. Also, the deviation might be from omitted 
institutional, social and personal factors (these factors were discussed in sub-section 3.7.2 and 
3.7.3). These institutional, social and personal factors were not part of this study as it focused  
mainly on economic factors only.  
 
In comparing Model 1 with Model 2, Model 1 has a better fit than Model 2 as shown by the 




among the micro and small-scale entrepreneurs was mainly for survival from lack of formal 
employment and from money supply shortages. Entrepreneurship was used as an alternative 
means to a source of income and alternative source of cash in hand. The failure by the formal 
financial intermediaries to meet the individual daily demand for money drove people into 
other cash-generating activities that use paper money as a medium of exchange like 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurship was to a lesser extent used for its refugee effect from 
unemployment and to a greater extent to cater for the cash in hand necessity as shown by 
Model 3. The positive refugee effects from unemployment are consistent with the earlier 
findings by Thurik et al., (2008; Ghavidel, 2011). 
 
The results show that higher levels of unemployment did not fully account for the sudden 
growth in new micro and small-scale businesses. However, not having enough money supply 
to meet transactionary demands, owing to hyperinflation, caused a liquidity constraint, and 
this pushed many people into micro and small-scale entrepreneurial activity as an alternative 
source of cash. The main finding from this part of the analysis is that refugee effects in 
entrepreneurship may not only come from unemployment but can also emanate from other 
factors depending on the state of the economy. In the case of Zimbabwe, micro and small 
scale entrepreneurial activity was a place of refuge from the liquidity constraints created by 
the economic meltdown. 
 
As a whole, Models 1-3 explain a state of abnormality surrounding the sudden growth in 
micro and small-scale entrepreneurial activity in Zimbabwe. Of the three models that were 
tested in this study, the one that best describes entrepreneurial activity during economic 
meltdown in Zimbabwe is Model 3 with a goodness of fit of 90.22%. Model 3 has an 
adjustment period from short run to long run of 4.68 years (λ=-0.2138), which is deemed too 
long. This long period of adjustment reflects the instability that was in the economy due to the 
meltdown and can also be defined as a measure of the loss of confidence felt in the system as 
a whole during the meltdown period. Failure to quickly adjust to shocks in the system could 
be because of the entrepreneurs’ choice to ignore the system, as they felt the government 
could not provide for their employment or basic needs. With this slow speed of adjustment, it 




entrepreneurial activity, the intended effects of the policy might not transmit fast enough into 
the economy.  
 
Unless changes are made through improvements in incentive structures to the MSEs and 
improvements in the institutions, micro and small-scale entrepreneurial activity in Zimbabwe 
will mostly be used for immediate survival without much benefit to the country. It is apparent 
that these MSEs were an integral part of people’s lives in Zimbabwe during the time of crisis. 
As the country now recovers from the effects of the meltdown, these MSEs can be used as 
tools in the recovery process. Policy makers should formulate incentive structures that 
encourage the growth of already existing MSEs so that they can move from being micro and 
small-scale to medium-scale businesses, and in so doing create employment and income 
opportunities for the country. It is possible that many jobs can be created by improving on 
already functioning enterprises rather than seeking to encourage the creation of new 
enterprises, which may take longer to become operational because of adjustment lags (λ), 
ranging from 4.68 to 10.4 years.    
 
6.5 Conclusion 
Entrepreneurial activity in the formal sector in Zimbabwe was to a greater extent driven by 
the absence of liquidity, as well as the absence of formal employment opportunities. During 
the meltdown period, financial institutions ran dry of cash and most people could not 
withdraw their income or savings from the banks. Failure by the financial intermediaries to 
supply a sufficient quantity of bank notes drove people into entrepreneurship, where they 
traded in hard currency such as the US dollar. The Zim dollar was useless, valueless and 
stopped operating as a medium of exchange. There was an entire loss of confidence in the 
local currency and stability of the system. Entrepreneurship was used as an alternative way of 
getting hard currency to pay for taxi fares and basic commodities in the informal sector. The 
positive relationship between squared unemployment and entrepreneurship shows the 








ENGAGING INFORMAL MSEs IN ZIMBABWE’S ECONOMY 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides results of the descriptive and empirical analysis which was carried out 
on survey data from MSEs operating in the formal and informal sectors in Harare, Zimbabwe. 
The objective of this analysis was to ascertain the appropriateness of “common law” in a 
country where MSEs are mostly concentrated in the unrecognised informal sector. The results 
reported in this section are a comparative analysis of MSEs in the formal sector to those in the 
informal sector. Initially, these two are compared through descriptive analysis of the 
demographic factors of the entrepreneurs, and the entrepreneurial dynamics of the MSEs. 
Secondly, the descriptive and principal component analysis results of the internal and external 
constraints hindering the growth of the MSEs in the two sectors will be reported. Internal 
factors refer to those factors that the entrepreneur has control over, whilst external factors are 
socio-economic, political and technological factors that the entrepreneur has no control over 
(Mahadea and Pillay, 2008). Thirdly, results of a logistic regression analysis of the 
relationship between the growth constraint clusters generated from the principal component 
analysis, and willingness by informal entrepreneurs to formalise their businesses, will be 
reported. 
 
7.2 Characteristics of MSEs in the formal and informal sectors. 
As was mentioned in chapter 5, the sample consisted of 150 firms, 88 in the informal sector 
and 62 in the formal sector. Thus, 88 owners of informal MSEs were interviewed and an 
additional 62 from the formal sector. Of those in the informal sector, 52% were females. The 
majority of these informal MSE owners, were sole proprietors (95%), married (62%) and 
operating on rented premises (69%). As in the informal sector, most of the formal MSE 
owners were females (60%), married (81%) and had sole proprietorship (100%). The average 
age of the enterprises in the formal sector was 9 years and for the informal enterprises was 7.5 
years. The means of years of operation in the two sectors are statistically significantly 
different from each other at 1% level of significance (t-statistic=2.559 and p-value=0.012), 





From the survey, it also became apparent that formalisation is associated with the 
entrepreneur having previous formal employment. On average, formal sector entrepreneurs 
had 2-5 years formal employment experience prior to starting their own business, whilst the 
informal entrepreneurs had an average of l-2 years of formal work experience. These means 
are statistically and significantly different at 1% level of significance (t-statistic=-3,106), 
suggesting that formal entrepreneurs had a better prior work experience and perhaps  a greater 
appreciation of the benefits of formalisation for them to start up their own businesses in the 
formal sector. Most of the formal sector entrepreneurs were previously employed in the 
private sector, whereas most of the informal MSE entrepreneurs had never been formally 
employed before; those who had been employed had worked in the government sector.  
 
The education level of the formal sector operators differed significantly from those in the 
informal sector. Most of the formal MSE entrepreneurs had either diploma/certificate 
qualifications (42%) or a first degree (32%). On the other hand, most of the informal sector 
MSE entrepreneurs had an O level certificate (35%), or a Diploma/Certificate qualification 
(39%), as the highest education qualification. The formation of the MSEs in the informal 
sector was mostly driven by the need to survive financially (necessity driven) and yet about 
65% of those in the formal sector were formed because an opportunity had presented itself.  
 
The N-Ach level of the surveyed entrepreneurs ranged from 16 to 77. On average the formal 
MSE entrepreneurs recorded an average N-Ach level of 39, which is slightly higher than that 
of the informal sector MSE entrepreneurs (32). The mean N-Ach of the two groups is 
statistically significantly different at 10% level of significance (t-statistic=-1.873), thus 
formal sector entrepreneurs have a higher need for achievement compared to informal sector 
entrepreneurs. An interesting aspect pertains to the way the entrepreneurs viewed their 
business as either growing or not. Of the formal MSEs 63% reported their businesses as not 
growing and 58% of the informal MSEs reported the same, and yet these businesses were 
reported as the main source of their household income. This is to be expected as the 






Table 23: Independent t-test for equality on mean 
 Formal Mean Informal 
Mean 
t-statistic Significance  
(2-tailed) 
Highest level of education Diploma/Cert. A level -6.094 0.000 
Years of formal employment 2-5 years 1-2 years -3.106 0.002 





Age of business 9.3years 7.5 years 2.559 0.012 
N-Ach 39 32 -1.873 0.063 
Source: Author’s own table reporting results from the survey 
 
7.3 Descriptive analysis of the factors hindering growth of MSEs in the formal 
and informal sectors. 
Various factors constrain the growth of formal and informal ventures. This section gives a 
comparative analysis of the internal and external factors that impact on the growth of both 
informal and formal enterprises. The growth-hindering factors of the formal sector firms are 
examined first. 
 
7.3.1 Internal factors hindering growth of formal MSEs 
The internal growth inhibiting factors in the surveyed formal sector ventures, as considered 
below, range from access to finance to management skills (figure 26). 
 
Figure 26: Formal sector: Internal factors hindering growth in formal enterprises 
 

























All of the surveyed enterprises acknowledged that the economic meltdown had impacted 
badly on the growth of their businesses. More than 80% of the surveyed formal enterprises 
either agreed or strongly agreed that the main internal factors that are hindering their growth 
are access to technology, access to marketing information, lack of entrepreneurial skills, and 
lack of management skills (figure 26 above). Most businesses were formed without any prior 
entrepreneurial training on the part of the founders, and the owners felt that this could be the 
reason for lack of growth in their businesses. This finding is consistent with previous findings 
which identified that human resource development and adaptation of modern technology are 
necessary for business growth and possessing the skill to initiate a business does not 
necessarily mean that one would be a good manager or entrepreneur (Mahadea and Pillay, 
2008). Although previous studies (Clover and Darroch, 2005) identified access to finance as a 
critical factor for business success and growth, results from the current survey showed that 
access to finance was not a major problem to most of the formal sector entrepreneurs. 
 
21st century technology utilises the internet in marketing, however most of the enterprises 
surveyed were still using cash boxes and old fashioned door signage which does not help with 
marketing their businesses. Von Broembsen, Wood, Herrington, Shay and Sheppers (2005) 
believe that adoption of the latest technology can trigger enormous growth, but many 
businesses fall short because the technology is inaccessible and expensive. In some instances, 
the entrepreneurs are not knowledgeable about modern technological approaches suitable for 
small businesses and how to use them. In the current study too, technology is was found to be 
one of the factors limiting growth in the formal sector. 
 
There are other traits necessary for business growth, like N-Ach (Mahadea, 1994). In the 
current study, the entrepreneurs involved in the formal enterprises had on average a 
significantly higher N-Ach level (39), than those engaged in the informal enterprises, whose 
average N-Ach level was 32, as mentioned earlier. Overall, the results of the growth 
constraints of the formal sector firms in Zimbabwe are to a large extent similar to those in the 





7.3.2 Internal factors hindering the growth of informal MSEs 
 
Figure 27: Informal sector: Internal factors hindering growth 
 
Source: Author’s own figure reporting results from the survey 
 
From the informal sector enterprises, about 50% of the respondents strongly agreed that 
access to finance and access to business premises are the main internal factors that have been 
hindering the growth of their businesses (see figure 27 above). Of the respondents, 20% were 
neutral about access to finance as a constraint, whilst about 12% strongly disagreed. 
Financing a business is ranked among the top five constraints to business development in sub-
Saharan Africa, and most financial institutions do not finance them in the foundation stage as 
they lack collateral and a sound track record (Mahadea, 1997; Clover and Darroch, 2005). 
The surveyed informal enterprises lacked proper recordings of their daily transactions which 
also indicated poor financial management skills. With regard to business premises, some of 
the enterprises were operating from informal structures, and a few rented premises outside the 
CBD area. Unlike the formal entrepreneurs, more than 70% of the informal entrepreneurs 
disagreed or strongly disagreed that lack of entrepreneurial skills, lack of management skills 




























7.3.3 External factors hindering growth of formal MSEs 
The external factors hindering the growth of formal ventures are considered below. 
Figure 28: Formal Sector: External factors hindering growth 
 
Source: Author’s own figure reporting results from the survey 
 
As presented in Fig 28, 80% of the surveyed respondents from the formal sector strongly 
agree that problems with the authorities are among the major external constraints to the 
growth of their business. There are a number of documents required for a formally registered 
business, like a shop license, which involves an expensive, time consuming and cumbersome 
process to acquire. Another 75% agree or strongly agree that high taxes and interest rates 
impact adversely on the growth of their businesses. Crime, political instability, excessive 
competition and late payment from debtors are also among the top possible reasons impeding 
growth of MSEs in the formal sector, and about 50% of the respondents agree to this. Lack of 
clients (42% strongly disagree) and business registration (50% strongly disagree) seem to be 































7.3.4 External factors hindering growth of informal MSEs 
Figure 29: Informal sector: External factors hindering growth  
 
Source: Author’s own figure reporting results from the survey 
 
Contrary to the entrepreneurs in the formal sector, informal sector entrepreneurs indicated 
excessive competition and lack of clients as the two main external factors hindering the 
growth of their MSEs. About 70% of the surveyed informal entrepreneurs strongly agreed or 
agreed that excessive competition is encumbering the growth of their business (see figure 29 
above). As informal sector entrepreneurs do not pay taxes, 90% agreed that taxes and interest 
rates are the least of their problems.29 This finding on tax evasion is consistent with previous 




29 All businesses are required to pay the following 4 taxes: 
1. Provisional tax – 1st quarter 10%, 2nd quarter 25%, 3rd quarter 30% and 4th quarter 35%. 
2. Presumptive tax – some businesses pay it e.g. operators of omnibuses, driving schools, hairdressing 
salons, small scale miners. 
3. Value Added Tax  



























                                                 
7.3.5 Discussion of the descriptive analysis results: internal and external factors 
hindering growth of formal and informal MSEs  
Table 24 below gives a summary of the 3 hypotheses that were tested with regard to the 
similarity and differences between formal and informal MSEs. 
Table 24: Hypotheses test results 
NH5: On average there are no differences between the formal sector 
business owners and informal sector business owners with respect to 
demographic aspects, average educational qualifications and pre-
entrepreneurship employment experience. 
AH5: On average there are differences between the formal sector 
business owners and informal sector business owners with respect to 
demographic aspects, average educational qualifications and pre-
entrepreneurship employment experience. 
Null hypotheses 
was rejected and 
concluded for 
alternative 
NH6: Entrepreneurs running informal enterprises have on average the 
same N-Ach level as those running formal enterprises.  
AH6: Entrepreneurs running informal enterprises have on average a 
lower N-Ach level compared to those running formal enterprises. 
Null hypotheses 
was rejected and 
concluded for 
alternative 
NH7: Factors that influence business growth in the formal sector are 
similar to those in the informal sector. 
AH7: Factors that influence business growth in the formal sector are 









Table 25: Dominant and least dominant internal and external factors 
  Most influencing Least influencing 
Internal factors Formal MSEs - Access to technology 
- Access to market information 
- Lack of entrepreneurial skills 
- Lack of management skills 
- Access to business premises 
- Access to finance 
 
Informal MSEs - Access to finance 
- Access to business premises 
- Finding right employees 
- Access to technology 
- Lack of management skills 
- Lack of market information 
External factors Formal MSEs - Problems with authority 
- High taxes and interest rates 
- Crime 
- Late payment from debtors 
- Business registration problems 
- Lack of clients 
- Gender discrimination 
- Corruption  
Informal MSEs - Excessive competition 
- Lack of clients 
- Gender discrimination 
- Corruption  
- High taxes and interest rates 
- Gender discrimination 
- Crime  
- Problems with business 
registration 




In comparing the formal sector and informal sector MSEs, one can see that the most 
influencing factors in the formal sector were the least influencing in the informal sector and 
vice versa. Among the internal factors, the informal entrepreneurs consider access to finance 
and access to business premises as their main internal growth inhibiting factors. For the 
formal enterprises these are the least inhibiting factors (table 25). Skills development is more 
important for formal entrepreneurs. The same is also observed with external factors, where 
the most influencing factors for formal entrepreneurs are the least influencing for the informal 
entrepreneurs. The findings suggest that there are some growth inhibiting constraints which 
are the most influencing internal and external factors being faced by informal operators, and 
which can be easily addressed by formalizing a business. Further analysis of these growth 
inhibiting factors and their link to formalization follows in the next section. 
 
7.4 Principal Component Analysis of the Factors hindering the growth of 
MSEs  
7.4.1 Principal Component Analysis in the formal sector 
From the descriptive analysis above, it is apparent that the factors that affect business growth 
in the formal sector are different from those in the informal sector. Also, within each sector, 
the internal and external factors do not impact with the same magnitude. Principal component 
analysis was thus used to reduce these factors into smaller manageable clusters to help make 
policy formulation easier, and also to show whether internal or external factors have a greater 
bearing.  
 
Prior to undertaking the principal component factor analysis, the Kaiser-Meyer- Olkin 
(KMO) test of sampling adequacy was applied to determine the suitability of the data for 
factor analysis. As a rule of thumb, if the KMO test result is 0.5 or higher, then the data is 
suitable for factor analysis (Field, 2009). The Bartlett test of sphericity was also applied to 
investigate whether there are relationships between the variables affecting growth of the 






In this study, the KMO measure of sampling adequacy for formal enterprise data was found 
to be 0.5820 and 0.548 for informal enterprise data. For both data sets, the Barlett test values 
were statistically significant with a p-value of 0.000 (full results in appendix pg. 219-226). 
These indicated that the data was suitable for factor analysis. Using Kaiser’s criterion, only 
factors with an Eigenvalue of 1 or more are retained in the analysis. 
 
According to Coakes and Steed (2003), a factor loading of 0.3 or greater makes a significant 
contribution to the component factor. In this study a cut off of 0.4 was used as the sample was 
small. A set of 6 components emerged in this study. The researcher used Cronbach’s alpha to 
confirm the reliability of the measuring instrument. According to Field (2009), an alpha score 
above 0.75 is generally taken to be a good measure of reliability. In this study, the Cronbach’s 
alpha values ranged between 0.933 and 0.7 for almost all factors. 
 
Results of the total variance in growth inhibitors in the formal sector and the component 




Table 26: Growth inhibitors of the formal sector MSEs: Rotated Factor Loadings 
Variables Principal Components (Eigen Values and loading) 




5 (1.258) 6(1.063) 
Lack of 
management skills 




0.894 0.168 0.046 0.058 0.206 0.182 
Lack of 
information 
0.876 0.176 -0.07 0.021 0.104 0.009 
Access to 
technology 
0.868 0.194 0.031 0.312 0.143 0.056 
Finding right 
employees 




0.816 0.301 -0.012 0.208 0.218 0.180 
Access to business 
networks 
0.577 0.272 0.105 0.337 0.367 0.039 
Political instability 0.065 0.84 0.31 0.031 -0.036 -0.062 
Interest rates 0.372 0.773 -0.182 0.063 0.312 0.096 
Taxes 0.495 0.717 -0.107 0.155 0.191 0.125 
Corruption 0.005 0.643 0.32 -0.176 -0.312 0.466 
Crime 0.493 0.618 0.107 0.073 -0.182 -0.253 
Lack of clients 0.086 0.105 0.854 0.246 0.028 -0.074 
Excess competition -0.189 -0.023 0.829 0.02 -0.02 0.304 
Lack of profitable 
markets 
0.35 0.195 0.715 0.167 0.235 -0.234 
Late payments by 
debtors 
0.122 0.035 0.118 0.895 0.058 0.02 
Dollarization 0.08 0.197 0.399 0.725 0.341 0.183 
Gender 
discrimination 
0.529 -0.03 0.111 0.592 -0.404 -0.158 
Access to finance 0.366 0.15 0.141 -0.026 0.719 0.086 
Access to business 
premises 
0.165 -0.229 0.052 0.516 0.7 0.056 
Problems with 
authorities 














Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 




The results in table 26 above show that there are 6 clusters which jointly explain 82.8% of the 
variation in growth constraints in the formal sector. The first cluster accounts for 39.7% of the 
total variation, whilst the second and third clusters explain 13.0% and 11.5% respectively. All 
6 clusters have Eigen values greater than 1. The rotated component matrix was then used to 
eliminate the growth inhibiting questions that were not loading on each of the 6 components. 
The grey boxes in table 27 below show the questions that were loading under each 
component. 
 
The first component is labelled “Entrepreneurial and Managerial skills” and is made up of 
seven internal constraints with loadings from 0.897 to 0.577 (see table 26 and 27). This 
cluster accounts for 39.7% of the variance in growth constraints. The factors in this 
classification are: lack of management skills with a loading of 0.897; lack of entrepreneurial 
training (0.894 loading); lack of marketing information (0.876 loading); finding right 
employees (0.846 loading); business registration process (0.816 loading); and access to 
business networks (0.577 loading). This cluster was tested for reliability and yielded a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of 0.933. 
 
The second set is labelled “Macroeconomic and Governance factors” and is made up of five 
external constraints namely political instability, high interest rates, high taxes, corruption and 
crime. Political instability had the highest loading (0.84) in this cluster. Interest rate and taxes 
are more of economic variables, but the fluctuations in taxes and interest rate can also be 
politically motivated especially in scenarios where the fiscal budget is used to finance 
political activities, as was the case in Zimbabwe during the meltdown (Matandirani, 2011). 
This cluster accounts for 13.0% of the variance (see table 26). Cronbach’s alpha value for this 
cluster is 0.836. 
 
The third cluster is labelled “Market factors” and is comprised of lack of clients (0.854 
loading); excessive competition (0.829 loading); and lack of profitable markets (0.715 
loading). This cluster accounts for 11.5% of the variance. The Cronbach’s alpha for this 
cluster is 0.778, making it a reliable instrument. This cluster is made up of external 




Cluster 4 consists of 3 factors that jointly explained 7.6% of the variance in the growth 
constraints. Late payment by debtors had the largest loading (0.895) in this cluster. The other 
two factors in this cluster were dollarization and gender discrimination. This fourth cluster is 
labelled “Money Supply factors” since all three factors have an influence on cash at hand. 
Gender discrimination is not directly linked to money supply, however some of the 
interviewed entrepreneurs indicated that they felt discriminated against when they were trying 
to access financial assistance, as women were given preference over men. The Cronbach’s 
alpha for this cluster is 0.735.  
 
Table 27: Classification of Cluster groups in formal sector 
Entrepreneurial and Managerial skills  
Lack of management skills Internal 
Lack of entrepreneurial training on start-ups Internal 
Lack of information Internal 
Access to technology Internal 
Finding right employees Internal 
Business registration process External 
Access to business networks Internal 
Macroeconomic and Governance factors  
Political Instability External 
High interest rates External 
High taxes External 
Corruption External 
Crime External 
Marketing Factors  
lack of clients External  
excessive competition External 
lack of profitable markets External 
Money Supply factors  
Late payment by debtors Internal 
Dollarization External 
Gender discrimination External 
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Financial factors  
Access to Finance External 
Access to business premises External 
Regulatory factors  
Problems with authorities External 
Source: Compiled by author based on results of Principal Component Analysis 
 
The fifth cluster is labelled “Financial factors” and has two external factors: access to finance 
with a loading of 0.719; and access to business premises with a loading of 0.7. Access to 
business premises is closely linked to the ability to either rent or buy premises, and this ability 
is measured in monetary or financial terms. This cluster explains 6.0% of the variation. The 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient for this cluster is 0.638, making it not a strongly reliable 
instrument. However, according to Coakes and Steed (2003), an alpha value lower than 0.7 is 
still acceptable. Cluster 6 is named as “Regulation factor”, and it has one external factor, 
namely problems with authorities with a 0.894 loading. This cluster is also not strongly 
reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.611. Nevertheless, the factors in this set 
were relevant to business development and hence were retained in the analysis. 
 
7.4.2 Principal Component Analysis in the Informal Sector 
This section looks at the growth inhibiting constraints in the informal sector. The results of 
total variance in growth constraints are summarised in table 28 below. Like the case of the 
formal sector, the results show that there are also 6 clusters which jointly explain 72.5% of 
the variation in growth constraints in the informal sector. The first cluster accounts for 22.4% 
of the total variation, whilst the second and third clusters explain 16.2% and 12.0% 
respectively. The forth cluster accounts for 8.7% of the variation, whilst the remaining two 
clusters account for 7.0% and 6.2% respectively. All 6 clusters have Eigen values greater than 
1. The rotated component matrix was again used to eliminate the growth inhibiting questions 
that were not loading on each of the 6 components. The grey boxes in table 28 below show 




Table 28: Growth inhibitors of the informal sector MSEs Rotated Factor Loading 
Variables Principal Components (Eigen Values and loading) 
1 (4.707) 2 (3.395) 3 (2.516) 4 (1.825) 5 (1.477) 6(1.299) 
Lack of 
clients 
0.869 0.113 -0.016 -0.017 -0.097 -0.070 
Excessive 
competition 








0.578 -0.067 0.027 0.168 0.393 0.289 
Access to 
finance 
0.566 -0.234 0.290 0.175 0.174 0.081 
High tax 
rates 
-0.186 0.850 0.195 0.028 0.050 0.061 
High interest 
rates 
-0.207 0.816 0.276 0.107 0.082 0.169 








0.250 0.416 0.096 0.329 0.371 -0.270 
Lack of 
information 
























0.056 0.105 -0.017 0.124 0.866 -0.162 




Corruption 0.264 0.141 -0.049 -0.187 0.035 0.836 
Political 
instability 





















Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis 
Source: Compiled by author based on results of Principal Component Analysis 
 
The components for the informal sector are slightly different from those for the formal sector. 
The first set combined two clusters from the formal sector analysis and this component is 
labelled as “Market and Financial Factors”. It is made up of five external questions with 
loadings ranging from 0.869 to 0.566 (table 28 and 29). This cluster accounts for 22.4% of 
the variation in growth constraints. The factors in this classification are: lack of clients, 
excessive competition, and lack of profitable markets, access to business premises and access 
to finance. This cluster was tested for reliability and yielded a Cronbach’s alpha value of 
0.810. 
 
The second set is labelled “Macroeconomic factors” and is made up of three external factors 
and two internal factors. These factors are high taxes, high interest rates, crime, finding the 
right employees and late payment by debtors. Taxes have the highest loading (0.84) in this 
cluster, whilst late payment by debtors has the least loading of 0.416. This cluster accounts 
for 16.2% of the variance (table 28). Cronbach’s alpha value for this cluster was 0.807 
indicating that it is a reliable component. 
 
The third cluster is labelled “Entrepreneurial and Managerial skills” and is comprised of lack 
of marketing information (0.847 loading); lack of entrepreneurial training (0.761 loading); 
and lack of management skills (0.721 loading). This cluster of internal factors accounted for 





Cluster 4 is labelled “Regulation”, with a combination of external factors and an internal 
factor, explained 8.688% of the variation. Access to business networks has the largest loading 
(0.863) in this cluster. The other two factors in this cluster are business registration problems 
and problems with authorities. Since most of the informal enterprises could possibly not have 
all the necessary documentation required when formalising their business, they might need a 
connection through the business network to facilitate this process. The Cronbach’s alpha for 
this cluster equalled 0.787, showing reliability. 
 
Table 29: Classification of the principal components in the informal sector 
Market and Financial factors  
Lack of clients External 
Excessive competition External 
Lack of profitable markets External 
Access to business premises External 
Access to Finance External 
Macroeconomic Factors  
High taxes External 
High interest rates External 
Crime External 
Finding right employees Internal 
Late payment by debtors Internal 
Entrepreneurial  and Managerial Skills  
Lack of information Internal 
Lack of entrepreneurial training on start-ups Internal 
Lack of management skills Internal 
Regulation  
Access to business networks Internal 
Business registration process External 
Problems with authorities External 
Technology  
Gender discrimination External 




Political Instability External 
Corruption External 
Source: Compiled by author based on results of Principal Component Analysis 
 
The fifth cluster consists of one internal factor and one external factor. The factors are gender 
discrimination (0.866 loading) and access to technology (0.856 loading). Since these factors 
are not linked, technology and gender discrimination were called a hybrid net. This 
component is reliable with a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.806. The two factors explain 7.035% of 
the variation. Cluster six is made up of two external factors namely political instability and 
corruption. The two explain 6.2% of the variation. Political instability has a loading of 0.836 
whilst corruption has a loading of 0.820. This component is labelled “Governance” and is 
reliable as shown by the Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of 0.695. 
 
7.4.3 Discussion of the Principal Component Analysis results 
From the analysis above it is apparent that the key growth inhibiting factors in the informal 
sector are different from those in the formal sector. This is consistent with the initial findings 
in the earlier section on descriptive analysis. In the formal sector, ‘Entrepreneurial and 
Managerial skills’ cluster and ‘Macroeconomic factors’ cluster are perceived as the most 
growth impeding factors is shown by their loading, whilst ‘Market and Financial factors’  and 
Regulatory factors’ clusters are the least impeding. From the informal sector, the most 
impeding are perceived as ‘Market and Financial factors’ and the least impeding are 
‘Governance and Technology factors’. Formal MSEs believe that internal factors affect the 
growth of their businesses more than external factors and can benefit more from policies that 
target them as individuals. On the contrary, informal MSEs can benefit more from macro 
policies as they regard the external factors as constraining growth of their businesses more 
than the internal factors. The external factors pointed out by informal MSEs as key 
constraints are the least concern for the formal MSEs as they are automatically covered by 
formalisation. For example, a registered enterprise can easily access financial support and 
hence can afford to rent favourable business premises in profitable areas because they have 




Once the external factors are addressed the next perceived constraints for the informal MSEs 
are ‘Macroeconomic factors’ and ‘Entrepreneurial and Managerial skills’. These are 
consistent with the first two constraints of the formal MSEs. One possible way to address the 
major constraints faced by MSEs in the informal sector is to encourage them to formalise as 
this is the only way they can get access to productive resources and also utilise the public 
services and infrastructure that is available to formal enterprises (Ishengoma and Kappel, 
2006). Before engaging on this policy, it is ideal to have a perspective on the willingness of 
the MSEs in the informal sector to formalise, and analyse the extent to which the growth 
constraints they are facing impact on their willingness to formalise.  
 
The two hypotheses (8 and 9) that tested the influence of internal and external factors on 
growth of formal and informal sectors were both rejected (see table 30 below) 
 
Table 30: Hypotheses testing results 
NH8: There are no differences between internal and external factors 
with respect to their influence on growth of formal sector businesses. 
AH8: Internal factors have a greater influence on the growth of formal 





NH9: There are no differences between internal and external factors 
with respect to their influence on growth of informal sector businesses. 
AH9: External factors have a greater influence on the growth of 





Source: Author’s own compilation 
 
7.5  Willingness to formalise by informal entrepreneurs  
7.5.1 Logistic Regression Results 
This section reports result of the logistic regression modelling the relationship between the 
willingness to formalise by informal MSEs and the 6 growth inhibiting clusters that were 
generated from the principal component analysis, ranging from market and financial to 
governance factors (see table 31). A component score for each principal component was 
automatically generated (by clicking on the following commands, score, save as variables, 
regression) from the factor analysis using SPSS (full data set in appendix after pg. 229). This 
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score is a predicted component score for each observation (total of 88) and is automatically 
saved for each observation in the main dataset. 
 
The logistic model also included the N-Ach variable, which is an important factor for 
business growth and success, as discussed earlier in section 3.3.2. The dependent variable 
(willingness to formalise) is dichotomous, assuming value 1 if the entrepreneur is willing to 
formalise, or 0 if not willing to formalise. Of the sampled 88 entrepreneurs from the informal 
sector, 60.2% reported that they were not willing to formalise their business. 
 
Table 31: Logistic regression output of willingness to Formalise by Informal MSEs 
              
Predictor β SE β Wald's  df p Exp (β) 
      χ2     
odds 
ratio 
Constant 2.071 1.028 4.061 1 0.044 N/A 
Market and Financial -3.241 0.922 12.348 1 0.000 0.039 
Macroeconomic -0.200 0.549 0.133 1 0.716 0.819 
Entrepreneurial and 
Mang. -4.092 1.286 10.122 1 0.001 0.017 
Regulations 2.373 0.954 6.187 1 0.013 10.729 
Technology 2.736 1.049 6.804 1 0.009 15.433 
Governance -0.542 0.500 1.175 1 0.278 0.581 
N-Ach -0.115 0.037 9.433 1 0.002 0.892 
 








              
Overall model evaluation 




3.629 1 0.05   
  
     
  
Goodness of fit  




83.836 7 0.000   
Hosmer and Lemshow 
  




              
Pseudo R-squared 
     
  
Cox and Snell 
 
0.614 





   
  
  





   
  
          
Note:  
N/A means not applicable 
    
  
All statistics reported herein use 3 decimal places in order to maintain statistical 
precision. 
Bolded values means statistically significant at 1% level of significance   
Source: Compiled by author based on the output of the logistic model analysis 
 
A direct logistic regression model was fitted to test the hypothesis that the likelihood of 
informal entrepreneurs formalising their business is positively related to the improvement in 
the growth constraints and N-Ach, as indicated below. The logistic analysis was carried out 
by the logistic procedure in IBM SPSS Statistics 22. The results showed that 
 
Predicted log of (WILL FORMALISE) = 2.071 + (-3.241)* MKT and FINANCIAL + (-
0.200) MACROECONOMIC + (-4.092)* ENTR. and MANG. SKILLS + 2.373* 
REGULATIONS + 2.736 TECHNOLOGY + (-0.542) GOVERNANCE + (-0.115) N-Ach 
            
Note: * means statistically significant 
According to the model, the odds of an informal entrepreneur willing to formalise his/her 
enterprise is positively and significantly related to Regulations (β=2.373) and Technology 
(β=2.736) clusters. Market and financial cluster (β=-3.241), entrepreneurial and managerial 
skills cluster (β=-4.092), and N-Ach (β=-0.115) are also significantly related to the 
willingness to business formalisation but the association is in a negative mode. Governance 





The logistic results seem to indicate that a 1% increase/ improvement in removal of the 
Regulation cluster (that is, access to business networks, improvement in business registration 
process and reduction in problems with authorities) may increase the odds of willing to 
formalise by informal entrepreneurs by 10.8% holding all other things constant. Improvement 
in the technology constraints is also associated with a positive impact as it increases the odd 
of formalising by 15.4% for a unit increase. The rest of the growth constraints as well as N-
Ach do not increase the odds of formalising but rather cements their roots in the informal 
sector. Improvement in market and financial cluster variables, entrepreneurial and managerial 
skills cluster variables, and N-Ach will decrease the odds of willing to formalise by less than 
1 unit for every unit improvement.  
 
7.5.2 Evaluation of the Logistic Regression Model 
The Wald test indicates that five composite variables in the model are significant predictors 
of the willingness to formalise outcome. These are market and financial cluster that has a 
Wald statistic (which has a chi-square distribution) of 12.348, entrepreneurial and managerial 
skills cluster (Wald statistic 10.122), regulations cluster (Wald statistic 6.187), technology 
cluster (Wald statistic 6.804) and N-Ach (Wald statistic 9.433) (see table 31 above). The 
Omnibus ‘goodness of fit’ test had a chi-square value of 83.836 with 7 degrees of freedom at 
0.00 significance value. This implies that the model is better than the SPSS original guess that 
assumes that everyone would report not willing to formalise. The result is supported by the 
Hosmer and Lemeshow test which also shows that the model is a good fit (the significance 
value is greater than 0.05, in this model it is 0.277). The Pseudo R-squared statistics given by 
the Cox and Snell and the Nagelkerke R Square values show that between 61.4% and 83.1% 
of the variability is explained by the set of predictors in the model. 
 
Table 32: The Observed and Predicted Frequencies for Willingness for formalize by 
Logistic Regression with the cutoff of 0.50 
        
  Predicted   
Observed Yes  No % correct 
Yes 32 3 91.4 
No 4 49 92.5 
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Sensitivity= 32/(32+3)%= 91.4% 
 
  




False positive = 4/(4+32)%= 11.1%   
False negative = 3/(3+49)%=  5.8%   
        
 
An assessment of the predicted probability is shown in table 31 above. The table shows that, 
with the cut off set at 0.5, the prediction for informal entrepreneurs who are willing to 
formalise was 91.4% accurate and for those not willing to formalise was 92.5% accurate. 
These values are supported by both the sensitivity and specificity values30. The false positive 
and false negative measures of misspecification are below 12%. The overall correction 
prediction was 92%, an improvement from 60.2% in the null model which predicted everyone 
as not willing to formalise.  
 
7.5.3 Discussion of the Logistic Regression Results 
 
Table 32: Hypotheses test results 
NH10: The level of the entrepreneur’s N-Ach has a positive impact on 
the formalisation propensity of the MSEs in the informal sector. 
AH10: The level of the entrepreneur’s N-Ach has a negative impact on 
the formalisation propensity of MSEs in the informal sector. 
Fail to reject the 
null hypotheses 
NH11: Improving the growth constraints will improve the odds of 
informal sector entrepreneurs formalising their businesses. 
AN11: Improving the growth constraints will not improve the odds of 
the informal sector entrepreneurs formalising their businesses. 
Fail to reject the 
null hypotheses 
Source: Author’s own compilation 
Logistic regression analysis was used to test null hypotheses 10 and 11 and based on the 
results reported above, we fail to reject the two hypotheses (see table 32 above). The main 
30 Sensitivity measures the proportion of correctly classified events 
Specificity measures the proportion of correctly classified non-events. 
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findings of the logistic analysis are that improvements in the business registration cluster 
constraints and technology cluster constraints can positively increase the odds of informal 
entrepreneurs’ willingness to formalise their enterprises. This finding is consistent with what 
is already in the literature (Gerxhani, 2004; Newadi and Pietersen, 2008; Ishengoma and 
Kappel, 2006; Baloyi, 2010; Hove and Tarisai, 2013). The growth of the informal sector has 
been attributed to the bureaucracy that exists around the registration processes as well as the 
stringent requirements. Relaxing some of these requirements will increase the willingness by 
the informal entrepreneurs to formalise their businesses. Technology in the modern era is 
crucial for access to information and its absence was found to affect the growth and survival 
of micro and small businesses, hence drive entrepreneurs into the informal sector where the 
cost of information is minimal (Baloyi, 2010).  
 
The improvements in other growth constraints like access to finance and entrepreneurial skills 
was found to reduce the odds of willingness to formalise, and this finding diverge from the 
initial findings in the literature. Lack of access to finance and lack of financial management 
skills are regarded as the key factors contributing to business failure as well as 
informalisation. The same result was found for N-Ach. This result suggests that as much as 
access to finance, improvement in entrepreneurial skills and improvement in N-Ach can 
trigger the growth of the MSEs, the same improvements will only encourage them to stay in 
the informal sector which does not bring a financial benefit the economy through taxation. 
This has been the case in Zimbabwe where a Fund was introduced in 2010, as indicated in 
Chapter 2, to help the informal entrepreneurs grow their businesses and encourage them to 
formalise. However, the country faces still a huge challenge of trying to eradicate the 
informal sector. Many businesses have been operating in the informal sector for years and 
still would rather remain there despite benefiting from the programs being administered by 
the government. The absence of the rule of law makes them unaccountable to anyone and the 
resistance to formalise could also be an indication of loss of confidence in the government. 
The results could possibly be improved further by including other factors like need for 
autonomy, need for power and market awareness. However these factors could not be 





The aim of this chapter was to give a comparative analysis between the entrepreneurs and 
MSEs in the formal and the informal sectors. Demographic aspects show that formal sector 
entrepreneurs are more educated than informal entrepreneurs, and have more years of formal 
employment experience prior to opening their businesses. They also have a higher N-Ach 
making the formation of their business opportunity driven, whereas most of the informal 
enterprises were formed out of a necessity to survive. Business growth in the formal sector is 
mainly constrained by internal factors relating to entrepreneurial and management skills’ 
development. Informal sector business growth is mainly constrained by external factors 
which are a combination of market and financial factors. Addressing these constraints in the 
two sectors is likely to boost business growth. Unwillingness to formalise by informal 
entrepreneurs is a result of the bureaucracy associated with the registration process as well as 
a lack of access to technology. Improving these two factors may increase the odds of the 





CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction  
This chapter summarises the study and provides conclusions and policy implications of the 
importance of formal and informal sector MSEs, in Zimbabwe’s recovery from the effects of 
the economic meltdown experienced during the period 1997 to 2008. The chapter will start 
with a synthesis of the findings of the study followed by a section on recommendations. The 
next section will look at possible areas for further research and then close with a conclusion. 
8.2 Synthesis 
There were two main objectives for this study. The first was to establish the relationship 
between growth in MSEs and economic meltdown by identifying the sources of the refugee 
effect. Empirical evidence shows that there is ambiguity when measuring the refugee effect 
from unemployment, although there is strong evidence of entrepreneurship being used as a 
survival platform. This study tested the refugee effect using five macro-economic variables as 
proxies for economic meltdown. These variables were unemployment, inflation, real GDP, 
and real money supply. The relationship between growth in the number MSEs and the macro-
economic variables was modelled in 2 Vector Error Correction Models (VECMs). Four 
hypotheses were tested and after running the VECMs the four null hypotheses were rejected 
and the study concluded for the alternative hypotheses (see hypotheses 1-4 on pages 104-
106). This implies that there is support for a positive relationship between growth in MSEs 
and the macroeconomic variables associated with economic meltdown. 
 
The second main objective of the study was to investigate how the existing MSEs in both the 
formal and informal sectors can be assisted to ensure that they contribute to the economic 
recovery of the Zimbabwean economy, post the meltdown and subsequently contribute to 
economic growth. Coming from a period of economic and political instability, the economy is 
not experiencing sufficient growth, not generating enough income and cannot generate 
sufficient formal work to accommodate the huge percentage of the labour force that is 
unemployed. To answer this second objective a comparative study of the enterprises in the 
formal sector to those in the informal sector was conducted. A comparative analysis of their 




With many MSEs in Zimbabwe operating in the informal sector, the study investigated what 
these existing businesses (which have already survived through difficult times especially 
during the period 1997 to 2008) need to grow as well as factors influencing their willingness 
to formalise. Evidence from previous research identifies a link between the informal sector 
and formal sector, where the informal sector is used as a training ground into the formal 
sector (Newadi and Pietersen, 2008). As it is important for policies to be put in place to 
facilitate the transmission from the informal to formal sector, this study tested the impact of 
the perceived growth inhibiting factors on the willingness by the informal sector 
entrepreneurs to formalise their businesses. 
 
To answer the first objective, a VECM was used to test the relationship between growth in 
MSEs and inflation, real GDP, real money supply and unemployment using time series data 
from 1980-2010. Inflation, real GDP, real money supply and unemployment were used as 
proxies for economic meltdown. A structural break dummy, a chaos period dummy and a 
melting down period dummy were also included in the model. The structural break dummy in 
1999 was necessary as it captured the year when the opposition party MDC was formed, 
which began a period of political instability in the country. The first draft constitutional 
referendum was also presented in 1999, and this was also the year when inflation rose above 
50%, commencing the period of hyperinflation, leading to the meltdown. In this study, 1999 
was used as the official onset date of the economic meltdown. 
 
The study focused on an abnormal situation when the Zimbabwean economy experienced 
economic meltdown. Most studies in the literature were done under normal economic 
conditions hence some of the findings of this study could not be supported by literature. The 
first results that were reported where on the findings of the regression analysis which showed 
that entrepreneurial growth in the formal sector of Zimbabwe can be best explained by 
inflation, real money supply and unemployment. Positive refugee effects were found with 
respect to unemployment, but a stronger relationship was found with money supply. 
Unemployment increased entrepreneurial activity and the positive relationship intensified as 
unemployment grew. The results from the regression analysis showed that the need for 
survival was emanating more from the need for hard currency (as shown by the money supply 
coefficient) than from unemployment. The collapse of the system and loss of confidence of 
the government to provide for its citizens pushed people into looking for alternative ways of 
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making a living for themselves. With money being the medium of exchange in all trading 
activities, its shortage or absence was a huge blow as it meant people were not be able to 
purchase their basic needs, like food. The objective, post meltdown, is to restore the 
confidence of the people by ensuring that everyone has financial stability. Creating new jobs 
for the more than 90% of the population that is presently unemployed cannot be easily done, 
but the solution could be to utilize the already established formal and informal MSEs.  The 
large adjustment to shock period of between 4 to 10 years was identified as a lag that 
represents a possible loss of confidence in the system by the entrepreneurs. Most of the 
entrepreneurs are reluctant to leave their businesses even if they are not growing as they are 
still not sure if the government will create jobs for them.  
 
The study then did a survey of 150 formal and informal MSEs, using judgmental sampling, 
from 3 cluster areas in Harare, namely; a high density area, an industrial area and the CBD 
and a low density area. Although some informal entrepreneurial activity was found in each 
area, formal enterprises were mostly located in the CBD and low density areas. Informal 
MSEs were mostly located in the high density area. A questionnaire with both closed and 
open-ended questions was administered to the 88 informal and 62 formal sector MSEs. Data 
was analyzed using descriptive, principal component and logistic regression analyses.  
 
A comparative analysis was done of the entrepreneurs and their businesses in the formal 
sector with those in the informal sector, firstly through descriptive analysis of their 
characteristics and secondly through principal component analysis of the factors hindering 
their growth (see hypotheses 5-9 on pages127-128). From the analysis, the null hypotheses 5-
9 were all rejected and the study thus concluded for the alternative hypotheses. The results 
showed that the formal sector entrepreneurs have a comparative advantage over informal 
sector entrepreneurs. The formal entrepreneurs have a higher level of education (Diploma or 
certificate), on average had more years of formal employment experience (2-5 years) prior to 
starting their business and on average a higher eagerness to succeed (N-Ach=39) relative to 
their counterparts in the informal sector (N-Ach=32). These characteristics make the formal 
sector businesses appear more organized, so they can easily attract support from the 
government and other supporting bodies. In many African countries, policy makers use these 
formal sector businesses as benchmarks for all entrepreneurship policies (in the formal and 
informal sectors), and laws that cut across the board (common laws) have always been passed 
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based on information gathered from the formal enterprises. Characterizing the MSEs and 
entrepreneurs in the two sectors in Zimbabwe showed that they are not similar, hence their 
requirements will not necessarily be the same.  
 
From the Principal Component analysis of the factors hindering the growth of businesses in 
the two sectors, the main finding was that the problems faced by formal entrepreneurs are 
different to those faced by informal sector entrepreneurs. ‘Common laws’ for the two sectors 
do not necessarily address the growth constraints faced by informal entrepreneurs. Informal 
entrepreneurs identified external factors as their main challenge, whilst formal entrepreneurs 
identified internal factors as their main growth constraint. For the formal sector, the 
‘Entrepreneurial and Managerial skills’ cluster, that included factors such as, a lack of 
management skills (loading 0.897), lack of entrepreneurial training (loading 0.894) and 
access to technology (loading 0.868) were identified as the main growth constraints. On the 
other hand, ‘Market and Financial’ cluster with factors such as, lack of clients (loading 
0.869), excessive competition (loading 0.831), access to business premises (loading 0.578), 
and access to finance (loading 0.566) were identified as the main growth constraints for 
informal sector entrepreneurs.  
 
Following the economic meltdown, the Zimbabwean government introduced a new Ministry 
in 2010 that catered for MSEs from both the formal and informal sector. The Ministry also 
developed a Fund to cater for the financial needs of the MSEs. The long term goal of the 
Ministry is to develop and grow the MSEs and make them viable enough to contribute to the 
economic recovery process. The study then tested whether prioritizing improvements in 
access to finance for MSEs, for example, through the creation of a Fund, would encourage the 
informal entrepreneurs to formalize their businesses and contribute to the formal economy. 
To answer the question, the study examined the relationship between the growth constraint 
clusters generated through principal component analysis and the willingness by the informal 
sector entrepreneurs to formalize their businesses using a logistic regression model (see 
hypotheses 10-11 on page 129-130). The analysis showed that improving the ‘Regulation 
cluster’ (odds ratio 10.729) as well as ‘technology cluster’ (odds ratio 15.433) would increase 
the odds of the informal sector entrepreneur’s willingness to formalize. These two composite 
clusters representing a stringent regulatory system and poor information technology also 
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represented the main reasons identified in the literature for informalisation (Ishengoma and 
Kappel, 2006; Newadi and Pietersen, 2008; Baloyi, 2010; Hove and Tarisai, 2013).  
 
The other growth constraints (‘market and financial’ and ‘entrepreneurial and managerial 
skills’ constraints) showed a negative relationship with willingness to formalize and N-Ach, 
thus rejecting null hypothesis 10. Improving the other growth constraints and N-Ach will 
discourage the informal firms from formalising. The results showed that if the informal firms 
are helped in overcoming the financial and skill development constraints, their businesses 
may grow, and the odds of them willing to formalize may decrease. The recently formed 
Fund, which was developed to help MSEs financially might help the MSEs to grow but may 
discourage them from formalising their businesses, according to the results of the odds ratios. 
In order for the economy to benefit from the MSEs in the informal sector, there is a need to 
address factors that affect their willingness to formalize and once they have formalized, their 
growth constraints are likely to be similar to those who are already in the formal sector. 
Hence common laws around improving financial constraints, developing entrepreneurial and 
managerial skills and enhancing the N-Ach can be employed for all MSEs.  
 
8.3 Recommendations 
This study provided insights on the development and the relationship between MSEs in the 
informal sector and those in the formal sector in Zimbabwe. The findings show that growth in 
MSEs in the informal sector between 1980 and 2010, was closely related to the need for 
immediate survival. Before the economic meltdown, MSEs were growing at a steady rate but 
during the crisis they started growing steeply being escalated by the failure of money supply 
to match the ever increasing inflation which created a shortage of cash in the economy. 
Entrepreneurship was thus used as a money sourcing channel and provided a survival 
platform for many of the citizens who were out of formal work. It was a refugee survival 
mechanism. Following the economic meltdown, most of these MSEs are still operational, and 





Policy Recommendation 1: The meltdown as experienced in Zimbabwe should be avoided 
through prudent alignment of the monetary policy and controlling the growth of the money 
supply and inflation. 
  
The macroeconomic analysis showed that entrepreneurial activity was partly a result of a 
shortage of liquidity for transactionary purposes during a period of high inflation when the 
local currency was not functioning effectively and there was a thriving black market and 
other hard currencies gradually supplementing the local currency. When the economy failed 
to provide adequate currency for its people, people engaged in income generating activities to 
meet their survival needs, hence an accelerated development of necessity entrepreneurship in 
the informal sector.  Post the meltdown, these informal sector businesses are still thriving and 
the further growth of this sector can be controlled by ensuring that money supply is correctly 
aligned with inflation in an expanding economy.  
 
Policy recommendation 2: Need to regain the confidence of the people of Zimbabwe by 
addressing their needs and follow up on any promises made by the government with regard to 
the growth of formal sectors businesses. 
 
The second finding from the macro analysis was the huge response lag to a shock which was 
identified to contribute to a measure of loss of confidence by the entrepreneurs in the 
government and its institutions. Going forward, policy makers need to work on regaining the 
confidence of the entrepreneurs, especially the formal ones and ensuring that finance for the 
growth of their activities are available. Priority should be placed on changing the mind-set of 
these entrepreneurs through bringing in interventions and incentives which target their 
specific needs in their sectors of operation.  These interventions include offering training and 
mentorship programs on entrepreneurial and managerial skills development. There is a need 
to show the formal entrepreneurs that the government listens to their problems, is committed 
to address them and it values the presence of MSEs in the country. 
 
Policy Recommendation 3: Address the specific needs of the informal sector entrepreneurs 





As much as the Zimbabwean government recognises the existence of informal MSEs, unlike 
in pre-meltdown situation, there is a need to consider the differences in the characteristics, 
needs and priorities of the MSEs in the formal and informal sectors. From the micro level 
analysis, the study revealed that the formal sector entrepreneurs have different characteristics, 
growth constraints and entrepreneurial dynamics, from those of informal sector entrepreneurs. 
It is evident that a common approach will not work when addressing issues pertaining to 
micro and small-scale entrepreneurial development. Currently in Zimbabwe there is no 
distinction between an established company and a start-up company or a small firm and a big 
firm in the two sectors, in terms of regulatory requirements. For instance, there are no tax 
brackets and licensing and presumptive tax requirements are standard for every business. 
Also, all businesses operate under the same minimum wage requirement, without taking into 
consideration the size or age of the business. These are some of the issues around the 
regulatory framework which discourage informal MSEs from formalising, and should be 
addressed to make it more flexible to facilitate their transition to the formal sector.   
Deregulation or easing of regulations and greater access to information technology will assist 
the growth and development of informal entrepreneurs greatly.  
 
An analysis of the willingness to formalise by the informal entrepreneurs revealed that there 
are factors which discourage the informal entrepreneurs from formalising and some which 
encourage them to. The policy maker’s focus has to be on improving the registration and 
regulatory system which is presently too restrictive. As much as access to finance and 
technology and enhancing the operators’ need achievement levels, are crucial for the growth 
of the informal entrepreneurs, priority has to be placed on creating a favourable environment 
that makes it easier for them to register their businesses without regulatory fears 
 
8.4 Areas for further research 
This study focused on identifying the role of micro and small-scale entrepreneurial activity in 
the Zimbabwean economy and how informal enterprises can be embraced into the formal 
sector. The main challenge for the study was lack of data hence a smaller sample was used. A 
nationwide study can improve the results with better pointers for policies. Further research is 
also needed on how to incentivise the informal entrepreneurs to formalise their businesses. It 
is critical for the country to prioritise and accelerate the formalisation process as many 
productive resources are being produced in the underground economy and not being properly 
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channelled into the economy. Informal enterprises constitute a greater percentage of the micro 
and small-scale enterprises and their contribution to the economy is yet to be realised. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
Flourishing MSE entrepreneurship is critical for individual and national propensity in a 
society. This is more so in the case of Zimbabwe as it has experienced a meltdown in the past 
two decades, with disastrous conditions to people’s welfare there. Living conditions can only 
improve when there is more growth, development, investment and employment creation in 
Zimbabwe. This turnaround cannot happen unless the micro and macro environments as well 
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Yr Tonnes Tonnes Tonnes Tonnes Tonnes 
1980 1,548,739 154,593 97,853 161,753 120,107 
1981 2,833,395 183,516 72,881 170,594 69,421 
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1985 2,826,110 174,294 86,825 284,960 107,957 
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SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC ASPECTS 
1. Age       ……………. 
 
2. Gender     ……………. 
 
3. Marital Status     ……………. 
 
For questions 4-9 tick the relevant box 
4. Are you the owner of the business?     
 
5. Is this a family business or non-family?    
 
6. Are you renting or owning business premises? 
 









 1-Yes    
2- No   
1- Yes   
2- No   
1-Yes    
 2-No   
1-Yes    




9. What is your highest level of education attained? 
 Tick 
Never went to school  
Primary Education  
Secondary Education- up to O’Level  
Secondary Education- up to A’Level  
Diploma or Certificate  
1st Degree  
Honours degree  
Masters degree  
Doctoral degree  
Others (please specify)  
 




11. How many years of formal working experience did you have prior to opening the 
business? 
 Tick 
Never worked  
Less than 1 year  
1-2 yrs  
2-5 yrs  
More than 5  
 
12. Is your working experience related to the type of business you are doing? 
 
 
13. If you were formally employed, what were the reasons for leaving formal 
employment? (Can tick more than one). 
 Tick 
Laid off  
Business closed  
Contract ended  
Pay too low  
To be independent  
Retired   
Illness or injury  
Others (specify)  
 
14. Was the reason for starting your business opportunity or necessity drive?  
1-Yes    
 2-No   
1-Yes    
 2-No   





SECTION B: THE ENTERPRISE 
15. When was your business established? (indicate year)  ……………….. 
16. What type of business ownership do you have? Tick applicable 
 Tick 
Sole proprietorship (individual)  
Partnership  
Others (specify)  
 
17. What is the legal status of your enterprise? Tick applicable 
 
 


















21. In the light of the constraints, what do you think the government should do to ensure 





22. If in the informal sector, are you willing to move to the formal sector?  
 Tick 
1- Yes  
 2-Necessity   
1-Formal   
 2-Informal   
195 
 
2- No  
 





24. What sector is your business in? Tick applicable 
 Tick 
Retail/ Manufacturing  
Service  
Construction  
Others (specify)  
 













28. Indicate your current average earnings per month   
 ……………… 
 
29. Indicate your current average expenses per month   
 ……………… 
 
30. Is your business site permanent? 
 
 
31. Indicate the reasons for starting your enterprise. (tick applicable) 
 tick 
1. Fired or laid off  
2. No other work  
3. To be independent  
1-Female   
 2-Male   
1-Female   
 2-Male   
1-Yes   
 2-No   
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4. Family tradition  
5. Complement family income  
6. Higher pay than salary  
7. Saw an opportunity  
8. To survive financially  
9. Self achievement  
10. Flexible hours  
 
32. What was your initial source of funds for the start-up business? (tick applicable) 
 tick 
Personal savings  
Family savings  
Loan from family/ friend  
Loan from bank  
Loan from informal institutions  
Government support  
Cooperative   
Others (specify)  
 




34. If your answer to above is No, how did you manage to keep your business running 







SECTION C: ENTREPRENEURIAL DYNAMICS 
35. Is your business growing 
 
 





1-Yes   
 2-No   
1-Yes   
 2-No   
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37. If your answer to 35 above is no, to what extent do you agree or disagree that the 
following factors have influenced the status of your business and are also hindering 
the growth of your enterprise. 
5 – Point scale 
1= strongly agree; 2 = agree; 3 = agree in some cases; 4 = do not agree; 5 = 
strongly disagree 
 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Access to finance 
     
2. Lack of information / advice on 
how to start an enterprise      
3. Access to business networks 
     
4. Lack of entrepreneurial training 
     
5. Lack of profitable markets 
     
6. Gender discrimination (one 
gender is favoured)      
7. Access to business premises 
     
8. Access to technology 
     
9. Finding the right employees 
     
10. Lack of clients 
     
11. Lack of management skills 
     
12. Business registration process 
     
13. Problems with authorities 
(ZIMRA and municipality)      
14. Excessive competition 
     
15. Late payment if using credit 
facility      
16. The Dollarization 
     
17. Taxes 
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18. Interest Rates 
     
19. Crime 
     
20. Political Instability 
     
Any other barriers to growth (please specify) 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
     
 
     
38. Do you think the government recognizes the existence of micro and small-scale 
enterprises? 
 






40. Do you know of any government programmes that support MSEs? 
 




42. If your answer to above question is yes, in what way have you benefited? (tick 
applicable) 
 Tick 
Capital for business  
Business advice through mentoring programs  
Assistance with provision of premises  
Assistance with business plan  





1-Yes   
 2-No   
1-Yes   
 2-No   
1-Yes   




SECTION D: ENTEPRENEUR PROFILE 
For the following questions, indicate for each item, the extent for owner’s agreement or 
disagreement for that item by entering the appropriate numeral (+4 to -4) in space provided 
by each item. +4   =  very strong  agreement,+3  = strong agreement,+2 = moderate 
agreement,+1 = slight agreement,0 = neither agreement or disagreement,-1 = slight 








2. I would rather work on a task where I alone am responsible for  the final product than 
one in which many people contribute to the final product(+) 
(…
….) 




4. I would rather do something that I feel confident and relaxed that something, which is 
challenging and difficult. (-) 
(…
….) 
5. If I am not good at something I would keep struggling to master it than move to 
something I may be good at. (+) 
(…
….) 
6. I would rather have a job in which my role is clearly defined by others and my 
rewards could higher than average than a job in which my role is to be defined by me 
and my rewards are average. (-) 
(…
….) 
7. I would prefer a well written informative book to a good movie. (+)  




8. I would prefer a job, which is important, difficult, and involves 50% chance of failure 
to a job which is somewhat important but not difficult. (+) 
(…
….) 
9. I would rather learn fun games that most people know than learn unusual skill game, 
which only a few people would know. (-) 
(…
….) 
10. It very important to me to do my work as well as I can even if it means not getting 
along well with my co-workers. (+) 
(…
…) 
11. For me, the pain of getting turned down after a job interview is greater than the 
pleasure of getting hired. (-) 
(…
….) 




13. I prefer competitive situations in which l have superior ability to those to which every 
involved is about equal in ability. (-) 
(…
….) 
14. I think more of the future than the present and past. (+) 
(…
….) 




16. In my spare time l would rather learn a game to develop skills than for recreation. (+) 
(…
…) 
17. I would rather run my own business and face 50% chance of bankruptcy than work for 
another firm. (+) 
(…
….) 
18. I would rather take a job in which the starting salary US$10,000 and could stay that 
way for some time than a job in which the starting salary is US$5,000 and there is a 





19. I would rather play in a team game than compete with just one person. (-) 
(…
….) 
20. The thing that is most important for me about learning to play a musical instrument is 




21. I prefer multiple choice questions on exams than essay questions. (-) 
(…
….) 
22. I would rather work on commission which is somewhat risky but where I would have 
the possibility of making more than working on a fixed salary. (+) 
(…
….) 




24. I would rather wait one or two years and have my parents buy me one great gift than 
have them buy me several average gifts over the same period of time. (+) 
(…
….) 
25. If I were to learn one or two incomplete tasks l would rather return to the difficult than 
the easy one. (+) 
(…
….) 





1. I think more about getting a good grade than l worry about getting a bad grade (-) 
(…
….) 
2. I more often attempt difficult task that am not sure a can do than easier tasks I believe 





3. I would rather do something that l feel confident and relaxed that something, which is 
challenging and difficult. (-) 
(…
….) 
4. If I am not good at something I would keep struggling to master it than move to 
something I may be good at. (+) 
(…
….) 
5. I would rather have a job in which my  job is clearly defined by others and my 
rewards could  higher than average than a job in which my role is to be defined by me 
and my rewards  are average. (-)   
(…
….) 
6. My strongest feelings are aroused more by fear of failure than by hope of success. (-) 
(…
….) 
7. I would prefer a well written informative book to a good movie. (+) 
(…
….) 
8. I would prefer a job which is important, difficult and involves 50% chance of failure 
to a job which is somewhat important but not difficult. (+) 
(…
….) 
9. I would rather learn fun games that most people know than unusual skill game, which 
only a few people would know. (-) 
(…
….) 
10. It very important to me to do my work as well as l can even if it means not getting 
along well with my co-workers. (+) 
(…
….) 
11. For me the pain of getting turned down after a job interview is greater than the 
pleasure of getting hired. (-) 
(…
….) 




13. I prefer competitive situations in which l have superior ability to those to which every 





14. I think more of the future than the present and past. (+) 
(…
….) 
15. I am more unhappy about doing something badly than I am about doing something 
well. (-)  
(…
….) 
16. I worry more about whether people will praise my work than I do about whether they 
will criticize it. (+) 
(…
….) 
17. If I had to spend my money myself I would rather have an exceptional meal out than 
spend less and prepare an exceptional meal at home. (-) 
(…
….) 
18. I would rather do a paper on my own than take a test. (+) 
(…
….) 
19. I would rather share in the decision making process of a group than take total 
responsibility for directing the group’s activities. (-) 
(…
….) 
20. I would rather try to make new and interesting meals that may turn out badly than 
more familiar meals that frequently turn out well. (+) 
(…
….) 
21. I would rather do something I enjoy than do something do something that I think is 
worthwhile but not much fun. (-) 
(…
….) 
22. I would rather try to get two or three things done quickly than spend all my time 
working on one project. (-) 
(…
….) 
23. If I am ill and must stay home, I use time to relax and recuperate rather than try to 
read or work. (-) 
(…
….) 
24. If we are rooming with a number of girls and we decide to have a party, I would rather 





25. I would rather cook for couple of gourmet eaters than for a couple who simply have 
huge appetites. (+) 
(…
….) 
26. I would rather have that our women’s group be allowed to help organize city projects 







Testing for stationarity in INFLAT 
. pperron inflat in 1/27 
 
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        26 
                                                   Newey-West lags =         2 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(rho)           29.273           -17.268           -12.532           -10.220 
 Z(t)              5.656            -3.743            -2.997            -2.629 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 1.0000 
 
. pperron dinfl in 1/27 
 
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        25 
                                                   Newey-West lags =         2 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(rho)          -18.798           -17.200           -12.500           -10.200 
 Z(t)             -1.520            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.5236 
 
. dfuller inflat in 1/27, lags(0) 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        26 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)              1.838            -3.743            -2.997            -2.629 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9984 
 
. dfuller dinfl in 1/27, lags(0) 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        25 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -2.329            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.1627 
 
. kpss inflat in 1/27, notrend 
  
KPSS test for inflat 
  
Maxlag = 8 chosen by Schwert criterion 
Autocovariances weighted by Bartlett kernel 
  
Critical values for H0: inflat is level stationary 
  
10%: 0.347  5% : 0.463  2.5%: 0.574  1% : 0.739 
  
Lag order    Test statistic 
    0           .978 
    1           .732 
    2           .598 
    3           .501 
    4           .449 
    5           .418 
    6           .398 
    7           .385 




. kpss dinfl in 1/27, notrend 
  
KPSS test for dinfl 
  
Maxlag = 8 chosen by Schwert criterion 
Autocovariances weighted by Bartlett kernel 
  
Critical values for H0: dinfl is level stationary 
  
10%: 0.347  5% : 0.463  2.5%: 0.574  1% : 0.739 
  
Lag order    Test statistic 
    0           .403 
    1           .418 
    2           .487 
    3           .443 
    4           .409 
    5           .389 
    6           .378 
    7           .369 
    8           .363 
 
Testing for stationarity in UNEMP 
. pperron unemp 
 
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        28 
                                                   Newey-West lags =         3 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(rho)            1.090           -17.404           -12.596           -10.260 
 Z(t)              1.397            -3.730            -2.992            -2.626 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9971 
 
. pperron dunemp 
 
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        25 
                                                   Newey-West lags =         2 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(rho)          -28.079           -17.200           -12.500           -10.200 
 Z(t)             -5.203            -3.750            -3.000            -2.630 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
. dfuller unemp in 1/29, lags(0) 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        28 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)              1.022            -3.730            -2.992            -2.626 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9945 
 
. dfuller dunemp in 1/29, lags(0) 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        25 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 




MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0000 
 
. kpss unemp, notrend 
  
KPSS test for unemp 
  
Maxlag = 8 chosen by Schwert criterion 
Autocovariances weighted by Bartlett kernel 
  
Critical values for H0: unemp is level stationary 
  
10%: 0.347  5% : 0.463  2.5%: 0.574  1% : 0.739 
  
Lag order    Test statistic 
    0           2.72 
    1           1.42 
    2           .983 
    3           .766 
    4           .637 
    5           .554 
    6           .496 
    7           .455 
    8           .425 
 
. kpss dunemp, notrend 
  
KPSS test for dunemp 
  
Maxlag = 8 chosen by Schwert criterion 
Autocovariances weighted by Bartlett kernel 
  
Critical values for H0: dunemp is level stationary 
  
10%: 0.347  5% : 0.463  2.5%: 0.574  1% : 0.739 
  
Lag order    Test statistic 
    0           .617 
    1             .7 
    2           .726 
    3           .623 
    4           .531 
    5           .486 
    6           .458 
    7           .421 
    8             .4 
 
 
Testing for stationarity in GDP 
.  pperron gdp 
 
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        28 
                                                   Newey-West lags =         3 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(rho)          -26.175           -17.404           -12.596           -10.260 
 Z(t)             -4.258           -3.730            -2.992            -2.626 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0005 
 
 
. dfuller gdp, lags(0) 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        28 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)             -5.189            -3.736            -2.994            -2.628 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 





. kpss gdp, notrend 
  
KPSS test for gdp 
  
Maxlag = 8 chosen by Schwert criterion 
Autocovariances weighted by Bartlett kernel 
  
Critical values for H0: gdp is level stationary 
  
10%: 0.347  5% : 0.463  2.5%: 0.574  1% : 0.739 
  
Lag order    Test statistic 
    0          .0843 
    1           .105 
    2           .219 
    3           .316 
    4           .299 
    5           .286 
    6           .326 
    7           .351 
    8            .37 
 
 
Testing for stationarity in MSE 
. pperron mse 
 
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        27 
                                                   Newey-West lags =         2 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(rho)            1.519           -17.336           -12.564           -10.240 
 Z(t)              0.532            -3.736            -2.994            -2.628 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9858 
 
. pperron D.mse 
 
Phillips-Perron test for unit root                 Number of obs   =        26 
                                                   Newey-West lags =         2 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(rho)          -19.092           -17.268           -12.532           -10.220 
 Z(t)             -3.350            -3.743            -2.997            -2.629 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0128 
 
 
. dfuller mse in 1/28, lags(0) 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        27 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 
               Statistic           Value             Value             Value 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 Z(t)              0.939            -3.736            -2.994            -2.628 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.9936 
 
. dfuller D.mse in 1/28, lags(0) 
 
Dickey-Fuller test for unit root                   Number of obs   =        26 
 
                               ---------- Interpolated Dickey-Fuller --------- 
                  Test         1% Critical       5% Critical      10% Critical 




 Z(t)             -3.345            -3.743            -2.997            -2.629 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
MacKinnon approximate p-value for Z(t) = 0.0130 
 
 
. kpss mse in 1/28, notrend 
  
KPSS test for lmse 
  
Maxlag = 8 chosen by Schwert criterion 
Autocovariances weighted by Bartlett kernel 
  
Critical values for H0: mse is level stationary 
  
10%: 0.347  5% : 0.463  2.5%: 0.574  1% : 0.739 
  
Lag order    Test statistic 
    0           1.26 
    1           .743 
    2           .564 
    3           .476 
    4           .426 
    5           .399 
    6           .386 
    7            .38 
    8           .379 
 
. kpss dmse in 1/28, notrend 
  
KPSS test for D.mse 
  
Maxlag = 8 chosen by Schwert criterion 
Autocovariances weighted by Bartlett kernel 
  
Critical values for H0: D.mse is level stationary 
  
10%: 0.347  5% : 0.463  2.5%: 0.574  1% : 0.739 
  
Lag order    Test statistic 
    0           .429 
    1           .352 
    2           .307 
    3           .283 
    4           .251 
    5           .223 
    6           .209 
    7           .201 
    8           .199 
 
Testing the order of the VAR 
. varsoc lmse lmsupply unemp inflat, maxlag(2) exog(d1 d2 s1) 
 
 Selection-order criteria 
 Sample:  1982 - 2010                         Number of obs      =        29 
 +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 lag     LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
 ----+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 0  -824.916                      1.8e+20   57.9942   58.2305   58.7486   
 1  -729.545  190.74   16  0.000  8.0e+17   52.5203   52.9929*  54.0291*  
 2  -711.061  36.969*  16  0.002  7.9e+17*   52.349*  53.0578   54.6121   
 +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 Endogenous:  lmse lmsupply unemp inflat 
 Exogenous:  d1 d2 s1  _cons 
 
. varsoc lmse lmsupply unemp inflat, maxlag(3) exog(d1 d2 s1) 
 
 Selection-order criteria 




 lag     LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
 ----+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 0  -798.129                      2.1e+20   58.1521   58.3848   58.9133   
 1  -702.994  190.27   16  0.000  7.9e+17   52.4996    52.965   54.0221*  
 2  -686.651  32.686   16  0.008  9.2e+17   52.4751   53.1732   54.7588   
 3  -662.402  48.499*  16  0.000  7.5e+17*  51.8858*  52.8167*  54.9309   
 +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 Endogenous:  lmse lmsupply unemp inflat 
 Exogenous:  d1 d2 s1  _cons 
 
. varsoc lmse lmsupply unemp rgdp, maxlag(2) exog(d1 d2 s1) 
 
 Selection-order criteria 
 Sample:  1982 - 2010                         Number of obs      =        29 
 +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 lag     LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
 ----+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 0  -689.871                      1.6e+16   48.6807    48.917   49.4351   
 1  -595.653  188.43   16  0.000  7.8e+13*  43.2864*  43.7589*  44.7952*  
 2   -581.53  28.246*  16  0.030  1.0e+14   43.4159   44.1246    45.679   
 +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 Endogenous:  lmse lmsupply unemp rgdp 
 Exogenous:  d1 d2 s1  _cons 
 
. varsoc lmse lmsupply unemp rgdp, maxlag(3) exog(d1 d2 s1) 
 
 Selection-order criteria 
 Sample:  1983 - 2010                         Number of obs      =        28 
 +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 lag     LL      LR      df    p      FPE       AIC      HQIC      SBIC     
 ----+---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 0  -665.563                      1.6e+16   48.6831   48.9158   49.4443   
 1   -575.87  179.39   16  0.000  9.0e+13   43.4193   43.8847   44.9418*  
 2  -562.396  26.947   16  0.042  1.3e+14   43.5997   44.2979   45.8835   
 3  -529.207  66.378*  16  0.000  5.5e+13*  42.3719*  43.3028*   45.417   
 +---------------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
 Endogenous:  lmse lmsupply unemp rgdp 
 Exogenous:  d1 d2 s1  _cons 
 
Testing for cointegration 
. vecrank lmse lmsupply inflat unemp, trend(constant) lags(1) sindicators(d1 d2 s1) 
 
Johansen tests for cointegration                         
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =      30 
Sample:  1981 - 2010                                             Lags =       1 
 
5% 
maximum                                      trace    critical 
rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value 
0      16     -810.82124           .    115.1161    47.21 
1      23     -766.12485     0.94919     25.7233*   29.68 
2      28     -756.81171     0.46253      7.0971    15.41 
3      31     -753.30422     0.20851      0.0821     3.76 
4      32     -753.26318     0.00273 
 
 
. vecrank lmse lmsupply rgdp unemp, trend(constant) lags(1) sindicators(d1 d2 s1) 
 
Johansen tests for cointegration                         
Trend: constant                                         Number of obs =      30 





maximum                                      trace    critical 
rank    parms       LL       eigenvalue  statistic    value 
0      16     -643.32309           .     56.9394    47.21 
1      23     -627.64853     0.64830     25.5903*   29.68 
2      28     -621.67571     0.32846     13.6447    15.41 
3      31     -616.10986     0.31000      2.5130     3.76 
4      32     -614.85338     0.08035 
VECM with inflation 
. vec lmse lmsupply inflat unemp, trend(constant) lags(1) sindicators(d1 d2 s1) 
 
Vector error-correction model 
 
Sample:  1981 - 2010                               No. of obs      =        30 
AIC             =  52.60832 
Log likelihood = -766.1248                         HQIC            =  52.95199 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  1.79e+17                         SBIC            =  53.68257 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
 
D_lmse                5     .158466   0.8983   220.8338   0.0000 
D_lmsupply            5     .454423   0.0585   1.554373   0.9067 
D_inflat              5     2.3e+09   0.6545   47.35755   0.0000 




Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
D_lmse        
_ce1  
L1.   -.0956335   .0072311   -13.23   0.000    -.1098061   -.0814609 
              
d1   -.0431814   .0737871    -0.59   0.558    -.1878014    .1014387 
d2    .3536915   .1120597     3.16   0.002     .1340585    .5733245 
s1    .0963324   .1713313     0.56   0.574    -.2394708    .4321357 
_cons    .0239799   .0363785     0.66   0.510    -.0473207    .0952804 
 
D_lmsupply    
_ce1  
L1.   -.0068168   .0207361    -0.33   0.742    -.0474588    .0338252 
              
d1    .0890302   .2115948     0.42   0.674    -.3256879    .5037483 
d2    .0950453   .3213468     0.30   0.767    -.5347827    .7248734 
s1   -.2932792   .4913163    -0.60   0.551    -1.256242    .6696831 
_cons     .027409   .1043204     0.26   0.793    -.1770552    .2318733 
 
D_inflat      
_ce1  
L1.    6.15e+08   1.06e+08     5.79   0.000     4.06e+08    8.23e+08 
              
d1    8.64e+08   1.08e+09     0.80   0.425    -1.26e+09    2.99e+09 
d2    4.78e+09   1.65e+09     2.90   0.004     1.55e+09    8.00e+09 
s1   -6.46e+08   2.52e+09    -0.26   0.798    -5.58e+09    4.29e+09 
_cons     -2.6956   5.34e+08    -0.00   1.000    -1.05e+09    1.05e+09 
 
D_unemp       
_ce1  
L1.    .1188065   .2212809     0.54   0.591    -.3148961    .5525091 
              
d1    2.031668   2.257988     0.90   0.368    -2.393906    6.457243 
d2    -.645662   3.429182    -0.19   0.851    -7.366735    6.075411 
212 
 
s1    6.875212   5.242975     1.31   0.190    -3.400831    17.15125 





Equation           Parms    chi2     P>chi2 
 
_ce1                  2   16.01349   0.0003 
 
 
Identification:  beta is exactly identified 
 
Johansen normalization restriction imposed 
 
beta       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
_ce1          
lmse           1          .        .       .            .           . 
lmsupply    -.944935   .4329318    -2.18   0.029    -1.793466   -.0964042 
inflat   -1.55e-09   9.36e-11   -16.58   0.000    -1.74e-09   -1.37e-09 
unemp   -.0291059   .0145736    -2.00   0.046    -.0576698   -.0005421 
_cons    11.51053          .        .       .            .           . 
 
 
VECM with real GDP 
. vec lmse lmsupply rgdp unemp, trend(constant) lags(1) sindicators(d1 d2 s1) 
 
Vector error-correction model 
 
Sample:  1981 - 2010                               No. of obs      =        30 
AIC             =  43.37657 
Log likelihood = -627.6485                         HQIC            =  43.72023 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  1.75e+13                         SBIC            =  44.45082 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
 
D_lmse                5      .34809   0.5093   25.94846   0.0001 
D_lmsupply            5     .404276   0.2549   8.550631   0.1284 
D_rgdp                5     1.1e+07   0.3880   15.85136   0.0073 




Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
D_lmse        
_ce1  
L1.   -.3351616   .0826845    -4.05   0.000    -.4972203   -.1731029 
              
d1    -.498657   .2008276    -2.48   0.013    -.8922719    -.105042 
d2   -.0969741   .2718254    -0.36   0.721    -.6297422    .4357939 
s1    .7380851   .4181951     1.76   0.078    -.0815623    1.557733 
_cons    .6094112    .140989     4.32   0.000     .3330778    .8857447 
 
D_lmsupply    
_ce1  
L1.    .2490012   .0960309     2.59   0.010     .0607841    .4372184 
              
d1    .4481717   .2332439     1.92   0.055     -.008978    .9053214 
d2    .4436243   .3157017     1.41   0.160    -.1751397    1.062388 
s1   -.8518418   .4856975    -1.75   0.079    -1.803791    .1001077 




D_rgdp        
_ce1  
L1.     3693582    2586085     1.43   0.153     -1375052     8762216 
              
d1   -1.16e+07    6281191    -1.84   0.065    -2.39e+07    723656.9 
d2    1.09e+07    8501756     1.28   0.202     -5811288    2.75e+07 
s1    -9478669   1.31e+07    -0.72   0.469    -3.51e+07    1.62e+07 
_cons    -.000031    4409648    -0.00   1.000     -8642750     8642750 
 
D_unemp       
_ce1  
L1.    .1711824   1.158004     0.15   0.882    -2.098463    2.440828 
              
d1    2.245652   2.812607     0.80   0.425    -3.266957    7.758261 
d2   -.4278555   3.806937    -0.11   0.911    -7.889315    7.033604 
s1    6.620924   5.856856     1.13   0.258    -4.858303    18.10015 





Equation           Parms    chi2     P>chi2 
 
_ce1                  3    152.892   0.0000 
 
 
Identification:  beta is exactly identified 
 
Johansen normalization restriction imposed 
 
beta       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
_ce1          
lmse           1          .        .       .            .           . 
lmsupply   -1.257284   .2671694    -4.71   0.000    -1.780926   -.7336417 
rgdp    1.43e-08   5.38e-09     2.67   0.008     3.81e-09    2.49e-08 
unemp     -.04864   .0074483    -6.53   0.000    -.0632384   -.0340415 
_cons    19.07043          .        .       .            .           . 
 
VECM with inflation and unemployment squared 
. vec lmse lmsupply inflat unemp unemp2, trend(constant) lags(1) sindicators(d1 d2 s1) 
 
Vector error-correction model 
 
Sample:  1981 - 2010                               No. of obs      =        30 
AIC             =  66.81501 
Log likelihood = -973.2252                         HQIC            =  67.24833 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  1.04e+22                         SBIC            =   68.1695 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
 
D_lmse                5     .155381   0.9022   230.6923   0.0000 
D_lmsupply            5     .455138   0.0556   1.471089   0.9164 
D_inflat              5     2.4e+09   0.6434    45.1072   0.0000 
D_unemp               5     4.80884   0.3750   15.00006   0.0104 




Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
D_lmse        
_ce1  
L1.    -.213786   .0158067   -13.53   0.000    -.2447665   -.1828054 
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d1   -.1821504    .073341    -2.48   0.013    -.3258961   -.0384046 
d2    .2845445   .1100551     2.59   0.010     .0688404    .5002485 
s1    .1993747   .1685038     1.18   0.237    -.1308868    .5296361 
_cons    .0223477   .0356927     0.63   0.531    -.0476088    .0923042 
 
D_lmsupply    
_ce1  
L1.   -.0079283   .0463004    -0.17   0.864    -.0986755    .0828189 
              
d1    .0847482   .2148283     0.39   0.693    -.3363075    .5058039 
d2    .0930592   .3223701     0.29   0.773    -.5387746     .724893 
s1   -.2928927   .4935763    -0.59   0.553    -1.260285    .6744991 
_cons    .0310729   .1045501     0.30   0.766    -.1738415    .2359873 
 
D_inflat      
_ce1  
L1.    1.35e+09   2.41e+08     5.63   0.000     8.82e+08    1.83e+09 
              
d1    1.74e+09   1.12e+09     1.56   0.119    -4.46e+08    3.93e+09 
d2    5.21e+09   1.67e+09     3.11   0.002     1.93e+09    8.49e+09 
s1   -1.29e+09   2.56e+09    -0.50   0.615    -6.31e+09    3.74e+09 
_cons    .2983696   5.43e+08     0.00   1.000    -1.06e+09    1.06e+09 
 
D_unemp       
_ce1  
L1.    .4137559    .489196     0.85   0.398    -.5450507    1.372562 
              
d1    2.318293   2.269809     1.02   0.307     -2.13045    6.767036 
d2   -.5001184   3.406062    -0.15   0.883    -7.175877     6.17564 
s1     6.60617   5.214973     1.27   0.205    -3.614989    16.82733 
_cons    2.213951   1.104644     2.00   0.045     .0488896    4.379013 
 
D_unemp2      
_ce1  
L1.    55.41933   63.19518     0.88   0.381    -68.44094    179.2796 
              
d1    319.1328   293.2177     1.09   0.276    -255.5634     893.829 
d2    58.30782   440.0009     0.13   0.895    -804.0781    920.6937 
s1    374.2495   673.6791     0.56   0.579    -946.1373    1694.636 





Equation           Parms    chi2     P>chi2 
 
_ce1                  3   82.70499   0.0000 
 
 
Identification:  beta is exactly identified 
 
Johansen normalization restriction imposed 
 
beta       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
_ce1          
lmse           1          .        .       .            .           . 
lmsupply   -.3910223   .1806411    -2.16   0.030    -.7450723   -.0369723 
inflat   -6.53e-10   3.73e-11   -17.50   0.000    -7.26e-10   -5.80e-10 
unemp   -.0008137   .0166534    -0.05   0.961    -.0334539    .0318264 
unemp2   -.0004139   .0002011    -2.06   0.040     -.000808   -.0000197 





VECM with real GDP and unemployment squared 
. vec lmse lmsupply rgdp unemp unemp2, trend(constant) lags(1) sindicators(d1 d2 s1) 
 
Vector error-correction model 
 
Sample:  1981 - 2010                               No. of obs      =        30 
AIC             =  56.95098 
Log likelihood = -825.2647                         HQIC            =  57.38429 
Det(Sigma_ml)  =  5.39e+17                         SBIC            =  58.30547 
 
Equation           Parms      RMSE     R-sq      chi2     P>chi2 
 
D_lmse                5     .441627   0.2102   6.652133   0.2478 
D_lmsupply            5     .454652   0.0576   1.527721   0.9098 
D_rgdp                5     1.1e+07   0.3390   12.82426   0.0251 
D_unemp               5     4.11641   0.5420   29.58887   0.0000 




Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
D_lmse        
_ce1  
L1.   -.1394355   .1621741    -0.86   0.390    -.4572908    .1784198 
              
d1    -.176634   .2764638    -0.64   0.523     -.718493     .365225 
d2     .340553   .3142267     1.08   0.278      -.27532    .9564259 
s1   -.0139817   .4771496    -0.03   0.977    -.9491777    .9212143 
_cons   -.7929135   1.081305    -0.73   0.463    -2.912232    1.326405 
 
D_lmsupply    
_ce1  
L1.    .0480618    .166957     0.29   0.773    -.2791679    .3752915 
              
d1    .1456335   .2846174     0.51   0.609    -.4122063    .7034732 
d2    .1066071    .323494     0.33   0.742    -.5274294    .7406437 
s1   -.2970386   .4912219    -0.60   0.545    -1.259816    .6657387 
_cons    .3542881   1.113195     0.32   0.750    -1.827534    2.536111 
 
D_rgdp        
_ce1  
L1.   -790901.1    4154836    -0.19   0.849     -8934231     7352429 
              
d1   -1.78e+07    7082894    -2.51   0.012    -3.17e+07    -3906997 
d2     5528619    8050365     0.69   0.492    -1.02e+07    2.13e+07 
s1    -1355350   1.22e+07    -0.11   0.912    -2.53e+07    2.26e+07 
_cons     8.00862   2.77e+07     0.00   1.000    -5.43e+07    5.43e+07 
 
D_unemp       
_ce1  
L1.    4.802659   1.511627     3.18   0.001     1.839924    7.765393 
              
d1    7.474609   2.576923     2.90   0.004     2.423933    12.52529 
d2    .3682349   2.928912     0.13   0.900    -5.372327    6.108797 
s1    7.339814   4.447519     1.65   0.099    -1.377163    16.05679 
_cons    33.88818   10.07886     3.36   0.001     14.13398    53.64238 
 
D_unemp2      
_ce1  
L1.    962.6802   128.7262     7.48   0.000     710.3816    1214.979 
              
d1    1373.871   219.4439     6.26   0.000     943.7686    1803.973 
d2    243.4433   249.4184     0.98   0.329    -245.4078    732.2943 
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s1    495.1149   378.7389     1.31   0.191    -247.1998     1237.43 





Equation           Parms    chi2     P>chi2 
 
_ce1                  4   268.0698   0.0000 
 
 
Identification:  beta is exactly identified 
 
Johansen normalization restriction imposed 
 
beta       Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>z     [95% Conf. Interval] 
 
_ce1          
lmse           1          .        .       .            .           . 
lmsupply    .3777686   .1086928     3.48   0.001     .1647347    .5908025 
rgdp   -2.42e-08   3.86e-09    -6.26   0.000    -3.18e-08   -1.66e-08 
unemp    .1436506   .0184034     7.81   0.000     .1075807    .1797206 
unemp2   -.0020672    .000222    -9.31   0.000    -.0025023   -.0016322 
























Factor Analysis Formal MSEs 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .582 





Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance 
1 8.330 39.669 39.669 8.330 39.669 
2 2.722 12.963 52.632 2.722 12.963 
3 2.405 11.455 64.086 2.405 11.455 
4 1.603 7.634 71.720 1.603 7.634 
5 1.258 5.991 77.712 1.258 5.991 
6 1.063 5.064 82.776 1.063 5.064 
7 .640 3.046 85.822   
8 .563 2.679 88.501   
9 .504 2.398 90.899   
10 .365 1.736 92.635   
11 .340 1.620 94.254   
12 .265 1.263 95.517   
13 .238 1.135 96.652   
14 .213 1.014 97.666   
15 .149 .710 98.376   
16 .101 .479 98.855   
17 .089 .425 99.280   
18 .067 .318 99.598   
19 .043 .203 99.801   
20 .031 .146 99.947   
21 .011 .053 100.000   
 







Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
LakMngtSk .897 .039 .091 .102 .046 -.123 
LakEntreTran .894 .168 .046 .058 .206 .182 
LackInfo .876 .176 -.070 .021 .104 .009 
AcssTech .868 .194 .031 .312 .143 .056 
RitEmpl .846 .120 .067 -.035 .032 .195 
BizRegPros .816 .301 -.012 .208 .218 .180 
AcssBizNet .577 .272 .105 .337 .367 .039 
PolInstab .065 .840 .310 .031 -.036 -.062 
IntRates .372 .773 -.182 .063 .312 .096 
Taxes .495 .717 -.107 .155 .191 .125 
Corruptn .005 .643 .320 -.176 -.312 .466 
Crime .493 .618 .107 .073 -.182 -.253 
LakClients .086 .105 .854 .246 .028 -.074 
ExComp -.189 -.023 .829 .020 -.020 .304 
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LakProfMkts .350 .195 .715 .167 .235 -.234 
LatPayCred .122 .035 .118 .895 .058 .020 
Dollazn .080 .197 .399 .725 .341 .183 
GendDiscr .529 -.030 .111 .592 -.404 -.158 
AccFinac .366 .150 .141 -.026 .719 .086 
AcssBizPrem .165 -.229 .052 .516 .700 .056 
ProbAuth .277 .022 .016 .110 .151 .894 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.a 
a. Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 .812 .397 .165 .299 .236 .102 
2 -.368 -.021 .788 .475 .126 .050 
3 -.175 .770 .246 -.422 -.362 .082 
4 -.235 .120 -.149 -.167 .622 .703 
5 .340 -.484 .433 -.448 -.280 .429 
6 -.056 .038 -.286 .528 -.577 .550 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
AccFinac .008 .007 .076 -.190 .451 -.052 
LackInfo .191 -.052 -.017 -.094 -.020 -.030 
AcssBizNet .034 .045 -.011 .070 .141 -.035 
LakEntreTran .184 -.077 .029 -.103 .020 .082 
LakProfMkts .054 -.014 .330 -.109 .137 -.245 
GendDiscr .122 -.083 -.020 .326 -.404 -.051 
AcssBizPrem -.055 -.095 -.034 .162 .366 -.016 
AcssTech .149 -.040 -.024 .062 -.044 .008 
RitEmpl .210 -.105 .058 -.132 -.082 .113 
LakClients .012 -.039 .375 -.018 -.012 -.090 
LakMngtSk .225 -.125 .069 -.080 -.061 -.116 
BizRegPros .118 .012 -.045 .013 .017 .082 
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ProbAuth .026 -.083 -.037 .046 -.057 .643 
ExComp -.016 -.087 .389 -.097 -.033 .201 
LatPayCred -.089 .032 -.101 .500 -.115 .038 
Dollazn -.125 .072 .044 .323 .094 .095 
Taxes -.031 .267 -.139 .063 .058 .026 
IntRates -.077 .321 -.170 .020 .173 -.014 
Crime .051 .207 .006 .012 -.137 -.214 
PolInstab -.106 .348 .064 .003 -.003 -.106 
Corruptn -.044 .215 .101 -.060 -.227 .326 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
 Component Scores. 
 
 
Component Score Covariance Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
2 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
3 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 
4 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 
5 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 
6 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.   


















Factor Analysis Informal MSEs 
 
 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .548 





Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance 
1 4.707 22.415 22.415 3.198 15.228 
2 3.395 16.168 38.583 2.825 13.454 
3 2.516 11.980 50.562 2.586 12.312 
4 1.825 8.688 59.251 2.514 11.971 
5 1.477 7.035 66.286 2.343 11.159 
6 1.299 6.186 72.472 1.753 8.348 
7 .984 4.687 77.158   
8 .908 4.325 81.484   
9 .789 3.756 85.240   
10 .713 3.396 88.637   
11 .542 2.583 91.220   
12 .375 1.788 93.007   
13 .340 1.620 94.628   
14 .276 1.313 95.940   
15 .217 1.035 96.975   
16 .187 .891 97.866   
17 .182 .865 98.731   
18 .111 .526 99.257   
19 .076 .362 99.620   
20 .053 .251 99.871   
21 .027 .129 100.000   





Rotated Component Matrixa 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
LakClients .869 .113 -.016 -.017 -.097 -.070 
ExComp .831 -.251 .112 .069 -.015 .135 
LakProfMkts .646 -.065 .147 .296 .063 .079 
AcssBizPrem .578 -.067 .027 .168 .393 .289 
AccFinac .566 -.234 .290 .175 .174 .081 
Taxes -.186 .850 .195 .028 .050 .061 
IntRates -.207 .816 .276 .107 .082 .169 
Crime .061 .747 -.091 .012 -.054 .106 
RitEmpl -.247 .517 .415 .354 .288 .123 
LackInfo .189 .004 .847 .057 .049 .066 
LakEntreTran .327 .195 .761 -.146 .015 -.074 
LakMngtSk -.006 .227 .721 .183 -.013 .118 
Dollazn .442 .412 -.512 .126 .283 -.006 
AcssBizNet .162 .039 -.024 .863 .291 .028 
BizRegPros .115 .150 -.039 .843 .363 -.072 
ProbAuth .217 .021 .189 .678 -.353 .091 
223 
 
GendDiscr .056 .105 -.017 .124 .866 -.162 
AcssTech .046 -.028 .037 .143 .856 .289 
LatPayCred .199 .347 .128 .366 .376 -.235 
Corruptn .264 .141 -.049 -.187 .035 .836 
PolInstab .004 .190 .186 .175 .020 .820 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.a 
a. Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
 
 
Component Transformation Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 .474 .362 .360 .534 .426 .218 
2 -.704 .682 .194 -.005 .029 .036 
3 .184 -.007 .722 -.321 -.532 .242 
4 .276 .385 -.473 -.422 -.018 .611 
5 .258 .394 -.276 .365 -.669 -.346 
6 .320 .317 .106 -.548 .294 -.631 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
 
Component Score Coefficient Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
AccFinac .141 -.103 .111 .009 .059 .006 
LackInfo .019 -.064 .349 -.043 .035 -.024 
AcssBizNet -.041 -.061 -.060 .382 -.006 .022 
LakEntreTran .129 .071 .309 -.174 .031 -.143 
LakProfMkts .187 -.013 .021 .077 -.041 -.003 
GendDiscr -.008 -.004 .015 -.101 .423 -.132 
AcssBizPrem .145 -.042 -.020 -.025 .147 .129 
AcssTech -.071 -.110 .022 -.065 .416 .162 
RitEmpl -.121 .101 .130 .099 .078 .032 
LakClients .349 .151 -.053 -.094 -.097 -.131 
LakMngtSk -.041 .011 .273 .043 -.030 .018 
BizRegPros -.039 -.011 -.064 .353 .031 -.048 
ProbAuth .013 -.026 .014 .381 -.307 .055 
ExComp .261 -.052 .020 -.028 -.042 .029 
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LatPayCred .068 .123 .024 .062 .110 -.202 
Dollazn .202 .233 -.270 -.035 .057 -.056 
Taxes -.004 .318 .018 -.055 -.024 -.037 
IntRates -.039 .275 .047 -.015 -.017 .034 
Crime .093 .327 -.113 -.045 -.092 -.003 
PolInstab -.082 -.027 .008 .088 -.045 .491 
Corruptn .056 .026 -.081 -.113 .006 .482 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.  
 Component Scores. 
 
 
Component Score Covariance Matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
2 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 
3 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 .000 
4 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 .000 
5 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .000 
6 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.   
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.   


















Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Casesa N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 88 100.0 
Missing Cases 0 .0 
Total 88 100.0 
Unselected Cases 0 .0 
Total 88 100.0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number of 
cases. 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 





Iteration -2 Log likelihood 
Coefficients 
Constant 
Step 0 1 118.287 -.409 
2 118.286 -.415 
3 118.286 -.415 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. Initial -2 Log Likelihood: 118.286 
c. Estimation terminated at iteration number 3 








 WilFormal Percentage 
Correct  0 1 
Step 0 WilFormal 0 53 0 100.0 
1 35 0 .0 
Overall Percentage   60.2 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is .500 
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Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant -.415 .218 3.629 1 .057 .660 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables FAC1_1 12.777 1 .000 
FAC2_1 6.619 1 .010 
FAC3_1 9.855 1 .002 
FAC4_1 10.959 1 .001 
FAC5_1 7.391 1 .007 
FAC6_1 .140 1 .708 
nach .325 1 .569 
Overall Statistics 54.324 7 .000 
 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 83.836 7 .000 
Block 83.836 7 .000 




Step -2 Log likelihood 




1 34.450a .614 .831 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 8 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than .001. 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 












 WilFormal Percentage 
Correct  0 1 
Step 1 WilFormal 0 49 4 92.5 
1 3 32 91.4 
Overall Percentage   92.0 
a. The cut value is .500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 








FAC1_1 -3.241 .922 12.348 1 .000 .039 .006 .239 
FAC2_1 -.200 .549 .133 1 .716 .819 .279 2.403 
FAC3_1 -4.092 1.286 10.122 1 .001 .017 .001 .208 
FAC4_1 2.373 .954 6.187 1 .013 10.729 1.654 69.600 
FAC5_1 2.736 1.049 6.804 1 .009 15.433 1.974 120.631 
FAC6_1 -.542 .500 1.175 1 .278 .581 .218 1.550 
nach -.115 .037 9.433 1 .002 .892 .829 .959 
Constant 2.071 1.028 4.061 1 .044 7.935   







Predicted Predicted Group 
Temporary Variable 
WilFormal Resid ZResid 
2 S 1** .017 0 .983 7.535 
17 S 1** .159 0 .841 2.304 
25 S 0** .763 1 -.763 -1.793 
54 S 1** .163 0 .837 2.263 
a. S = Selected, U = Unselected cases, and ** = Misclassified cases. 
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